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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
This article contends that the ethical principle underlying C. B. Macpherson's attempted retrieval of liberal democracy embodies two ontologies, a liberal ontology of self-governance and a humanist ontology of developmental man. The presence of the latter ontology is shown to reveal a fundamental weakness in Macpherson's thought: it justifies a type of political authority destructive of what he values in liberal democracies. The article concludes that, contrary to Macpherson's understanding, his radical effort to rescue liberal democracy from capitalism could dispense with the humanist ontology and be sustained on the basis of the liberal ontology alone.
Cet article soutient que le principe moral sous entendu dans l'effort de recherche du libéralisme démocratique chez Macpherson est composé de deux ontologies: une ontologie d'autogestion et une ontologie de développement humaniste. La présence de celle-ci est montrée comme étant le reflet d'une faiblesse fondamentale de la pensée de Macpherson: la justification d'une forme d'autorité politique néfaste aux valeursde la démocratic libérale auxquelles il tient. Dans son analyse l'auteuren vient à la conclusion que, contrairement à ce que croit Macpherson, son effort radical pour sauvegarder la démocratic libérale des attaques du capitalisme pourrait se passer de 1'ontologie humaniste et étre soutenue par la seule base de l'ontologie libérale.
1 Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973)Google Scholar
2 See Macpherson's comment: “what I have been trying to do all along... is.. .to work out a revision of liberal-democratic theory, a revision which clearly owes a good deal to Marx, in the hope of making that theory more democratic while rescuing that valuable part of the liberal tradition which is submerged when liberalism is identified with capitalist market relations” (Macpherson, C. B., “Humanist Democracy and Elusive Marxism: A Response to Minogue and Svacek,” this JOURNAL 9 [1976], 423)Google Scholar.
3 This is Minogue”s, K. R. view in his “Humanist Democracy: The Political Thought of C. B. Macpherson,” this JOURNAL 9 (1976). 394.Google Scholar
4 See Svacek, Victor. “The Elusive Marxism of C. B. Macpherson,” this JOURNAL 9 (1976), 416–22Google Scholar; Wood, Ellen Meiksins. “C. B. Macpherson: Liberalism, and the Task of Socialist Political Theory.” in Miliband, Ralph and Saville, John(eds.). The Socialist Register 1978 (London: Merlin Press, 1978), esp. 216, 222–26Google Scholar; and Weinstein, Michael A., “C. B. Macpherson: The Roots of Democracy and Liberalism,” in Crespigny, Anthony de and Minogue, Kenneth (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophers (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975), 270–71Google Scholar. For an alternative critique of Macpherson”s individualism, see Lukes, Steven, “The Real and Ideal Worlds of Democracy,” in Kontos, Alkis (ed.), Powers, Possessions, and Freedom. Essays in Honour of C. B. Macpherson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 144–52.Google Scholar Macpherson replies to Svacek and Minogue in his “Humanist Democracy and Elusive Marxism.” A spirited critique of Wood”s assessment of Macpherson and an equally forceful rebuttal can be found in Panitch, Leo, “Liberal Democracy and Socialist Democracy: The Antinomies of C. B. Macpherson,” in Miliband, Ralph and Saville, John (eds.), The Socialist Register 1981 (London: Merlin Press, 1981), 144–68;Google Scholar and Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Liberal Democracy and Capitalist Hegemony: A Reply to Leo Panitch on the Task of Socialist Political Theory,” Ibid., 169–89.
5 See Minogue, “Humanist Democracy,” 394.
6 As do Svacek, “Elusive Marxism,” passim; Panitch, “Liberal Democracy and Socialist Democracy,” passim; and Weinstein, “C. B. Macpherson: The Roots of Democracy and Liberalism,” 271.
7 See particularly Panitch, “Liberal Democracy and Socialist Democracy,” 161; Weinstein, “C. B. Macpherson,” 269–71; and Wood, “C. B. Macpherson,” esp. 216, 217. The charge of inconsistency is implicit in Svacek”s analysis (“Elusive Marxism,” passim). Compare this with Minogue”s comment that there is a “curious mixture of individualism and communal sentiment” in Macpherson”s thought and that he is “likely to be assailed by liberals for his communal bias, yet attacked by socialists for the individualist undertones of his work” (“Humanist Democracy,” 394).
8 The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes 10 Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 263–64Google Scholar. Briefer restatements of the “possessive individualist” assumptions can be found in Macpherson”s Democratic Theory, 158, 167, 192–93.
9 Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, P. (ed.), (New York: New American Library, 1965), sec. 4.Google Scholar
10 Possessive Individualism, 48.
11 Ibid., 263.
12 Strictly speaking, in Locke”s doctrine there are two other constraints on a person”s freedom apart from those voluntarily accepted. The first is that a person may not invade another”s freedom of self-governance or the subsidiary ”natural” rights it includes. This constraint is included by Macpherson in possessive individualist postulate (6) (Possessive Individualism, 264). The second is the Lockean proscription of taking one”s own life (Second Treatise, sees. 6. 23). Since they do not vitally affect this stage of our argument, we have omitted mention of them until below (see footnote 17).
13 See, inter alia, Possessive Individualism, 55–56, 267; and Democratic Theory, 11, 43, 64–65, 146.
14 Second Treatise, sees. 27, 33. Part of the following argument on the implications of Locke”s doctrine of property is drawn from Seaman, John W., “Unlimited Acquisition and Equality of Right: A Reply to Professor Lewis,” this JOURNAL 11 (1978), 402–06Google Scholar. Compare with Lewis, Thomas J., “An Environmental Case Against Equality of Right,” this JOURNAL 8 (1975), 258–64.Google Scholar
15 Locke. Second Treatise, secs. 37. 41.
16 Ibid., sees. 36, 50. For Macpherson”s treatment of how Locke circumvented the “enough, and as good” constraint, see Possessive Individualism, 311–14.
17 See above, footnote 12.
18 See also Seaman, “Unlimited Aquisition,” 406.
19 Democratic Theory, 103
20 For Macpherson, ”s various formulations of this principle, see his Democratic Theory, 6, 10, 11, 13, 19, 21, 23, 32, 34, 36, 40, 51, 52–53, 55, 57; The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1, 2, 114Google Scholar; “The Meaning of Economic Democracy,” University of Toronto Quarterly 11 (1942), 404, 416–17Google Scholar; and The Real World of Democracy (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1966), 36–37, 58–59, 66.Google Scholar
21 Democratic Theory, 177; see also, 174, 178.
22 Ibid., 41.
23 Ibid., 34.
24 Ibid., 32.
25 Ibid., 8.
26 Ibid., 9.
27 Ibid., 5.
28 Ibid., 37–38. The emphases are in the original.
29 Ibid., 53.
30 Ibid., 4, 53–54.
32 Ibid., 55. The emphases are in the original.
33 See above, footnote 13.
34 Possessive Individualism,56–57; Democratic Theory, 9–11, 35,64–65; The Real World, 40–44.
35 Democratic Theory, 12.
36 Ibid., 42, 44
37 Ibid., 41–42; compare with 9–11.
38 See Ibid., 9–11, 40–42.
39 Ibid., 15.
40 Macpherson”s claim that his ethical principle of “positive liberty” is nonprescriptive of ends (Ibid., 112) must accordingly be challenged. While the principle may not be so monistic as to prescribe which of the essentially human capacities a person ought to concentrate on developing, it does operate with an unquestionable prescriptive force against the kind of acquisitive ends which currently prevail in liberal market societies.
41 See, for example, Ibid., 10, 11,13,19,51,54–55; Life and Times, 2; and The Real World, 37, 58.
42 Democratic Theory, 51; compare with “The Meaning of Economic Democracy,” 404.
43 The Real World, 58.
44 Ibid., 59.
45 Democratic Theory, 60.
46 Ibid., 96, 105.
47 Ibid., 41. The liberal assumption might also be lurking behind Macpherson”s assertion that the “autonomous theory of political obligation” which he is searching for at the conclusion of his Possessive Individualism could only be “valid” if it receives “wide acknowledgement” (276). To presume that political obligation is valid only when it receives widespread acknowledgement or assent is to presume, with Locke, that rightful political power must rest on the assumption that man is naturally free from dependence on the will of others and may be politically obliged only by his voluntary consent.
48 Democratic Theory, 56.
49 This makes Macpherson the inheritorof J. S. Mill”s position (see Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, Spitz, David [ed.], [New York: Norton, 1975]. esp. 54–60)Google Scholar.
50 Svacek, “Elusive Marxism,” 416–22. Another critic, Michael Weinstein, argues (“C. B. Macpherson,” 270–71) that Macpherson will not condone the use of force to impose moral transformation and complains about his “failure to will the means to overcoming human debasement.” In spite of this complaint, Weinstein himself does not accept moral transformation being imposed by a vanguard.
51 Panitch, “Liberal Democracy and Socialist Democracy,” 153–54, 157–59; and Wood, “Liberal Democracy and Capitalist Hegemony,” 177–79.
52 One possible exception to this is Leo Panitch who appears to see that Macpherson defended both positions, but not simultaneously (Panitch, “Liberal Democracy and Socialist Democracy,” 157–61).
53 The Real World, 19.
54 Ibid., 19.
55 Ibid., 19–20.
56 Democratic Theory, 106. The emphasis is in the original. See also, Ibid., 96.
57 Ibid., 106. The emphasis is in the original.
58 The Real World, 20.
59 Life and Times, 99: compare with Democratic Theory, 76, 140.
60 Life and Times, 99–100. Compare with Democratic Theory. 76.
61 Life and Times, 100.
62 Ibid., 101. Compare with Macpherson”s “partial breakdown-partial breakthrough” thesis, in Democratic Theory, 76, 140.Google Scholar
63 Life and Times, 107.
64 Democratic Theory, 14.
65 Life and Times, 91. Emphasis added.
66 “Humanist Democracy and Elusive Marxism,” 425.
67 Democratic Theory, 115.
68 The Real World, 20.