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Executive Power and Committee Autonomy in the Canadian House of Commons: Leadership Selection, 1968–1979*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Michael M. Atkinson  and
Kim Richard Nossal
Michael M. Atkinson
Affiliation:
McMaster University
Kim Richard Nossal
Affiliation:
McMaster University
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Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 287 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1980

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References

1 King, Anthony, “Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain. France, and West Germany,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 1 (1976), 11–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Thomas, Paul G., “The Role of Committees in the Canadian House of Commons, 1960–1972,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1975, 90Google Scholar. See also Jackson, Robert J. and Atkinson, Michael M., The Canadian Legislative System (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 132Google Scholar.

3 Franks, C. E. S., “The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons,” this JOURNAL 4 (1971), 465Google Scholar.

4 Included in the definition of “leadership position” are cabinet ministers, the speaker and deputy speaker, chief government whip, chairman of the government caucus, parliamentary secretaries, and chairmen and vice-chairmen of standing, special and joint committees.

5 For a discussion of influence which distinguishes between “persuasion” and “inducement,” see Parsons, Talcott, “The Concept of Influence,” in Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1969), 410–15Google Scholar.

6 Franks, “Standing Committees,” 464. For a discussion of committee autonomy which emphasizes the development of a corporate identity, see Lowenberg, Gerhard and Patterson, Samuel C., Comparing Legislatures (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 204–12Google Scholar.

7 Stewart has recently pointed out that the adversary relationship in committees is much less intense than it is in the chamber. Stewart, John, The Canadian House of Commons—Procedure and Reform (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1977), 168CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 For an explicit statement of this position, see Byers, R. B., “Perceptions of Parliamentary Surveillance of the Executive,” this JOURNAL 5 (1972), 250Google Scholar.

9 Polsby, Nelson, “Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review 62 (1968), 145CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also, Campbell, Colin, “The Interplay of Institutionalization and the Assignment of Tasks in Parliamentary and Congressional Systems,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 18(1977), 132–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 There are, of course, other indicators of autonomy, particularly membership stability. By this measure, however, the standing committee system in Canada has considerable strides to make: see Byers, “Parliamentary Surveillance,” 238; Franks, “Standing Committees,” 466; Byrne, Dorothy, “Some Attendance Patterns Exhibited by Members of Parliament during the 28th Parliament,” this JOURNAL 5 (1972), 136–41; Jackson and Atkinson, Canadian Legislative System, 125–26Google Scholar.

11 Throughout this paper we employ the nomenclature currently in use on Parliament Hill to describe these positions. It must be noted, however that since 1972, a growing number of women are occupying committee leadership roles.

12 Thomas has noted that “in attempting to institutionalize the parliamentary secretary's job, the government was clearly designating the appointee as the principal government leader on committees” (“Role of Committees,” 111).

13 Organizational complexity refers to the division of labour and role differentiation within an organization. See Polsby, “Institutionalization,” 145.

14 Campbell, “Assignment of Tasks,” 140.

15 Thomas, “Role of Committees,” 92–93.

16 For a discussion of linguistic balance in the committee system during the 28th Parliament, see ibid., 90–92.

17 Van Loon, Richard J. and Whittington, Michael S., The Canadian Political System (2nd ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 315Google Scholar.

18 The notable exception is Campbell, “Assignment of Tasks,” whose examination includes the first half of the 1st session of the 30th Parliament.

19 For a discussion of the 1968 reforms, see Hockin, Thomas, “The Advance of Standing Committees in Canada's House of Commons,” Canadian Public Administration 13 (1970), 185–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rush, Michael, “The Development of the Committee System in the Canadian House of Commons—Reassessment and Reform,” The Parliamentarian 55 (1974), 81–94, 149–58Google Scholar.

20 We have taken the liberty of excluding the Standing Committee on Miscellaneous Private Bills and Standing Orders, which meets rarely in a normal session. A precedent has been set in this regard by Komberg, Allan and Mishler, William, Influence in Parliament: Canada (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976), 166Google Scholar.

21 It should be noted that during the 30th Parliament, the chairmanship of the Standing Committee on Procedure and Organization was held by two cabinet ministers, Mitchell Sharp and John Reid. In addition, Reid was vice-chairman of the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections during the 4th session of the 30th Parliament. These appointments are not included in the analysis.

22 In the 28th, 29th and 30th Parliaments, opposition members did hold other leadership positions, but these were usually gained by unconventional means, including For example, Paul Yewchuck (Conservative: Athabaska [Alberta]) acquired the vice-chairmanship of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in the 2nd session of the 28th Parliament by demanding that a vote be taken before all the Liberal members had arrived for the first meeting. Because there was a quorum, the chairman had no alternative but to conduct an election.

23 None of the 27 officials and MPs who were kind enough to give us interviews bears any responsibility for the facts related or the interpretations made.

24 Stewart, House of Commons, 314, n. 57; House of Commons, Debates, 1973–74, vol. 1, 178, 313. One Conservative MP decided to defy his party's leadership: Jack Homer (Conservative: Crowfoot [Alberta]) successfully sought election to the chairmanship of the transport committee. Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 29th Parl., 1st sess., issue 1.

25 Compare Thomas, “Role of Committees,” who observed that “lobbying for the position of chairman is not unknown but it is rare” (96).

26 Despite this example, the role of opposition parties in the choice of leaders is limited. Usually the opposition members leam of leadership choices at the organization meetings and are not consulted or informed in advance.

27 MPs and officials generally confirmed the prestige ranking provided in Kornberg and Mishler, Influence in Parliament, 164–69.

28 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 30th Parl., 2nd sess., issue 1, 1:9. An indication of the collegial mood was the selection of William Knowles (Conservative: Norfolk Haldimand [Ontario]) as vice-chairman in the 4th session of the 30th Parliament.

29 When asked whether or not linguistic balance was actively sought by members of a committee, one former chairman replied: “It's not something we do consciously. It's just done.”

30 Peter C. Dobell, “Committee Staff—What Else is Needed?” paper prepared for the Conference on Legislative Studies in Canada, Simon Fraser University, Bumaby, B.C., February, 1979, 6.

31 For information on recent turnover levels, see Jenson, Jane and Tomlin, Brian, Canadian Politics: An Introduction to Systematic Analysis (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977), 117Google Scholar.

32 A discussion of these appointments can be found in Thomas, “Role of Committees,” 95. One of the committees in which these appointments were made. Labour, Manpower and Immigration, ranks low on the Kornberg-Mishler index; the other. Procedure and Organization, was constituted as a standing committee in 1968.

33 Because of the rapid turnover of MPs on committees, it is sometimes difficult to determine who comprises the “regular” or “core” membership. The level of 50 per cent eligibility is sufficiently high to eliminate all transient members. Komberg and Mishler usei a 10 per cent eligibility as their criterion for membership (Influence in Parliament, 163).

34 Because of the extraordinary length of the 1st session of the 30th Parliament (1974–1976),’ we considered that an MP who served on the committee for 12 months had the equivalent of one session of experience.

35 For example, Gaston Clermont (Liberal: Gatineau [Quebec]), nominating Len Hopkins (Liberal: Renfrew North [Ontario]) for the vice-chairmanship of the regional development committee in 1977, commented on Hopkins’ “assiduous attendance.” Standing Committee on Regional Development, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 30th Part., 3rd sess., issue 1.

36 The committees and sessions were chosen at random and the chairmen, vice-chairmen and those ineligible for 50 per cent of the committees’ meetings were excluded from the calculation of attendance to eligibility ratios. Although this is a small sample of attendance patterns, it satisfied the limited purpose of illustrating differences between aspiring committee leaders and other Liberal MPs.

37 When the vice-chairman in the final session of the previous parliament retired or was defeated in general elections, a vacancy occurring in the chairmanship at the outset of the next parliament was not considered. In the 29th Parliament, 4 of the 10 vacancies considered were filled by the vice-chairman; in the 30th Parliament, 14 of the 35 vacancies considered were filled in the same manner.

38 In the last session of the 30th Parliament, for example, Ursula Appoloni (Liberal: York South [Ontario]), who had been elected chairman of the labour committee at the outset of the session, was deposed after several meetings.

39 Thomas, “Role of Committees,” 89. For an example of a chairman who chose to retire voluntarily, see Eymard Corbin's explanation to the regional development committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 30th Parl., 3rd sess., issue 1.

40 During the minority 29th Parliament, the government chose to appoint only 16 parliamentary secretaries.

41 The Parliamentary Secretaries Act of 1959 had stipulated that the term be limited to 12 months with the possibility of reappointment. Unlike Pearson, who kept some members in this position for as long as five years, Trudeau allowed the vast majority of appointments to lapse after two years.

42 This figure does not include the 20 parliamentary secretaries appointed at the outset of the 30th Parliament in 1974.

43 In the first three sessions of the 30th Parliament (1974–1978), there were only three cases of committee leaders who left the committee to serve two years as parliamentary secretaries, and who then returned to the committee as ordinary members. Their average attendance to eligibility ratio was .38, well below the average for committee leaders before their appointment.

44 Dobell, “Committee Staff,” 7; for adiscussionofthe role of parliamentary secretaries as “government manager” on committees, see Thomas, “Role of Committees,” 108–12.

45 MacGuigan, Mark, “Parliamentary Reform: Impediments to an Enlarged Role for the Backbencher,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 675–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.