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Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: An Institutional Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Martin Painter
Martin Painter
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Abstract

From recent debates about the performance of the Canadian federal system, two images of processes of intergovernmental relations can be extracted: a “competitive” and a “collaborative” image. Differing propositions about the effects on processes and outcomes of the framework of rules and institutions of intergovernmental relations are embodied in these contrasting images. Elinor Ostrom's framework for institutional analysis is applied to the investigation of these effects. Using Fritz Scharpf's analysis of the “pathological” effects of a specific set of collaborative arrangements in West Germany as points of departure and contrast, the working rules underlying Canadian intergovernmental relations are elaborated. The author concludes that a competitive dynamic underpins a high degree of flexibility in these arrangements. Proposals to implement a more collaborative set of arrangements through constitutional reform are critically evaluated in this light, and the author makes suggestions about the course constitutional reform might take following the failure to adopt the Meech Lake Accord.

Résumé

Deux aspects des processus de fonctionnement des relations intergouvernementales se dégagent des récents débats sur la performance du système fédéral canadien: un aspect de « compétition » et un aspect de « collaboration ». Différentes propositions concernant les effets sur les processus de ce fonctionnement et les résultats ressortant de l'ensemble des règles et des institutions régissant les relations intergouvemementales sont contenues dans ces différents aspects. Le cadre de travail d'Elinor Ostrom concernant l'analyse institutionnelle est appliqué à l'étude de ces différents effets. Les règles de base du fonctionnement des relations intergouvemementales sont élaborées à partir de l'analyse de Fritz Scharpf concernant les effets « pathologiques » d'un ensemble spécifique de mesures collaboratives en Allemagne de l'Ouest comme contraste et points de départ. L'auteur conclut qu'un dynamisme compétitif soutient un haut degré de flexibilité des dispositions prises. De ce point de vue, les propositions en vue de mettre en oeuvre un ensemble de mesures plus collaboratives par le biais d'une réforme constitutionnelle sont évaluées de façon critique, et l'auteur propose quelques idées concernant la direction que la réforme constitutionnelle devra suivre après l'échec de l'Accord du lac Meech.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 269 - 288
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1991

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References

1 See, for instance, Leslie, Peter, Federal State, National Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), chap. 3Google Scholar, and Fletcher, Frederick J. and Wallace, Donald C., “Federal-Provincial Relations and the Making of Public Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies,” in Simeon, Richard, ed., Division of Powers and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 125–205Google Scholar.

2 These reflect differing emphases more than fully fledged theoretical schools of thought. See Simeon, Richard, “Meech Lake and Shifting Conceptions of Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Public Policy 14 (1988), S7–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Smiley, Donald, The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), 94–99Google Scholar.

3 The public choice school advocates a radical version of competitive federalism. See Breton, Albert, “Supplementary Statement,” in Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Report Volume Three (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985), 485–526Google Scholar.

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9 Ibid., 267. Scharpf's analysis contradicts the common argument that West Germany's form of “instrastate federalism” at the centre has had a centralizing effect. Rather, in this case, it has had a unifying effect through harmonization, but in a way that serves the lowest common denominator of Land (not federal government) interests. See Leslie, Federal State, National Economy, 84.

10 Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap,” 267.

11 On “linked arenas” see Ostrom, “A Method of Institutional Analysis,” 473.

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25 Ibid., 52.

26 Ibid.

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32 See Banting, “The Decision Rules: Federalism and Pension Reform,” and Banting, Keith G., “Institutional Conservatism: Federalism and Pension Reform,” in Ismael, Jacqueline, ed., Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 48–74Google Scholar.

33 Banting, “Institutional Conservatism,” 66.

34 Skogstad, Grace, “Federalism and Agricultural Policy,” in Bakvis, and Chandler, , eds., Federalism and the Role of the StateGoogle Scholar. Peter Leslie uses agriculture as an example of “voluntary vacancy,” a variant of unilateralism that is contrasted with thrust and riposte (Federal State, National Economy, 68–69).

35 Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, 135.

36 Brown, Douglas M., “The Federal-Provincial Consultation Process,” in Leslie, Peter M., Watts, Ronald L., eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1987–88 (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1988), 87–88Google Scholar.

37 Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, 57–61.

38 Aucoin, Peter and Bakvis, Herman, “Regional Responsiveness and Government Organization: The Case of Regional Economic Development Policy in Canada,” in Aucoin, Peter, ed., Regional Responsiveness and the National Administrative State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1985)Google Scholar.

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43 Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada, 101–20.

44 For a discussion of the contrast with West Germany's more integrated party system see Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties.”

45 Trudeau employed such stratagems to advantage, including his appeal to public opinion in support of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in an attempt to isolate recalcitrant provinces in the constitutional negotiations; and his use of a parliamentary inquiry—the Breau Committee—to provide a forum for a litany of complaints about provincial health and welfare administration from welfare groups. This provided ammunition to justify later legislation aimed at recovering federal power lost under block-funding arrangements. See Milne, Tug of War: Ottawa and the Provinces Under Trudeau and Mulroney, 178–84.

46 Smiley, Donald V. and Watts, Ronald L., Intrastate Federalism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1985), 125Google Scholar. For a proposal that attempts to overcome this kind of objection, see Engelmann, Frederick C., “A Prologue to Structural Reform of the Government of Canada,” this Journal 19 (1986), 667–678Google Scholar. Engelmann proposes a veto power on matters of overlapping jurisdiction. Deadlocks would be broken by ajoint sitting, with the Senate to have no more votes than one-half of the House of Commons.

47 Smiley and Watts, Intrastate Federalism in Canada, 124.

48 Dupré, J. Stefan, “The Workability of Executive Federalism in Canada,” in Bakvis, and Chandler, , eds. Federalism and the Role of the State, 252Google Scholar.

49 Royal Commission, Report Volume Three, 265.

50 Simeon, “Meech Lake and Shifting Conceptions of Canadian Federalism,” S18.

51 Royal Commission, Report Volume Three, 265–69.

52 In this regard, however, note Chandler's argument that the integration of the West German party system is partly a result of the collaborative institutions set up by the federal constitution. This is another case of the linkages that exist between different arenas. In order to exert some control over the partisan composition of the Bundesrat, federal politicians and national party organizations have sought to intervene directly in Land elections, as a result inhibiting the development of distinctive Land party systems (Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties,” 160).