Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
1 The original draft of this paper was presented at the 1975 annual general meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Edmonton, where it was delivered to a plenary session entitled, “From Possessive Individualism to Democracy: An Evaluation of C.B. Macpherson's Contribution to Political Thought.” I would like to thank all those who have contributed their criticisms and encouragement to the preparation of the present version of this paper. But I would like to express my particular gratitude to Edward Andrew, Arthur DiQuattro, Dan Goldstick, Patricia Hughes, John Keane, Norine Naskar, Jean Roberts, Mary Rous, and Emilee Swanson. Without their assistance the elusive task of writing this paper would have been a thoroughly evasive one for sure.
2 A very few examples are required to show this trend. Jacob Viner and Sir Isaiah Berlin have interpreted Macpherson as a Marxist attacker of modern liberalism; see Viner, J., “Possessive Individualism as Original Sin,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, xxix (1963)Google Scholar; C.B. Macpherson, “Scholars and Spectres: A Rejoinder,” ibid.; and, J. Viner, “The Perils of Reviewing: A Counter-Rejoinder,” ibid. See also Berlin, I., “Hobbes, Locke and Professor Macpherson,” Political Quarterly, xxxv (1964).Google Scholar Antonio Negri has remarked that, “C.B. Macpherson is a Hobbesian, … not a Marxist; see Negri, “Prefazione,” in Liberia e proprieta alle origini del pensiero borghese: la teoria dell individualismo possessivo de Hobbes a Locke (Milano 1973)Google Scholar; this is the preface to the Italian edition of Macpherson's The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. However, of Macpherson's most recent work Kenneth Minogue said, “For all its sophistication, indeed, the genuine intellectual interest, of Macpherson's argument, we are thus forced back to what seems to be its Marxist roots;” see Minogue, , “Two Hisses for Democracy,” Encounter (December 1973), 62.Google Scholar Perhaps the most noteworthy of recent appraisals, to be applauded for its elegant subtlety, is R.S. Neale's: “Macpherson's position is a conventional Marxist philosopher's …;” see Neale, , “Introduction: Property, Law, and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” in Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond, ed Kamenka, and Neale, (Canberra 1975), 7.Google Scholar
3 However this, too, could be a mistake. Although it is beyond the scope of the present study, any full evaluation of Macpherson's work should show the extent and character of the influence of both classical liberalism and Rousseau's critique of it on Macpherson. In the concluding section of this paper I attempt to demonstrate how one aspect of liberalism has surmounted a Marxist theorem in Macpherson's writings. But I have left it for future critics to examine fully the insurgent liberalism of C.B. Macpherson.
4 On Hobbes, , the Levellers, , Harrington, , and Locke, , see The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford 1962)Google Scholar; hereinafter, this volume cited as PI. On Burke, , see “Edmund Burke,” in Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, LIII, series III (June 1959).Google Scholar Contemporary theorists Macpherson has looked at include Warrender, Howard (“The Treadmill,” Canadian Forum [January 1958])Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert and Schumpeter, Joseph (“Revisionist Liberalism,” in Macpherson's Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval [Oxford 1973], esp. 78–80)Google Scholar; Sir Isaiah Berlin (“Berlin's Division of Liberty” in Democratic Theory); John Chapman and John Rawls (“Revisionist Liberalism,” esp. 80–94; and, “Rawls's Model of Man and Society,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, III, 4 [December 1973]); and d'entreves, Alexandre (“The Quandary of Positive Liberalism,” New Statesman [3 November 1967]).Google Scholar
5 C.B. Macpherson, “The Deceptive Task of Political Theory,” in his Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, 198; hereinafter, this volume cited as DT.
6 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow, n.d.), 99–100; hereinafter noted as Ec Phil Mss.
7 Marx, , Capital I (Moscow 1965), 79–80.Google Scholar “The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.” Ibid., 80
8 Marx, , Capital III (Moscow 1966), 820Google Scholar; see also: Ec Phil Mss, 106–7.
9 Marx, and Engels, , The German Ideology (Moscow 1968), 43–4, 93Google Scholar
10 Ec Phil Mss, 111–2
11 Marx, and Engels, , “The Communist Manifesto,” in Marx/Engels Selected Works, 3 vols (Moscow 1969), I, 127.Google Scholar Hereinafter this set noted as MESW.
12 Cf. Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” MESW III, 13–20
13 Rousseau, J.-J., “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,” in The Social Contract and Discourses, transl. W. Intro. by Cole, G.D.H. (London 1973), 44Google Scholar
14 Engels, F., Anti-Duhring, Part I, chap, x, “Morality and Law: Equality” (Moscow 1969), 124Google Scholar
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 128
17 University of Toronto Quarterly xi, 4 (July 1942), 404
18 Ibid., 408–9
19 Ibid., 410
20 Ibid.
21 DT, 51
22 Ibid.
23 “Problems of a Non-Market Theory of Democracy,” ibid., 55
24 “Revisionist Liberalism,” ibid., 94
25 A Political Theory of Property,” ibid., 138
26 Marx, “Preface to the First German Edition,” Capital I, 10
27 The German Ideology, 32
28 MESW I, 109
29 The German Ideology, 33–7
30 Ibid., 33
31 Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer. in a letter dated 5 March 1852, MESW I, 528. Marx goes on to list two more innovations which will be dealt with in (4) and (4A) below.
32 The German Ideology, 61
33 PI, 47–8
34 See esp. ibid., 53–4
35 Ibid., 55
36 Ibid., 93. See also, Macpherson's, “Introduction” to Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Harmonds-worth 1968), 55Google Scholar
37 Ibid., 267
38 Ibid., 273
39 “The Ruling Class,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science VII, 1 (Feb. 1941), 99
40 “Review” of Talmon, J.L.: The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, in Past and Present 2 (Nov. 1952), 57Google Scholar
41 E.g. see DT, 11–12, 35, 46–7, 89–92, 99, 102, 120–1, 148–9, 176, 193, 195–6, 202–3, and 249.
42 Cf. PI, 72–87, esp. 81–2
43 Marx, Ec Phil Mss, 76
44 Ibid., 75.
45 The German Ideology, 44
46 Ibid., 45
47 Ibid., 87
48 Marx and Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” passim. Likely it was this point that moved Mill, J.S. to characterize the demands of the working class for social equality as “an impatient dislike of superiority,” in “On Liberty,” in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (London 1910), 70.Google Scholar
49 The German Ideology, 62–3.
50 Marx, , Grundrisse, trans. Nicolaus, Martin (London 1973), 488.Google Scholar See also, Marx, , Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, trans. Cohen, J., ed., Hobsbawm, E.J. (New York 1965), 84–5.Google Scholar In the latter text the identical passage is translated, and “predetermined” is rendered as “previously established.” In this.same passage Marx offers an insight to our more nostalgic colleagues: “In bourgeois political economy – and in the epoch to which it corresponds – this complete elaboration of what lies within man, appears as the total alienation and the destruction of all fixed, one-sided purposes, as the sacrifice of the end in itself to a wholly external compulsion. Hence in one way the childlike world of the ancients appears to be superior; and this is so, in so far as we seek for closed shape, form and established limitation. The ancients provide a narrow satisfaction, whereas the modern world leaves us unsatisfied, or, where it appears to be satisfied with itself, is vulgar and mean.” Ibid.,85
51 “Problems of a Non-Market Theory of Democracy,” DT, 58–9
52 Ibid., 42; see also, “Maximization of Democracy,” DT, 9.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 DT, 13, 50, 94, 99, 146
56 “Problems of a Non-Market Theory of Democracy,” DT, 66–70
57 “Maximization of Democracy,” DT, 10–11; cf. ibid., 66–7
58 “Problems of a Non-Market Theory of Democracy,” DT, 47
59 “Property,” DT, 140
60 “Maximization of Democracy,” DT, 15
61 Cf. Diquattro, Arthur W., “Verstehen as an Empirical Concept,” in Sociology and Social Research, LVII, 1 (Oct. 1972).Google Scholar A very interesting, quasi-Marxist discussion
62 Marx, “ ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in MESW I, 503. Cf. Marx, , The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (New York 1963), 47.Google Scholar Here Marx speaks of “the different forms of property,” “social conditions,” and “material foundations” forming the “reality” and “real interests” of a society.
63 The German Ideology, 38, 61
64 Ibid., 61
65 Cf. esp. Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I, chap. 3
66 “Theses on Feuerbach,” II and III, MESW, I, 13–14.
67 Engels, ‘Review of Marx's A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” in MESW I, 514
68 Engels, “Letters to C. Schmidt, August 5, 1890” and “Letter to J. Bloch, Sept. 21–22, 1890”, in MESW III, 484, 487–8
69 Marx's conclusion here is that “when reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence,” The German Ideology, 38. See also, ibid., 50.
70 DT, 121
71 Ibid., passim.
72 “The Economic Penetration of Political Theory: Some Hypotheses,” mimeo; revised version of a paper presented at the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, 19 April 1974, 4a
73 Ibid., 30
74 “The Ruling Class,” 99
75 E.g. “Pareto's ‘General Sociology’: The Problem of Method in the Social Sciences,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, III, 3 (August 1937); “The History of Political Ideas,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, VII, 4 (Nov. 1941); “The Position of Political Science,” Culture III (1942); “A Disturbing Tendency in Political Science,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVI, 1 (Feb. 1950); “World Trends in Political Science Research,” American Political Science Review, XLVIII, 2 (June 1954); “The Treadmill”, Canadian Forum (Jan. 1958); “Bow and Arrow Power,” The Nation (19 Jan 1970); etc.
76 DT
77 “Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology,” in DT, 34
78 The German Ideology, 38
79 Marx, and Engels, , The Holy Family (Moscow 1956), 125Google Scholar
80 The German Ideology, 38
81 “Theses on Feuerbach,” III, MESW
82 Engels, “Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx,” in MESW III, 162; and The German Ideology, 37
83 The German Ideology, 41
84 Capital I, 373 n3
85 Cf. “Revisionist Liberalism,” in DT, 77; “Problems,” in DT, 46–7
86 “World Trends in Political Science Research,” 448–9. Of course this passage is also relevant to (3).
87 Marx, “Letter to P.V. Annenkov, December 28, 1846,” in MESW 1, 518
88 Ibid., 519
89 The German Ideology, 56
90 “Maximization of Democracy,” DT, 17
91 This is a recurrent prescription in Macpherson's work and can be found practically anywhere. E.g., see DT, 19–20, 36–8, 54–5, 62–3, 113, 139–40, 178, 182–3, and, “The Myth of Maximization” in The Real World of Democracy (Toronto 1965), esp. 55.
92 “Ontology and Technology,” DT, 37
93 “Preface to the First German Edition,” Capital I, 8, 10
94 “Afterword to the Second German Edition,” Capital I, 14. Marx continues, in elaborating this point: “The Continental revolutionx of 1848–9 also had its reaction in England. Men who still claimed some scientific standing and aspired to be something more than mere sophists and sycophants of the ruling-classes, tried to harmonize the Political Economy of capital with the claims, no longer to be ignored, of the proletariat. Hence a shallow syncretism, of which John Stuart Mill is the best representative … Under these circumstances [English] professors fell into two groups. The one set, prudent, practical business folk, flocked to the banner of Bastiat, … the other, proud of the professorial dignity of their science, followed John Stuart Mill in his attempt to reconcile irreconcilables.” Ibid., 15–16
95 DT, 195–203. Originally published in The Cambridge Journal, VII, 3 (June 1954), 560–8
96 Ibid., 197–8
97 Ibid., 199
98 Ibid., 200
99 “Post-Liberal-Democracy?” in DT, 184
100 The German Ideology, 48
101 Ibid., 85; also see 45–6, 57, 61–3, 69–70, 92–6
102 MESW, I, 101
103 “Problems,” in DT, 65.
104 Ibid., 69
105 Cf. esp. “Maximization of Democracy,” DT, 14.
106 The German Ideology, 50
107 Ibid., 87
108 Marx, , The Poverty of Philosophy (Moscow 1955), 152.Google Scholar Hence the irreconcilable contradiction in J.S. Mill's position (see note 94).
109 The Manifesto of the Communist Party, 137
110 Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” 26
111 Engels, “Letter to P. Lavrov, November 12, 1875,” in MESW III, 478–9
112 Marx, “Letter to J. Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852,” ibid., 528
113 Marx, in Marx and Engels: On the Paris Commune (Moscow 1971), 116Google Scholar
114 “The Economic Penetration of Political Theory,” 1–15
115 “The Role of Party Systems in a Democracy,” paper presented at the Third Congress of the IPSA (August 1955), 1. See also: “Notes on the Requirements of a General Theory of Party Systems,” paper presented at the IPSA roundtable on Comparative Government (Florence, April 1954), 8–9. The latter piece was published in Italian as “I Partiti Politici,” Studi Politici, III, 1 (March–May 1954).
116 DT, 22
117 Ibid., 157
118 Ibid., 167
119 Ibid., 75–6
120 Ibid., 76
121 Ibid. If recent events in Chile may be seen to meet the requirements of the breakdown/breakthrough conflux, it is also clear that whatever progress the breakthroughs may occasion will require organized defence. This was not unforeseen by Marx, who praised the Paris Communards for their defence organization. As well, Marx seemed to have a pre-sentiment for those in Chile who thought that democratic consciousness and an economic crisis were enough. “The democrats concede that a privileged class confronts them, but they, along with all the rest of the nation, form the people … Accordingly, when a struggle is impending, they do not need to examine the interests and the positions of the different classes … They have merely to give the signal and the people, with all its inexhaustible resources, will fall upon the oppressors. Now, if in the performance their interests prove to be uninteresting and their potency impotence, then either the fault lies with pernicious sophists who split the indivisible people into different hostile camps, or the army was too brutalized and blinded to comprehend that the pure aims of democracy are the best thing for it itself, or the whole thing has been wrecked by a detail in its execution, or else an unforeseen accident has this time spoilt the game. In any case, the democrat comes out of the most disgraceful defeat just as immaculate as he was innocent when he went into it, with the newly-won conviction that he is bound to win, not that he himself and his party have to give up the old standpoint, but, on the contrary, that conditions have to ripen to suit him.” The Eighteenth Brumaire, 54—5
122 DT
123 Ibid.
124 “A Political Theory of Property,” DT, 140
125 “The Deceptive Task of Political Theory,” DT, 202
126 Ibid.
127 “A Political Theory of Property,” DT, 140
128 1
129 “The Position of Political Science,” 457
130 Kafka, Franz, The Trial (New York 1968), 12Google Scholar
131 In The German Ideology Marx makes some particularly pointed remarks about Bentham: “Under the guise of interest, the reflecting bourgeois always inserts a third thing between himself and his mode of action – a habit seen in truly classic form in Bentham, whose nose had to have some interest before it would decide to smell anything,” 233.
132 “Berlin's Division of Liberty,” DT, especially see 117–19.
133 Ibid., 117