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Maldistribution in Western Provincial Legislatures: The Case of Alberta

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

John Anthony Long
John Anthony Long
Affiliation:
University of Lethbridge
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Extract

L'article examine les lacunes de la carte électorale provinciale en Alberta. Dans une première partie, l'auteur discute de la nouvelle carte électorale, adoptée par l'Assemblée législative au cours de la session de 1969, et la controverse qu'elle a soulevée. Cette carte, qui change le rapport du nombre de sièges attribués aux centres urbains et ruraux, traduit l'effort du gouvernement créditiste de donner suite au désir des districts urbains de la province d'accéder à une représentation égalitaire à l'assemblée, tout en maintenant par ailleurs la surreprésentation rurale. La deuxième partie de l'article explore les effets théoriques de la mauvaise distribution électorale sur l'égalité politique: elle désavantage injustement non seulement les électeurs urbains mais aussi les partis dont ils constituent la clientèle. Dans une troisième partie, l'auteur établit un indice de mauvaise distribution, à partir de la carte en vigueur lors des élections provinciales de 1967. Cet indice, qui mesure la qualité de la distribution des sièges d'un district législatif entre les diverses formations électorales, a été proposé par Henry F. Kaiser, sur le principe « un homme, un vote ». Cette distribution de la carte électorale provinciale de l'Alberta est comparée avec celle de la carte fédérale, de meilleure qualité, pour la même province. L'article se termine par la proposition de « critères de tolérance » auxquels devrait se conformer, dans l'avenir, la carte électorale provinciale albertaine afin de répondre aux exigences d'une bonne distribution, telles qu'établies par Kaiser.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , September 1969 , pp. 345 - 355
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1969

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References

1 Bill no. 108, An Act to Facilitate the Redistribution of Seats in the Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Alberta, 2nd session, 16th Legislature, April 7, 1969, p. 6.

2 Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Alberta, 1st session, 16th Legislature, April 5, 1968, p. 1.

3 This rationalization is expressed in the Alberta Wheat Pool's submission. See Pool, Alberta Wheat, “Submission to Province of Alberta, Legislative Committee on Redistribution,” July 26, 1968.Google Scholar

4 See the Calgary Chamber of Commerce's brief, “Redistribution of Alberta, Electoral Constituencies,” Sept. 16, 1968; and the Edmonton Chamber of Commerce's brief, “Redistribution of Electoral Constituencies in Alberta,” Sept. 30, 1968.

5 The new Alberta Electoral Boundaries Commission is to consist of: “(a) a judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court or a district court, to be chosen by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, (b) one person (not a member of the Assembly or an employee of the Government) nominated by the Speaker of the Assembly after consultation with the President of the Executive Council and the Leader of Her Majesty's loyal opposition, (c) two members of the Assembly nominated by the Leader of Her Majesty's loyal opposition, to be chosen one from the Leader of the opposition's party and, where possible, one from the next largest opposition party in the Assembly, (d) two members of the Assembly chosen from the Government party by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, and (e) the Clerk of the Executive Council, one of whom shall be appointed chairman.” Bill no. 108, pp. 1–2.

6 8369 US 186 (1962).

7 377 US 533 (1964). See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 US 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964); and Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado, 377 US 713 (1964). Many commentaries about the reapportionment controversy in the United States are available. For example, see among others Hamilton, Howard D., ed., Legislative Apportionment: Key to Power (New York, 1963)Google Scholar, Hanson, R., The Political Thicket: Reapportionment and Constitutional Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, 1966)Google Scholar; and Grazia, Alfred de, Essay on Apportionment and Representative Government (Washington, 1963).Google Scholar

8 This point is illustrated by the diverse computer methods developed for drawing the boundaries of legislative districts. See Weaver, James B. and Hess, Sidney W., “A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of Computer Techniques,” Yale Law Review, LXXIII (1963), 288–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Forrest, Edward, “Electronic Reapportionment Mapping,” Data Processing Magazine (July 1965)Google Scholar; Nagel, Stuart S., “Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting,” Stanford Law Review, XVII (1965), 863–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hale, Myron Q., “Computer Methods of Districting,” in Reapportioning Legislatures, ed. Hamilton, Howard D. (Columbus, 1966), 96–124.Google Scholar

9 In Manitoba and British Columbia, for example, the population criterion is treated as only one of the factors to be considered in provincial redistribution. See Donnelly, M. S., The Government of Manitoba (Toronto, 1963), 78–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Government of British Columbia, Statement of Votes, General Election, Sept. 12, 1966.Google Scholar

10 “Representation by Population: A Comparative Study,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXXIII (May 1967), 257–8.

11 Alfred de Grazia, for example, outlines the non-population factors that have been traditionally considered in the apportionment of the New York state legislature. He lists such factors as community, decentralization, and rural inaccessibility. Essay on Apportionment, 40–51.

12 “Representation by Population,” 258.

13 Essay on Apportionment, 20.

14 For support of this argument see Mayo, Henry B., An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York, 1960), 62–3Google Scholar; and Ranney, Austin and Kendall, Willmore, Democracy and the American Party System (New York, 1956)Google Scholar, chaps. 1–3. This idea of representational equality can, of course, even be traced to John Locke: see Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government, Gough, J. W., ed. (Oxford, 1956), 79–80.Google Scholar

15 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1966 Census on Canada, I (1–8) (March 1968).

16 The legislative discrimination index is calculated as follows: [No. of urban seats actually held/(% of total voters urban × total no. of seats)] equals legislative discrimination index. For example, in the election year 1967, [20/(49.41% × 65)] =.625. Unlike the federal government, Alberta has consistently districted on the basis of total voters, not people. In fact, the Alberta government does not have available the total number of individuals in the provincial constituencies. Consequently, the figures and conclusions in this section are based upon number of voters, rather than population figures.

17 The Dominion Bureau of Statistics definition of “urban” includes the population living in cities, towns, and villages of one thousand or over, whether incorporated or not. DBS, 1966 Census on Canada, 1 (1–8).

18 Statutes of Alberta, 1967, c. 44; 1966, c. 47; 1964, c. 44; 1962, c. 39; 1961, c. 43; 1959, c. 44; 1957, c. 41; 1953, c. 66.

19 For a survey and critical analysis of the methods of measuring legislative malapportionment see Schubert, Glendon and Press, Charles, “Measuring Malapportionment” American Political Science Review, LVIII (June 1964), 305–12.Google Scholar

20 “A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment,” American Political Science Review, LXII (March 1968), 208–15.

21 Statutes of Canada, 13–14 Eliz. II (1964–5), c. 31, p. 5.

22 This section explaining Kaiser's method duplicates in part his calculations and is in accord with his more complex development of the malapportionment index. For a more detailed explanation of the development of this index the reader should consult the Kaiser article.

23 The Dauer-Kelsay method is the classic way of arriving at the percentage of the population able to elect a majority of representatives in a legislative body. Under the Dauer-Kelsay method all districts within a particular set are ranked from the least to the most populous and 50 per cent plus one of the population in the number of least populous districts equivalent to a minimal majority of representatives in the particular house is summed and divided by the total population to arrive at the percentage of the population which can elect a majority of the legislature. See Dauer, Manning J. and Kelsay, Robert G., “Unrepresentative Voters,” National Municipal Review, XLIV (1955), 515–75.Google Scholar There are several methodological difficulties with this measure, however, that make it unsuitable as an index for comparing the quality of distribution among different legislative district sets. See Kaiser, “A Measure of the Population Quality,” 212–13.

24 “A Measure of the Population Quality,” 211.

25 Ibid., 213–15.

26 Federal index b would be slightly higher if all Alberta federal districts were currently within the 25 per cent tolerance limit.

27 “A Measure of the Population Quality,” 212.