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Rawlsian Reasonableness: A Problematic Presumption?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2006

Shaun P. Young
Shaun P. Young
Affiliation:
York University
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Abstract

Abstract. The notion of “reasonableness” has been a prominent feature of liberalism since the latter first emerged as a coherent philosophical project. Indeed, arguably, reasonableness is the core value animating the liberal outlook. Such a claim is especially true with respect to the conception of political liberalism promoted by John Rawls. In essence, the viability of Rawlsian political liberalism is dependent upon the “reasonableness” of both the public conception of justice and the individuals who must live under its constraints. However, this reliance on reasonableness poses a number of potential difficulties for Rawls's argument, particularly insofar as his belief in the ability of his conception to secure the conditions essential to establishing and sustaining a just and stable liberal democracy is premised upon a number of questionable claims and expectations regarding the reasonableness of individual attitudes and behaviour. The primary task of this essay is to identify and explain a number of concerns that render suspect the plausibility of Rawls's conclusions regarding the extent to which it is realistic to presume the reasonableness of individuals and, by extension, the ability of his conception to achieve its stated goal.

Résumé. La notion du “ raisonnable ” constitue un aspect important du libéralisme depuis l'émergence de ce dernier en tant que projet philosophique cohérent. En fait, le raisonnable est sans doute la valeur principale qui anime le point de vue libéral. Ceci est particulièrement vrai de la conception du libéralisme politique défendue par John Rawls. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls dépend essentiellement du caractère raisonnable de la conception publique de la justice, ainsi que des individus qui doivent vivre selon ses contraintes. Toutefois, l'importance du raisonnable dans ce concept soulève un certain nombre de problèmes dans le raisonnement de Rawls. Il est persuadé que ses idées garantissent les conditions essentielles pour établir et maintenir une démocratie libérale, mais ce postulat s'appuie sur de nombreuses affirmations et espérances discutables quant au caractère raisonnable des attitudes et comportements individuels. Cette dissertation s'efforcera principalement d'identifier et d'expliquer un certain nombre de problèmes remettant en cause la plausibilité des conclusions de Rawls. On étudiera tout particulièrement dans quelle mesure il est réaliste de présumer du caractère raisonnable des individus et, par extension, de la capacité de la conception de Rawls à atteindre ses objectifs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 159 - 180
Copyright
© 2006 Cambridge University Press

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