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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
The Supreme Court's decisions on constitutional amendment made possible and then sanctioned a political compromise which conflicts with the logic of the only provision of the BNA Act dealing with amendments to the division of powers. The implications of section 94 have been overlooked partly because judges are ill-disposed to arguments based upon the structure of the BNA Act, and partly because of Frank Scott's misleading essay on the subject. Scott's centralist interpretation of section 94 is untenable, largely because that section does not restrict provincial sovereignty or federalism but gives constitutional recognition to them. Section 94 also implies a formal amending procedure of unanimity: neither unilateral action by the federal Parliament nor substantial provincial consent has any application to the division of powers. Since the centralist interpretation of the Canadian constitution cannot be reconciled with a significant provision of the BNA Act, a conception of Canadian federalism is required which gives greater recognition to the constitutional autonomy of the provinces.
Le jugement de la Cour Suprême sur I'amendement constitutionnel a rendu possible, puis sanctionné, un compromis politique en opposition avec la logique de la seule disposition de l'A.A.N.B. concemant les amendements au partage des pouvoirs. Les implications de I'article 94 ont été négligées en partie parce que les juges sont peu sensibles aux arguments concemant la structure de l'A.A.N.B. et en raison de l'interprétation centraliste de Frank Scott. L'interprétation dece dernier n'est pas fondée, principalement parce que cet article ne restreint pas le fédéralismea ou la souveraineé des provinces, mais lui donne une reconnaissance constitutionnelle. L'article comprend aussi une formule d'amendement exigeant l'unanimité: ni une intervention unilatérale du gouvernement fédéral, ni un accord avec plusieurs provinces ne convient à cette division des pouvoirs. Puisque cette interprétation centralisante de la Constitution canadienne n'est pas en accord avec les dispositions de l'A.A.N.B., il faut rechercher une vision du fédéralisme canadien qui reconnaisse une autonomie constitutionnelle aux provinces.
1 See Russell, Peteret al., The Court and the Constitution (Kingston:Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1982);Google ScholarHogg, P. W., “Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions,” Canadian Bar Review 60 (1982), 307;Google ScholarKnopff, Rainer, “Legal Theory and the ‘Patriation’ Debate, ” Queen's Law Journal 7 (1981), 41.Google Scholar
2 Of contemporary textbook writers only McConnell, W. H., Commentary on the British North America Act (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977)Google Scholar discusses section 94 in any detail; but he does not address the issues raised in this article.
3 Lyon, Noel, “Constitutional Theory and the Martland-Ritchie Dissent,” in Russell et al., The Court and the Constitution, 59Google Scholar. See also Russell's, , “The Central Fallacy of Canadian Constitutional Law, ” McGill Law Journal 22 (1976), 40.Google Scholar
4 Black, Charles L., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 7.Google Scholar
5 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (1982) 125 Dominion Law Reports (3d) 1 at 58.Google Scholar
6 , K. C.Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed.; London: Oxford University Press. 1967), 18–20.Google Scholar
7 Scott, Frank. R.“Section 94 of the British North America Act,” Canadian Bar Review 20 (1942), 525Google Scholar; reprinted in his Essays on the Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 112.
8 Ibid..
9 Scott, Frank R., “The Special Nature of Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 23 (1947), 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted in his Essays on the Constitution,, 175.
10 Ibid.., 115.
11 Ibid.., 114.
12 Newfoundland presents no special difficulties for this claim.
13 Scott, Essays on the Constitution, 122.
14 Ibid.
15 Waite, P. B. (ed.), The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada/1865 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), 47.Google Scholar
16 Ibid.
17 Justice Fauteux's opinion (A.-G. N.S. v. A. -G. Can. [1951] Supreme Court Reports 31, at 59) that “the presence of [section 94]... in the [B.N.A.] Act clearly indicates that the right of one of the legislative bodies to delegate to the other, cannot be implied under the Act; otherwise the section would be useless,” appears to conflate the delegation of powers and the transfer of constitutional jurisdiction. A conflation of this kind has led some writers (such as Cheffins, R. I.Tucker, R. N., The Constitutional Process in Canada [Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976], 27)Google Scholar to misinterpret section 94 as a delegation of powers provision.
18 Appeal Cases, 96.
19 Scott, Essays on the Constitution, 122.
20 Ibid.., 186.
21 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125.
22 Scott, Essays on the Constitution, 117. For a similar view see McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act, 299: and Citizens Insurance Company v. Parsons, 110, where it is suggested that “the province of Quebec is omitted. . . for the obvious reason that the law which governs property and civil rights in Quebec is in the main the French law.”
23 Scott, Essays on the Constitution, 114.
24 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 103.
25 Ibid.., 41.
26 See Gé-Lajoie, paulConstitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 32–43.Google Scholar
27 Reference re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House [1980] I Supreme Court Reports 54,
28 Smith, Jennifer, “Origins of the Canadian Amendment Dilemma,” Dalhousie Review 61 (1981/1982), 304.Google Scholar
29 , K. C.Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 58–72.Google Scholar
30 Hogg, , “Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions,” 332.Google Scholar
31 See British North America Acts: The Role of Parliament, First Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1981)Google Scholar, xxxii. lii, liv, lvi; and Geoffrey Marshall, “The United Kingdom Parliament and the British North America Acts,” Alberta Law Review 19 (1981), 352.
32 Favreau, Guy, The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), 10–16.Google Scholar
33 Black, Edwin R., Divided Loyalties (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), 188–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
34 Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems (Province of Quebec, 1956), II, 173–85. The view of the commissioners (at 183) that section 94 “is a clearadmission that the Province of Quebec occupies a very special constitutional situation in Canada,” is consistent with my argument, as is their suggestion (at 184) that Quebec's jurisdiction over property and civil rights cannot be modified without its consent.
35 Favreau, , The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 10–16.Google Scholar
36 The Quebec Court of Appeal decision on Quebec's veto (April 7, 1982: reprinted Le Devoir, April 14, 1982) dismissed section 94 for the somewhat unusual reason that the provision does not confer greater legislative power upon Quebec than the other provinces.
37 Justices Martland Ritchie, dissenting.
38 The Chief Justice and Justices Estey McIntyre, dissenting.
39 Reference re Attorney-General of Quebec and Attorney-General of Canada [1983] 140 Dominion Law Reports (3d) 385 at 402.
40 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 61.
41 Scott, Essays on the Constitution, 122.
42 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125.