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Perceptions of the Great Coalition in West Germany, 1966–1969*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Frederick C. Engelmann
Frederick C. Engelmann
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
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Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , March 1972 , pp. 28 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1972

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References

1 The following German books have appeared on this coalition: Schneider, Franz, Grosse Koalition, Ende oder Neubeginn? (Munich, 1969Google Scholar); Rummel, Alois, ed., Die grosse Koalition, 1966–1969 (Freudenstadt, 1969Google Scholar); Hennis, Wilhelm, Grosse Koalition ohne Ende? (Munich, 1968Google Scholar). Of these, Hennis is an electoral-law polemic. For the placing of the early aspects of the coalition in the German political context, see Edinger, Lewis J., Politics in Germany (Boston, 1968Google Scholar). For the latest on West German politics, see the entire July 1970 issue of Comparative Politics, especially the articles by Klingemann and Pappi, Edinger, and Kaltefleiter. For early, pithy, critical comments, see Grass, Guenter, Ueber das Selbstverstaendliche (Neuwied, 1968Google Scholar). For periodical literature, see Lehmbruch, G., “The Ambiguous Coalition in West Germany,” Government and Opposition, III (1968), 181–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tilford, R. B., “German Coalition Politics,” Political Quarterly, XXXIX (1968), 169–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Interesting public opinion items can be found in Kaase, Max, “Determinanten des Wahlverhaltens bei der Bundestagswahl 1969,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, II (1970), 46–110Google Scholar, and in Institut fuer Demoskopie, Waehlermeinung – nicht geheim (Allensbach, 1969Google Scholar).

2 Otto Kirchheimer first saw the Austrian coalition as the embodiment of the “waning of opposition” concept (“The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes,” Social Research, XXIV (1957), 127–56). His posthumous chapter in LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M., eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966CrossRefGoogle Scholar) shows that he had come to think of the concept in terms of the competition between converging “catch-all” parties. Kirchheimer's death in 1965 deprived us of what might well have been the most incisive analysis of the Great Coalition.

3 Herbert Wehner first suggested a common foreign policy of SPD and CDU in 1960, and he actually conducted coalition talks with Luecke (CDU) and Guttenberg (CSU) in 1962. Throughout the sixties he saw a coalition with the CDU as the appropriate vehicle for the competitive equalization of the SPD.

4 The seminal work in modern coalition theory is Riker, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn., 1962Google Scholar). Three important articles appeared in volume LXII of the American Political Science Review (1968): C. R. Adrian and C. Press, “Decision Costs in Coalition, Formation,” 556–63; M. A. Leiserson, “Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games,” 770–87; P. R. Brass, “Coalition Politics in North India,” 1174–91. See also Kelley, E. W., “Techniques of Studying Coalition Formation,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), 62–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Volume IV of Scandinavian Political Studies (Oslo, 1969) has important chapters by E. Damgaard (Denmark), K. Toernudd (Finland), and O. Ruin (Sweden). The most comprehensive work in the area is Groennings, Svenet al., A Study of Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970Google Scholar). It contains a chapter, by Merkl, Peter H., on “Coalition Politics in West Germany,” leading up to the end of 1966.Google Scholar

5 See especially Val Lorwin's chapter in Dahl, R. A., ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, 1966Google Scholar).

6 On the Austrian Coalition, see, among others, Nassmacher, K. H., Das oesterreichische Regierungssystem (Koeln, 1968Google Scholar); Lehmbruch, G., Proporzdemokratie (Tuebingen, 1967Google Scholar); F. C. Engelmann in Dahl, Political Oppositions; and R. P. Stiefbold's forthcoming Small European Democracies: Austria.

7 The seminal work is Hermens, Ferdinand A., Democracy or Anarchy? (Notre Dame, Ind., 1938Google Scholar). See also Hennis, Grosse Koalition ohne Ende?

8 The terminology used here is derived from Almond, G. A., “Comparative Political Systems,” Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 391–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For excellent applications to Austria, where these subcultures emerge more clearly than in Germany, see Wandruszka's, A. section in Benedikt, H., ed., Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich (Vienna, 1954Google Scholar) – which antedates Almond – and Diamant, A., “The Group Basis of Austrian Politics,” Journal of Central European Affairs, XVIII (1958), 134–55.Google Scholar Adenauer's success was of course based initially on his ability to add Protestant elements to a once Catholic political organization.

9 See especially Chalmers, Douglas A., The Social Democratic Party of Germany (New Haven, 1964Google Scholar).

10 The daily and periodical press of the Federal Republic of Germany provides the major source of events referred to in this paper.

11 See especially the cover story in Der Spiegel, Sept. 1, 1965.

12 For a fuller discussion of Proporz, see Engelmann in Dahl, Political Oppositions.

13 The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag. The government of the Great Coalition was the first since 1957 with a two-thirds majority.

14 Grundgesetz, art. 65.

15 Reprinted in Rummel, Die grosse Koalition, 179–95.

16 Loewenberg, Gerhard, Parliament in the German Political System (Ithaca, NY, 1966), 123–8.Google Scholar

17 The interviews were conducted in May, June, and July 1969, by Ulrich von Alemann, Victor G. Hamm, Paul T. Luebke, Jr., and Marilyn S. Sibley, all graduate students with German and North American training. Four subjects could not be interviewed until early September 1969.

18 Since it proved impossible to sample party functionaries and members (size and characteristics of the universe are not known), their answers could not be submitted to a significance test. Instead Cramer's V was used to indicate strength of relationships.

19 The writer's questions were formulated with the advice of Dr W. Hartenstein and Mr W. Stumpf of the Institut (referred to below as infas).

20 Individual index values were transferred to a 9 to 1 range. Values were arbitrarily assigned as high (9–7), medium (6–4), and low (3–1); see Table XXV. On this, the writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr V. G. Hamm.

21 In addition to the indices described here, an SES index was constructed, for the population sample, consisting of education, occupation, perceived social class, income.

22 The questions were not identical. Both samples were given the choice of two statements – one positive, one negative – about the effect of the Great Coalition on parliamentary democracy. While the élite question just mentioned “parliamentary democracy,” the mass question, though otherwise simplified, mentioned “parliamentary democracy and our country.” The writer was, at the time, persuaded by infas that the question would not be sufficiently salient without adding “our country.” While he does not feel, in retrospect, that this consideration was worth the price of non-identical questions, he does feel that the SES and educational skewings of the answers to the mass question establishes that the élite and the mass question tend to be comparable.

23 All references to the SES scale are in a high-low direction.

24 For significance, see Table XXV.

25 SPD acceptance showed a slightly negative correlation with education, but it was below that for the question on the coalition's effect on democracy. Education then was a good differentiator of answers relating the Great Coalition to democracy, but not much of a differentiator once more affective answers about the coalition were elicited.

26 “Preponderantly” indicates that only a secondary expectation remained unfulfilled; “partly,” that either the chief expectation or several secondary ones remained unfulfilled; “scarcely,” that only a secondary expectation was fulfilled.

27 There is a significant difference between the mean party marks (t = 3.5778, p < .001).

28 A possible explanation for this relationship is the failure of the Great Coalition to meet left expectations of a more flexible Eastern and German policy. A deeper explanation presents itself, the interpretation of the Great Coalition as a manifestation of the one big authoritarian governing complex, drawing support from those who desire authoritarian government. The writer was persuaded that to arrive at valid statements in the area of basic political psychology would require an undertaking too costly for the frame of this project. But some findings of the study, especially the strong public support for the incumbent chancellor, show that such a basic investigation might well have yielded most significant data.

29 The Gamma correlations of the shifts were (optimism positive, pessimism negative): parliamentarians, —0.34 to 0.27; functionaries, —0.24 to 0.69; members, —0.46 to 0.13.