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Institutional Reform in the European Community: The Case for Bicameralism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Juliet Lodge  and
Valentine Herman
Juliet Lodge
Affiliation:
University of Hull
Valentine Herman
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam
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Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 575 - 600
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1978

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References

1 See Pryce, R., “Legitimacy and European Integration: The Role of Information,” paper presented at International Political Science Association,Edinburgh, 1976, 2–3Google Scholar; and Herman, V. and Lodge, J., “Democratic Legitimacy and Direct Elections to the European Parliament,” West European Politics 1 (1978), 226–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See introduction in Herman, V. and Lodge, J., The European Parliament and the European Community (London: Macmillan, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See, for example, Elections to the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage (Luxembourg: European Parliament Directorate-General for Research and Documentation, 1977), 31–63Google Scholar.

4 Ernst Haas defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing ones.” Haas, E. B., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16Google Scholar.

5 European Union: Report by Leo Tindemans to the European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76, Brussels, 1976, 36 ppGoogle Scholar.

6 Herman, V., Parliaments of the World: A Reference Compendium (London: Macmillan, 1976), 4Google Scholar.

7 See, for example, Mayne, R., The Institutions of the European Community (London: PEP & Chatham House, 1968)Google Scholar; also see Pryce, R., The Political Future of the European Community (London: Marshbank & the Federal Trust, 1962), 58–65Google Scholar.

8 Bowie, R. R., “The Process of Federating Europe,” in MacMahon, A. W. (ed.), Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 508Google Scholar.

9 The Court of Justice is also regarded by some as the EC's “most federal” institution.

10 Spinelli, A., The Eurocrats (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1966), 151–52Google Scholar.

11 Ibid., 153.

12 See Pryce, The Political Future of the European Community; also see Steed, M., “The European Parliament: The Significance of Direct Election,” Government and Opposition 6 (1971), 462–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Wheare, K. C., Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 11Google Scholar.

14 See Mitrany, D., The Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1975)Google Scholar, and Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, P., Functionalism (London: London University Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

15 In Etzioni's sense of the word. See Etzioni, A., Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965)Google Scholar.

16 Fora discussion of this see Elazar, D., “Fiscal Questions and Political Answers in Intergovernmental Finance,” Public Administration Review 32 (1972), 471–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Wheare, Federal Government, 36.

18 C. Friedrich, “Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals,” in MacMahon (ed.), Federalism, 510.

19 Lindeiner-Wildau, K. von, La Supranationalité en tant que principe de droit (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1970)Google Scholar.

20 The Court of Justice also has a special role not discussed here.

21 For a discussion of this see Coombes, D., Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 86–100Google Scholar.

22 For details see Noël, É., “The Committee of Permanent Representatives,” Journal of Common Market Studies 5 (1967), 219–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 We are not concerned here with those areas in which the Commission can decide on and pass measures, usually of an administrative nature.

24 Spinelli, A., The European Adventure (London: Charles Knight, 1972), 180ffGoogle Scholar. The ways in which decisions are made are seen as indicators of the level of integration. Thus, there is a hierarchy ranging from the lowest common denominator through splitting the difference to upgrading the common interest—the process associated with supranationalism and the EC.

25 Smith, G., Politics in Western Europe (London: Heinemann, 1972), 328Google Scholar; also see Williams, P. M., The French Parliament: 1958–67 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968), 29Google Scholar, and Herman, Parliaments of the World: A Reference Compendium, 585–94.

26 Fora series of comparative studies see Coombes, D. et al., The Power of the Purse: The Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976)Google Scholar.

27 Herman, Parliaments of the World: A Reference Compendium, 586.

28 Ibid., for an explanation of this.

29 See Smith, G., “West Germany and the Politics of Centrality,” Government and Opposition 11 (1976), 393CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 See Lodge, J., “Citizens and the EEC: The Role of the European Parliament,” The Parliamentarian 58 (1977), 176–81Google Scholar; also see Lodge, J. and Herman, V., “Citizens, Direct Elections and the European Parliament,” Res Publica 19 (1978), 579–605Google Scholar.

31 Wheare, Federal Government, 11.

32 See The Case for Elections to the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage (Luxembourg: European Parliament Directorate-General for Documentation and Information, 1969)Google Scholar; The Report by the ad-hoc Committee Studying the Problem of Expanding the Authority of the European Parliament (Vedel Report) (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1972)Google Scholar; and Lodge, J., “The Reform of the European Parliament,” Political Science 25 (1973), 58–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 For details see Cocks, Sir B., The European Parliament (London: HMSO, 1973)Google Scholar.

34 For a discussion of this see Vredeling, H., “The Common Market of Political Parties,” Government and Opposition 6 (1971), 455CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 The White Paper on Direct Elections to the European Assembly (Annex), (London: HMSO, Cmnd. 6768, 1977)Google Scholar.

36 Luxemburgensis, , “The Emergence of a European Sovereignty,” Government and Opposition 9 (1974), 79–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 On budgetary powers see Cocks, The European Parliament, pp. 20–24.

38 Discussed in Lodge, J., “Parliamentary Reform in the EEC,” The Parliamentarian 55 (1974), 254–55Google Scholar.

39 Spinelli, The Eurocrats.

40 The European Parliament (Luxembourg: European Parliament Directorate-General for Documentation and Information, 1976), 7Google Scholar.

41 For details see Strasser, D., “La Nouvelle Procédure Budgétaire des Communautés Européennes et son Application a l'établissement du Budget pour l'exercise 1975,” Revue du Marché Commun, no. 182 (1975), 79–87Google Scholar; also see Ehlermann, C.-D., “Applying the New Budgetary Procedure for the First Time (Article 203 of the EEC Treaty),” Common Market Law Review 12 (1975), 325–43Google Scholar.

42 Cocks, The European Parliament, 105ff.

43 Debates of the European Parliament, December 14, 1976.

44 Cocks, The European Parliament, chap. III, 19–20; also see the Derringer Report Document 74, Session 1962–63.

45 European Union: Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans.

46 Thomas, H., Europe: The Radical Challenge (London: Quartet, 1973), 24Google Scholar.

47 A. Spinelli, The European Adventure, 173.

48 By “own resources” the EC means the revenue derived from tariffs, levies and percentages of Value Added Tax—which are regarded as independent sources of revenue, and which contrast with the revenue derived from contributions by the member states.

49 A. Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 162.

50 Developed in Hogan, W. N., Representative Government and European Integration (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

51 Henig, S., “New Institutions for European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 12 (1973), 129–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also see his “The Institutional Structure of the European Communities,” Journal of Common Market Studies 12 (1974), 373–409CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Budgetary Powers of the European Parliament (Luxembourg: European Parliament Directorate-General for Documentation and Information, 1975), 1Google Scholar.

53 On problems associated with fixing this, see European Report, December 6, 1975.

54 Coombes et al., The Power of the Purse.

55 Herman, V. and Lodge, J., “The European Parliament and the ‘Decline of Legislatures’ Thesis,” Politics 13 (1978), 10–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 Fordetails of procedures in other countries see Herman, Parliaments of the World: A Reference Compendium, 755–91.

57 Coombes et al., The Power of the Purse, 370; also see Normanton, E. L., The Audit and Accountability of Governments (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

58 Coombes, The Power of the Purse, 390.

59 The Times, January 14, 1977.

60 See Fitzmaurice, J., The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Famborough: Saxon House, 1975)Google Scholar; Coombes, D., Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970)Google Scholar, and Allott, P., “The Democratic Basis of the European Communities: The European Parliament and the Westminster Parliament,” Common Market Law Review 11 (1974), 298–326Google Scholar.

61 A. Spinelli, The European Adventure, 180.

62 R. Mayne, The Institutions of the European Community, points out that the Council is an executive “in the limited sense that its role in the Community is to take decisions; but it has neither the legal freedom of movement nor the practical agility of most national governments” (29).

63 See Grosser, A., “The Evolution of the European Parliaments,” Daedalus 93 (1964), 153–78Google Scholar.

64 Had Norway acceded to the EC, the five small member states in coalition would have had the power to block measures favoured by the larger member states.

65 We are not concerned here with the Commission's decisional powers in respect to daily amendments to levies et cetera.

66 See Lodge, J., “Towards the European Political Community: EEC Summits and European Integration,” Orbis, 19 (1975), 626–51Google Scholar.

67 See Lodge, J., The European Policy of the SPD (Beverly Hills & London: Sage, 1976), 66–67Google Scholar.

68 Meyer, K., “Integration and its Institutions,” Aussenpolitik 23 (1976), 61–82Google Scholar.

69 See report of Sir Christopher Soames's speech at Whitchurch on the subject of direct elections and accountability in European Community, October/November, 1976, 6–7.

70 Commission Report on European Union (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1976)Google Scholar.

71 Noël, “The Committee of Permanent Representatives”; also see Noël, É. and Étienne, H., “The Permanent Representatives Committee and the ‘Deepening’ of the Communities,” Government and Opposition 6 (1971), 422–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 See footnote 45 in Wallace, H., National Governments and the European Communities (London: PEP & Chatham House, 1973), 59Google Scholar. Under the “A” points procedure the Committee of Representatives passes the legislative item. It is not debated by the Council of Ministers which “rubber stamps” the decision of the Permanent Representatives. If the latter are unable to reach agreement on items, then a full-scale discussion takes place in the Council of Ministers. The procedure was designed to expedite decision-making.

73 Norrenberg, D., “Un modele institutionnel déficient: la communauté européenne,” Res Publica 18 (1976), 210Google Scholar.

74 For discussions of the role of European Ministers see Revue du Marché Commun, October 1971,355–60, and The Vedel Report in Bulletin of the European Communities (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, Supplement 4, 1972), 78Google Scholar.

75 Steed, “The European Parliament.”

76 Lodge, “Towards the European Political Community: EEC Summits and European Integration.”

77 See European Report, February 18, 1976; also see Bieber, R. and Palmer, M., “A Community Without a Capital,” Journal of Common Market Studies 15 (1976), 1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.