Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2003
There is little agreement about the degree to which parliamentary institutions can help overcome the democratic deficit in global governance. While much of the literature on the European Union's democratic deficit focuses on reforming parliament, most commentary on the subject in global governance and foreign policy holds out little hope that national parliaments could be used to mitigate the effects of the internationalization of public policy. This article examines the case of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), established by the Australian government in 1996 in an explicit attempt to use parliamentary reform to address the democratic deficit. Although JSCOT was highly active, it did not significantly change the way in which Australian national positions in international negotiations were arrived at; the democratic deficit created in Australia by increasing internationalization has not been mitigated by the creation of this committee. While the JSCOT initiatives might have been motivated by the concerns of the government of John Howard to overcome the democratic deficit, the way in which JSCOT actually evolved departed considerably from those original intentions. Ironically, JSCOT evolved in ways not dissimilar to the evolution of NGO consultation in Canada in the 1990s: as a tool of political management, a means by which the government could channel protest, deflect opposition, and in essence legitimize its own policy preferences.