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Organizational Change in the Machinery of Canadian Government: From Rational Management to Brokerage Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Peter Aucoin
Peter Aucoin
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
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Abstract

Organizational change in the central machinery of government is essentially a function of executive leadership. The major determinants of such change are invariably political and not administrative in character and derive from the leadership paradigms of chief executive officers—their philosophy of government, management style and political objectives. This phenomenon is examined in the recent transformation of the Canadian central executive system from one based upon the Trudeau paradigm of rational management to one structured to fit the Mulroney paradigm of brokerage politics. The organizational instruments of each paradigm are considered and their respective capacities to meet the requirements of executive leadership in our modern administrative state are assessed. It is argued that the two different systems and the changes introduced by them are best explained by the paradigms of these two prime ministers.

Résumé

Les changements organisationnels dans les rouages centraux de l'état dépendent avant tout du style des dirigeants. Les déterminants principaux de ces changements sont invariablement de nature politique plutôt qu'administrative. Ils résultent des paradigmes des principaux dirigeants: leurs philosophies gouvernementales, leurs styles de gestion. leurs buts politiques. Nous examinons ce phénomène dans le contexte de la transformation récente des organes politiques centraux au Canada, soil à partir d'un système fondé sur le paradigme « Trudeau » de gestion rationnelle vers celui fondé sur le paradigme « Mulroney » de politique de médiation. Nous analysons les instruments organisationnels de chaque paradigme ainsi que leurs capacités à satisfaire aux exigences de la direction d'un état moderne. Les qualités et les styles différents des deux premiers ministres expliquent bien les deux types de système et les changements qu'ils ont introduits.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 1986 , pp. 3 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1986

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References

1 Campbell, Colin, Governments Under Stress (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1983), 351.Google Scholar

2 For a description of these changes, see Clark, Ian D., “Recent Changes in the Cabinet Decision-Making System in Ottawa.” Canadian Public Administration 28 (1985). 185–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 In addition to Campbell (Governments Under Stress), see Doern, G. Bruce, “Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy Making in Canada,” this JOURNAL 4 (1971), 243–63Google Scholar, and Seidman, Harold, Politics, Position and Power (3rd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

4 Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, Canada, Release, September 17, 1985.Google Scholar

5 See, for instance, Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin, Peter (eds.). Public Policy in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979).Google Scholar

6 The analysis in this study is restricted to the paradigms of Trudeau and Mulroney. This is not to imply that the changes introduced by either Joe Clark or John Turner were not based upon their personal paradigms. On Clark, for example, see Doern, G. Bruce and Phidd, Richard, Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Methuen. 1983).Google Scholar By restricting the analysis to prime ministers Trudeau and Mulroney, however, it is possible to consider in some depth the relationships between their paradigms and their organization of the central machinery of government and do so within the limits of a single article.

7 The Trudeau regime has been analyzed extensively by students of Canadian politics and public administration. The treatment here draws upon these analyses. It is necessary, however, to consider the Trudeau regime at some length in order to look systematically at the effects of the three principal dimensions of his paradigm, and to do so not only with hindsight but also in contrast to another major paradigm.

8 See, for instance, King, Anthony, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis,” Parts 1–1, British Journal of Political Science 3 (1973), 291–313 and 409–409.Google Scholar

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35 See Simpson, Jeffrey. “The Missing System,” Globe and Mail (Toronto). July 4. 1985.Google Scholar