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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
This article examines the complementary hypotheses that voting blocs can exist in small cities as well as large cities, and that voting blocs can develop and exist in non-partisan councils. In this respect the study compares the council voting patterns of two Alberta cities—Calgary and Grande Prairie—over the period of one council term, from 1983 to 1986. Well-defined voting blocs, revealed through Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis, are found in both councils. Moreover, discriminant analysis reveals that, contrary to previous research on bloc formation in partisan councils, bloc composition can be generally attributed to the interplay of the councillor background attributes.
Cet article examine deux hypothèses complèmentaires, à l'effet que le vote aligné (voting blocs) peut exister dans les petites aussi bien que dans les grandes villes et peut se développer et exister dans les conseils de ville non partisans. L'étude compare les types de votes dans les conseils de deux villes albertaines—Calgary et Grande Prairie—durant un mandat, de 1983 à 1986. Une analyse de groupe (cluster bloc analysis), telle qu'élaborée par Rice-Beyle, fait apparaître clairement l'existence de votes alignés dans les deux conseils de ville. De plus, une analyse discriminante contredit les recherches précédentes sur les votes alignés dans les conseils de ville, en montrant que ces alignements sont généralement attribuables à la composition des caractéristiques d'origine du conseiller.
1 See, for example, Kay, Barry, “Decision-Making Patterns in an Urban Legislature: An Issue, Time and System Level Study of Toronto City Council” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1976)Google Scholar; Kay, Barry and Wichern, Philip H. Jr., “Legislative Decision-Making in Two Canadian Cities: Toronto and Winnipeg Compared,”paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,Saskatoon, 1979Google Scholar; Kay, Barry J., “A Model of Non-Partisan Legislative Bargaining and the Impact of Toronto Council's Partisanization 1967–72,”paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,Toronto, 1974Google Scholar; and Masson, Jack K., “Decision-Making Patterns and Floating Coalitions in an Urban City Council,” this Journal 8 (1975), 128–137Google Scholar.
2 Kay, Barry J., “Urban Decision-Making and the Legislative Environment: Toronto Council Re-examined,” this Journal 15 (1982), 554Google Scholar. Kay initially studied the Toronto council over the 1967–1972 period during which time it became increasingly partisan. See his subsequent work, “A Model of Non-Partisan Legislative Bargaining.” Masson studied the 1966–1972 period during which Edmonton council was marked by the sporadic emergence of municipal political parties (Masson, “Decision-making Patterns”). See also Higgins, Donald J. H., “Mother Stubbs and Her Fourteen Alderchildren: A Short Story of a Gypsy Family That Fell Apart,”paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,Edmonton, 1975Google Scholar. Less directly pertinent although still of value from the perspective of the study of councils in relatively small municipalities, see Alexander, Alan, “The Institutional and Role Perception of Local Aldermen,” in Masson, Jack K. and Anderson, James D., eds., Emerging Party Politics in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 114–140Google Scholar, and Winn, Conrad and McMenemy, John, “Political Alignment in a Polarized City: Electoral Cleavages in Kitchener, Ontario,” this Journal 6 (1973), 230–242Google Scholar.
3 In Alberta, the general provincial legislation which establishes general areas of jurisdictional competence and which applies to all municipalities is the Municipal Government Act. Although there is a similarity between Grande Prairie and Calgary in general terms, some degree of a regional (north-south) cleavage within Alberta may be present but this is beyond the scope of this article.
4 This follows, to an extent, the categorization scheme suggested by Eulau, Heinz and Hinckley, Katherine, “Legislative Institutions and Processes,” in Robin, James A. son, ed., Political Science Annual, Vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1966), 87Google Scholar, and adopted by Kay in “Urban Decision-Making.”
5 Kay, “Urban Decision-Making,” 556. On voting blocs as dependent variables related to municipal diversity, see Higgins, Donald J. H., Local and Urban Politics in Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1986), 380–385Google Scholar. For a discussion of the merits of partisanship on council, see Leo, Christopher, “Strong Government, Weak Government: Classifying Municipal Structural Change” (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1986), 7–9Google Scholar.
6 Kay, “Urban Decision-Making,” 556.
7 Ibid., 563. Kay refers to this as the interpersonal environment but the point remains that an individual operating within that environment can also affect it, or put somewhat differently, the interpersonal environment is functionally related to the personal attributes of the councillors themselves (573).
8 Higgins, Local and Urban Politics, 380–85. For a discussion of “old style” and “new style” politicians, see 365–73; for an application of this typology, see Price, Trevor and Krause, Robert, “Representational Styles in Local Government: A Case Study of Hamilton-Wentworth,”paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,Saskatoon, 1979Google Scholar.
9 Higgins, Donald J. H., Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 273–280Google Scholar.
10 For a concise review of the community power literature, see Orum, Anthony, Introduction to Political Sociology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 158–194Google Scholar. For a more complete evaluation of the literature, see Clark, Terry N., Community Power and Policy Outputs: A Review of Urban Research (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973)Google Scholar.
11 See Masson, Jack, Alberta's Local Governments and Their Politics (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985), 1–13Google Scholar. See also Martin, Roscoe, Grass Roots (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1957)Google Scholar. For some evidence of perceived remoteness from local government as size increases, see Brown, Steven D. and McMenemy, John, “Generality or Specificity in Political Orientations: A Case Study,” this Journal 15 (1982), 365–376Google Scholar.
12 For an early treatment of this see Wirth, L., “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” American Journal of Sociology 44 (1938), 3–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a more recent assessment, see Berry, B. J. L., The Human Consequences of Urbanization (London: Macmillan, 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 In part, this line of argument is, of course, consistent with both the advocacy of ward systems of election in larger municipalities as well as with more “radical” calls for forms of neighbourhood self-government. See Lightbody, James, “Electoral Reform in Local Government: The Case of Winnipeg,” this Journal 11 (1978), 312–319Google Scholar; Leo, “Strong Government”; and Higgins, Urban Canada, 169–71.
14 There is at least some evidence to suggest that the public in smaller municipalities is more highly prone than are residents of larger cities to contact municipal governments as well as to be more involved in community activity. See Mishler, William, Political Participation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), 39–62, 106Google Scholar. See also University of Alberta Extension, Local Government Studies, “Survey of Alberta Chief Municipal Administrators and Municipal Development Officers” (Edmonton: Alberta Municipal Affairs, 1983)Google Scholar. For a discussion of contacting using a data base from another Canadian city, see Brown, Steven D., “The Explanation of Particularized Contacting: A Comparison of Models,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 18 (1982), 217–234Google Scholar.
15 Masson, Alberta's Local Governments, 1–13.
16 See Wahlke, J. C., et al. , The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962), 221Google Scholar.
17 Kay and Wichern, “Legislative Decision-Making,” 12.
18 Eulau, Heinz and Prewitt, Kenneth, Labyrinths of Democracy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), particularly 79–216Google Scholar.
19 Kay “Decision-Making Patterns,” 39–62. Kay also argues that time and level of government in terms of the two-tiered Metro Council are important variables (86–120).
20 Kay's methodology regarding the councillor background variables appears to rely on a “stacking” procedure rather than allowing for multiple traits to interact independently. See Kay, “Decision-Making Patterns,” 39–62, and Kay “Urban Decision-Making,” 555–56.
21 See Higgins, Local and Urban Politics, 365–73. See also Price and Krause, “Representational Styles in Local Government.”
22 Masson, “Decision-Making Patterns”; Kay, “Decision-Making Patterns”; Kay, “Urban Decision-Making”; and Kay and Wichern, “Legislative Decision-Making.”
23 Kay, “Decision-Making Patterns,” 555.
24 It may also be possible, although not likely, that a councillor may be a member of two blocs depending on the inter-agreement score cut-off utilized to define bloc structures.
25 In the 1985–1986 term, the mayor (Blais) and one councillor (Rice) were well-known Liberals. Rice subsequently ran in the 1988 federal election as a Liberal. Councillors Graydon and Mirlin were both well-known Progressive Conservatives sitting on the executive of the local constituency association—a fact which Mirlin used in his campaign literature. Graydon contested unsuccessfully the Conservative nomination for the 1986 Alberta provincial election.
26 Like most Canadian municipalities which employ the ward system, Calgary's elections are not entirely based on a representation-by-population structure. See Drabek, Stan, “One Person, One Vote and the Ward Electoral System at the Local Level” (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1986)Google Scholar. For a review of partisan politics in Calgary, see Masson, Alberta's Local Governments, 304–14. Calgary's mayor, Ralph Klein, was considered at the time to be a Liberal. Hawkesworth was well known as a member of the New Democratic party and in 1986 was elected to the Alberta Legislature as an NDP member. Pears and Leigh made their affiliation with the Conservative party known during the course of the 1983 municipal campaign.
27 For an interesting study of how Alberta municipalities dealt with the “crash” of the early 1980s, see Einsiedel, Edna F. and Ho, Peter, “The Management of Retrenchment Among Alberta Municipalities” (Edmonton: University of Alberta Extension and Alberta Municipal Affairs, 1984)Google Scholar. See also Drabek, Stan and Woods, John, “Calgary: The Boom Ends,”paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,Guelph, 1984, 1Google Scholar.
28 In Grande Prairie, only the mayorality incumbent was defeated while only four of the nine aldermanic incumbents chose to contest in 1983. In Calgary, only eight incumbents ran in the 1983 election.
29 Rice-Beyle cluster analysis is discussed in detail in Anderson, Lee F., Watts, Meredith N. Jr. and Wilcox, Allen R., Legislative Roll Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 59–74Google Scholar. The Grande Prairie data base includes all votes in the 1983–1986 term. For Calgary, the data base includes all votes in the 1983–1986 term up to the end of March 1986.
30 Kay and Wichern, “Legislative Decision-Making,” 8. See also Masson, “Decision-Making Patterns,” 131, for a general overview of the topic. For more detail, see Willetts, Peter, “Cluster Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference,” American Political Science Review 66 (1972), 569–582CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Anderson, et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis. For Kay's description, see “Decision-Making Patterns,” 27–32. see “Decision-Making Patterns,” 27–32.
31 Beyle, Herman C., Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 100CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 Although a case can be made for interpreting abstentions as partial (dis)agreement, abstentions were not included here in the analysis of councillor agreement. For a methodology which includes abstentions, see Lijphart, Arend, “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal,” American Political Science Review 57 (1963), 902–917CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 Adoption of the more stringent 25 per cent criterion (in practice 33 per cent criterion) would reduce the number of competitive roll call votes and unduly limit the number of cases.
34 Votes were also classified as substantive or non-substantive where, by exclusion, votes on such matters as adopting the minutes of a meeting were deemed to be non-substantive to the extent that the decision of the council was reached unanimously. There were 36 possible pairs on the 9-member Grande Prairie council and 105 pairs on the 15-member Calgary council.
35 Kay and Wichern, “Legislative Decision-Making.”
36 Curiously, although this is pointed out by Masson, he used 50 per cent interagreement as his bloc inclusion level. See Masson, “Decision-Making Patterns,” 132–35.
37 Willets, “Cluster Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference,” 569–82.
38 The difference in levels of statistical significance is attributable to the larger number of competitive votes in Calgary. Formally the 60 per cent criterion is statistically significant (greater than chance) at the .056 level for Grande Prairie and well above the .001 level for Calgary.
39 Kay, “Decision-Making Patterns,” 39–56. See also Kay, “Urban Decision-Making,” 556.
40 See Klecka, W. R., “Discriminant Analysis,” Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Sage University Paper Series, No. 07–001 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980)Google Scholar, and Norusis, Marija J., SPSS-X: Advanced Statistics Guide (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 73–112Google Scholar.
41 Higgins, Urban Canada, 273–80.
42 Only statistically significant inter-agreement scores are presented. The full set of inter-agreement scores is available from the authors.
43 These data are available from the authors.
44 One-tailed t-tests (separate variance estimates) for significant differences between group means on these variables were also performed. Results of this analysis are available from the authors. However, no statistically significant (p <. 10) differences between background characteristics were evident between bloc 1 and bloc 2. This may reflect both the limited number of cases as well as the similarity in bloc composition. However, both Grande Prairie blocs did differ significantly (p <. 10) on the age variable and bloc I was significantly less highly educated than the independents.
45 Although these differences proved to be statistically insignificant (p < 10) based on t-tests, the cell sizes are such that differences between blocs have to be quite marked for statistical significance to be concluded. In addition, t-tests assume interval-level data although only nominal and ordinal data were used here for the majority of background characteristics. Nevertheless, since we are addressing a population rather than a sample of councillors, the use of descriptive statistics may be all that is strictly necessary.
46 Varimax and obliquely rotated factor analysis as well as discriminant analysis dichotomizing single-bloc membership yielded much the same results as are evident from the simple correlational analysis. These data are available from the authors.
47 The level of significance is formally a test of the null hypothesis that the means of the three groups on their discriminant function scores are equal. The test is based on a chi square transformation of Wilks' Lambda.
48 Standardized discriminant coefficients are available from the authors.