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Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

J. Patrice McSherry
J. Patrice McSherry
Affiliation:
Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations
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Abstract

The transition from military to civilian rule in Latin America has thrown a searchlight upon the legacy of military repression from the era of the national security states, and the problem of still-powerful and unrepentant armed forces. These intertwined problems have profound implications for the possibility of fundamental change in a region long characterized by extreme social inequality and political instability. As Rouquié notes, civilianization of the military state does not necessarily mean the democratization or demilitarization of power. How to deal with the perpetrators of state terror is a burning and controversial issue throughout the region. During the process of transition, the major demand of the military in virtually all states was for guarantees against accountability for human rights crimes—widely called impunity in the region—a demand that implicitly places the military above the law. This issue strikes at the very heart of the transformation of national security states and the democratization of power. Additionally, despite the transition from military rule, structures of the national security apparatus remain embedded within the civilian regimes. An examination of the question of impunity and those embedded structures exposes the tensions between democratization and persisting military prerogatives and power.

Résumé

Le passage de l'autorité militaire à l'autorité civile en Amérique Latine a mis en évidence l'héritage de la répression militaire depuis l'époque des États de sécurité nationale et le problème posé par des forces armées impénitentes et encore puissantes. Ces problèmes étroitement liés pourraient peser profondément sur les possibilités d'un changement fondamental dans une région longtemps caractérisée par une inégalité sociale extrême et une instabilité politique. Comme le remarque Rouquié, la transformation de l'État militaire en État civil n'entraîne pas nécessairement la démocratisation ou la démilitarisation du pouvoir. L'attitude à adopter vis-à-vis des responsables de la terreur de la part du gouvernement est une question brûlante et très controversée. Pendant le processus de transition, dans pratiquement tous les pays, la principale demande de l'armée a été d'obtenir des garanties contre toute inculpation de crime contre les droits de l'homme—ce qui est communément appelé impunité dans la région—demande qui place tacitement l'armée au-dessus des lois. Ce problème est au centre même de la transformation des États de sécurité nationale et de la démocratisation du pouvoir. De plus, malgré la transition du pouvoir militaire au pouvoir civil, les structures de l'appareil de sécurité nationale restent inbriquées dans les régimes civils. Un examen de la question de l'impunité et de ces structures étroitement liées révèle les tensions entre la démocratisation et les privilèges et le pouvoir persistents des forces armées.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 463 - 488
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1992

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References

1 See Rouquié, Alain, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 350.Google Scholar

2 This is my definition, drawn from the literature, and elaborated in McSherry, J. Patrice, “The Evolution of the National Security State: The Case of Guatemala,” Socialism and Democracy 10 (1990), 121–153CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other sources in English on this type of state include: Alves, Marian Helena Moreira, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 6–10Google Scholar; O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C. and Whitehead, Laurence, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)Google Scholar, especially the selections by Manuel Antonio Garretón and Luciano Martins in Latin America (1989 edition); O'Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)Google Scholar, and “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” in Collier, David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979Google Scholar). This analysis highlights Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay, although other states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru share some similar traits. Traditional one-man dictatorships such as Duvalier's Haiti, Somoza's Nicaragua and Stroessner's Paraguay fall outside my definition of national security states.

3 Important contributions to the literature on national security doctrine include Comblin, José, The Church and the National Security State (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979)Google Scholar; Guatemalan Church in Exile (IGE), Guatemala: Security, Development, and Democracy (Mexico City, April 1989Google Scholar); Landau, Saul, The Dangerous Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Lernoux, Penny, Cry of the People (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980Google Scholar); Pion-Berlin, David, “The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception and the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 382–407CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pion-Berlin, David and Lopez, George A., “Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975–1979,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991), 35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lopez, George A., “National Security Ideology as an Impetus to State Violence and State Terror,” in Stohl, Michael and Lopez, George A., eds., Government Violence and Repression (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 73–95Google Scholar; and Weinstein, Martin, Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988Google Scholar).

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18 Nash, Nathaniel C., “Chile's Leader and Army Square Off Over the Past,” New York Times, March 26, 1991Google Scholar. Some encouraging steps to combat impunity were taken in September 1991 in Chile: a court order to exhume bodies of the disappeared from clandestine cemeteries was obtained for the first time, and two high-ranking officers accused of overseeing the assassinations of Orlando Letelier (Allende's ambassador to the US, killed in Washington, D.C. in 1976) and Ronni Moffitt were arrested. See Nash, Nathaniel C., “Graves Without a Name Yielding Their Secrets,” New York Times, September 19, 1991Google Scholar, and “Chile Seizes Two Policemen in Letelier Case,” New York Times, September 24, 1991.

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38 Arturo Valenzuela, address at Columbia University, September 28, 1990. Hereafter cited as Columbia address.

39 In September 1991, as bodies packed two per coffin were exhumed from clandestine cemeteries, Pinochet outraged Chileans by commenting “How economical!” and congratulating “the seekers of cadavers.” He also demanded general pardons for violators of human rights, arguing it was “time to stop the party” and “not reopen the wound” (“Gobierno califica de ‘crueles’ comentarios de Pinochet sobre ejecutdaos politicos,” El Diario/La Prensa [September 4, 1991; “Pinochet pide indultar violadores de DH,” Ed Diario/La Prensa, September 16, 1991]).

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47 Valenzuela, Columbia address.

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49 A recent example is the case of Haiti, where President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected by 65 per cent in early 1991, only to be overthrown by the military, with the support of the elites, in September 1991. See also Stephens, Evelyne Huber, “Democracy in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 25 (1990), 157–176.Google Scholar

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