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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
1 Schindeler, F. F., Responsible Government in Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).Google Scholar
2 On the parallel rather than complementary relation between administrative and legislative reform in this province, see Bryden, Kenneth, “Executive and Legislature in Ontario: A Case Study in Government Reform,” Canadian Public Administration 18 (1975), 235–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On COGP, see James D. Fleck, “Restructuring the Ontario Government,” Ibid., 16 (1973), 55–68, and Szablowski, George J., “Policy-Making and Cabinet: Recent Organizational Engineering at Queen's Park,” in MacDonald, Donald C. (ed.), Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), 93–113.Google Scholar
3 Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Debates, February 29, 1972, 5. Hereafter cited as Debates.Google Scholar
4 Draft memorandum, prepared by the Premier's Office, of guidelines and purposes for an enquiry into the Legislature, March 6, 1972, papers of the Ontario Commission on the Legislature, Public Archives of Ontario.
5 See the comments of Nixon, R. F., leader of the opposition, Debates, June 9, 1972, 3438–39.Google Scholar
6 Debates, June 9, 1972, 3464. The formal terms of reference were “to study the function of the Legislative Assembly with a view to making such recommendations as it deems advisable with respect thereto, with particular reference to the role of the Private Members and how their participation in the process of Government may be enlarged, including the services, facilities, and benefits provided to Members of the Assembly,” Journals, 1972, 117.
7 John Cronyn, Chairman of COGP had been rumoured as a fourth commissioner; see Slinger, John, “Probers of MPP's role to be named next week,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 10, 1972.Google Scholar
8 Former MPP Walter Pitman called them “a stellar trio with both experience and imagination, all committed to a strong, influential parliament,” Toronto Daily Star, July 7, 1972.Google Scholar
9 The questionnaires are included among the Commission's papers in the Public Archives of Ontario. The principal theme of the responses is the members’ feeling of being hamstrung in the execution of their duties through inadequate facilities. In addition, members from all parties shared a profound frustration at their impotence in affecting government policy.
10 Ontario Commission on the Legislature, papers, Public Archives of Ontario.
11 Manthorpe, Jonathan, The Power and the Tories: Ontario Politics, 1943 to Present (Toronto: MacmiUan, 1974), 254–64.Google Scholar
12 Debates, December 12, 1972, 5476–77, 5502–23.Google Scholar
13 Ontario, Royal Commission on Book Publishing, Final Report (Toronto, 1972).
14 Elsewhere the Commission gently rebukes the Ministry of Government Services for its well-intentioned emasculation of the Speaker's Office, and speaks of the difficulty in impressing the importance of an independent Speaker upon “those who construct models and flow-charts based upon other priorities, such as efficiency” (1: 58). Members and Assembly staff, who have had to depend upon the Ministry's tender mercies, are less restrained in their criticism.
15 Statutes of Ontario, 1973, c 151.
16 Donald C. MacDonald, “Modernizing the Legislature,” in MacDonald, Government and Politics, 96.
17 Statutes of Ontario, 1974, c 170.
18 Vigorous pressure from several quarters resulted in the bill being substantially altered at the committee stage, chiefly as regards the composition of the Board, preparation of the Assembly's estimates, the tenure of the Clerk, and the job security of Assembly employees.
19 The existing Election Act and the new federal act were examined and found wanting in basic principle as well as in administrative provisions (3: 13–18).
20 Statutes of Ontario, 1975, c 12.
21 The subsidy proposed by the Commission was the lesser of $7,500 or the difference between expenses and contributions, with a reduction of $2 for each $1 by which expenses exceeded certain limits (3: 40). The Act provides the lesser of campaign expenses or 16 cents for the first 25,000 voters and 14 cents for additional voters. (Both included an additional $2,500 for candidates in large northern ridings.) Judging by the data on expenses, contributions and subsidies contained in the Appendices of the Second Annual Report and the Third Annual Report of the Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, almost all candidates in 1975 and 1977 fared better, often substantially better, under the Act than they would have under the Commission's proposals. This is scarcely surprising since the subsidies are payable regardless of the level of contributions.
22 Statutes of Ontario, 1975, c 16.
23 That the Commission's recommendation of even this limited closure was more of a tactical ploy to compensate the government for allowing the opposition greater prerogatives than a response to a real need is indicated in the Commission's own observation that opposition obstruction has not been a serious problem in the Ontario Legislature (1: 5).
24 Management Board Orders are handy devices by which the cabinet, with nary a word in the House, can allocate virtually unlimited funds to ministries which experience shortfalls. Under section 5 of the Management Board of Cabinet Act, orders are to be issued only when “the public interest or the urgent requirements of the public service necessitate further payments,” but the Assembly has virtually no means of checking if such is indeed the case. In 1976–77 and 1977–78, $301 million and $173 million were authorized by Management Board Order. This practice has been defended on the grounds that it permits ministries to present more realistic estimates since it obviates the need for padding for unforeseen circumstances. A good many orders are simply transfers of contingency salary funds voted in a block in the Management Board's estimates, and doled out over the year to the appropriate ministry as the details of salary and wage settlements become known.
25 Select Committee on the Fourth and Fifth Reports of the Ontario Commission on the Legislature, First Interim Report (Journals, December 3, 1975). This report was not printed separately, but was incorporated into the second report as an appendix.
26 Select Committee on the Fourth and Fifth Reports of the Ontario Commission on the Legislature, Second Interim Report (Journals, June 22, 1976), 4.
27 Ibid., 15.
28 Ibid., 19.
29 Ibid., 23.
30 Ibid., 26–31.
31 Ibid., 32
32 Journals, December 16, 1976.
33 On this practice, see my “An Important Procedural Innovation in Ontario,” Canadian Regional Review 2 (1979), 17–20.Google Scholar
34 Select Committee on the Fourth and Fifth Reports of the Ontario Commission on the Legislature, Final Report. This report is of intimidating bulk owing to the inclusion of consultants’ reports on members’ remuneration and on the legislative library.
35 The recommendations of the Commission's First Report, brought forward in early 1979, were fully implemented in a Government bill in June 1979.
36 MacDonald, “Modernizing the Legislature,” 98–99.