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Reforming Canadian Democracy? Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

David Laycock
David Laycock
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
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Abstract

This article considers connections between the ideological orientations of the Reform party of Canada and its proposals for reform of political representation. Particular attention is devoted to its advocacy of direct democracy, new models of representative behaviour and constitutional reform as means of democratizing Canadian politics. These proposals are discussed in relation to Reform's account of collusion between special interests, parties and interventionist governments in our federal system. Reform's preference for market-based over political decision-making is identified as a key foundation of their explanation and remedies for the crisis in Canadian democracy. A review of Reform's blending of older populist critiques with modern neo-conservative perspectives on this problem clarifies the party's distinctiveness and appeal. The Reform agenda emerges as one aiming to contract not just the power of special interests, but also the scope of democratic decision-making in public life.

Résumé

Cet article examine les liens entre les orientations idéologiques du Reform Party du Canada et ses propositions de réforme portant sur la représentation politique. Une attention particulière est accordée au plaidoyer en faveur de la démocratic directe, de nouveaux modéles de représentation ainsi que des réformes constitutionnelles visant à démocratiser davantage la vie politique canadienne. Ces propositions sont mises dans le contexte de l'analyse proposée par le Reform Party concernant la collusion entre les intérêts particuliers, ceux des partis et des gouvernements dans notre système fédéral. La préférence affichée par le Reform Party en faveur d'un processus décisionnel s'inspirant des lois du marché plutôt que des pratiques politiques est identifiée comme le principal facteur expliquant la position des réformistes à propos de la crise de la démocratic canadienne ainsi que des solutions mises de l'avant par ce parti. Un examen de l'ensemble des pratiques populaires antérieurs ainsi que des idées néo-conservatrices actuelles, telles qu'exprimées par le Reform Party, clarifie ce qui le distingue des autres partis et explique ce qui le rend attirant. Le programme du Reform Party est particulier en ce qu'il vise à restreindre non seulement le pouvoir des intérêts particuliers mais aussi la portée du processus décisionnel démocratique dans la vie publique.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , June 1994 , pp. 213 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1994

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References

1 Media support for the Reform fiscal and economic position has extended from the Alberta Report and BC Report magazines to The Globe and Mail. The latter editorially endorsed Reform's deficit reduction plans following their response to the April 1993 federal budget and Reform's budget-cutting programme during the federal election campaign. Many nonmetropolitan dailies and weeklies across Alberta and BC also supported Reform, especially those in the Sterling (Hollinger) and Thomson chains. This may have had significant electoral effects in centres like Prince Rupert and Nanaimo that had previously elected New Democratic party MPs.

2 For a recent account that captures much of this position, see Gairdner, William, The War against the Family (Toronto: Stoddart, 1992)Google Scholar; and Gairdner, William, The Trouble with Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1990)Google Scholar. Gairdner was a regular keynote speaker at Reform meetings until his anti-oriental racism became too politically damaging for the party.

3 For an account of the variety of these campaigns, see Laycock, David, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910–45 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

4 Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1992), 6Google Scholar.

5 Aberhart, William, Post-War Reconstruction: Second Series of Broadcasts (Edmonton: Bureau of Information, 1943)Google Scholar; Finkel, Alvin, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), chaps. 3 and 4Google Scholar; and Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, chap. 5Google Scholar.

6 The Globe and Mail (Toronto), March 29, 1993Google Scholar.

7 Reform Party of Canada, “Industrial Development and Diversification,” Principles and Policies: The Blue Book (1991), sees. A and B, 13–14Google Scholar.

8 Manning, The New Canada, 341, 346–347Google Scholar.

9 For a notable exception to this rule, see ibid., 320.

10 ibid., 321.

11 Huntington, S., Crozier, M. et al., The Crisis of Democracy: Report of the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975)Google Scholar. Hayek's largely compatible account of interest-group capture of modern liberal governments is succinctly stated in The Political Order of a Free People, Vol. 3 of Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 13–17Google Scholar. For some insight into the mindset of neo-conservative American citizens, see the account of “private liberalism” in Dryzek, John and Berejikian, Jeffrey, “Reconstructive Democratic Theory,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 55–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 This alternative was mentioned in the federal election campaign once Manning was questioned about his plan to cut federal transfers to individuals. No suggestions were offered regarding how lower-income families would afford premiums in private unemployment insurance plans in regions and periods of high unemployment.

13 Reform Party of Canada, “Alternatives to the Welfare State,” Principles and Policies (Calgary, 1990), sees. A and B, 20Google Scholar. For the early Social Credit attack on the compulsory character of the emerging welfare state, see Aberhart, , Post-War ReconstructionGoogle Scholar.

14 Manning, The New Canada, 344Google Scholar.

15 The chair of a recent report by the National Forum on Family Security emphasized that “the middle class is now at risk and the next generation faces a dismal future … the middle class is bewildered by change” (“Family Incomes Drop to 1976 Level,” The Globe and Mail [Toronto], May 4, 1993).

16 See Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, 272–275Google Scholar, for an overview of four prairie populist perspectives on this question.

17 In Ottawa, Every Special Interest Group Counts Except One: Canadians (Calgary: Reform Party, 1992), 2Google Scholar.

18 This Election Don't Just Buy Packaging: Look at What's Inside (Vancouver: Reform Party of Canada, March 1993), 3Google Scholar.

19 See Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, chap. 5, esp. 215–223Google Scholar.

20 For an excellent account of this as the project of social democracy, see Esping-Anderson, Gosta, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (New York: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

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23 Manning repeats one such figure in The New Canada, 121: $110 billion from “the producing provinces to the federal treasury and the energy consumers of central and eastern Canada” from 1980–1985.

24 “Preamble,” Constitution of the Reform Party of Canada (October 1992), 1Google Scholar.

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26 Quebec as villain is an important theme in Alberta Report founder Ted Byfield's account of the Canadian political economy and the need for the Reform party. In his introduction to Act of Faith, Byfield insists that following the introduction of the NEP, “More and more it began to look as though Canada was a mere con game, being played out by Ontario and Quebec at the expense of the West. And the numbers proved it. Between 1969 and 1984, Alberta transferred more than $85 billion to the rest of Canada, most of it to Quebec, which gained $80 billion out of tax transfers and energy benefits during the same period. This money, had it stayed in Alberta, would have financed industrial diversification in the bust that followed. But by then the money was gone” (O'Neill, Terry, ed., Act of Faith: The Illustrated Chronicle of the Reform Party of Canada [Vancouver: BC Report Books, 1991], 3)Google Scholar.

27 Manning, The New Canada, 300–305Google Scholar.

28 ibid., 305.

29 Government of Alberta, The Case for Alberta (Edmonton, 1938)Google Scholar, part 2, chap. 5, “Democracy and Confederation,” and chap. 6, “Recommendations for Social and Economic Reconstruction.”

30 The best account of these circumstances remains Mallory, James, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954)Google Scholar.

31 Reform Party, Blue Book, 6Google Scholar.

32 ibid., 7–8.

33 ibid., 30.

34 Manning, The New Canada, 318Google Scholar.

35 Special Edition, “Know More!” The Reformer (Fall 1992), 1Google Scholar.

36 ibid.

37 These boards and other supply management mechanisms are attacked in the Blue Book section on agricultural policy. In this case Reform's commitment to market principles runs headlong into its desire to expand its rural electoral base beyond the richer districts of the southern prairies. How this might affect its MPs' voting records on agricultural issues in the future remains to be seen.

38 Such opportunities are presumably abetted by public school delivery of French immersion education to anglophone students in English Canada, which explains Manning's October 1993 election promise to eliminate federal subsidies to school boards offering such programmes.

39 The irony can be better appreciated from reading the party constitution's preamble, which features a list of “the farsighted and courageous men and women [who] have sought to correct … injustices and inequities and to achieve more responsible and representative government in Canada.” The list includes “the leaders and supporters of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec” (Party, Reform, Constitution [1992], 1Google Scholar).

40 See, for example, Manning The New Canada, chap. 17Google Scholar; and Preston Manning, “Navigating toward a New Canada,” address to joint meeting of the Empire and Canadian Clubs, Toronto, March 12, 1992.

41 Manning, The New Canada, 306Google Scholar.

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43 Manning, The New Canada, 305–306Google Scholar.

44 Manning has added his party to the bandwagon of support for “sustainable development.” In his spring 1992 address to the Empire and Canadian Clubs in Toronto, Manning listed “our common stake in the conservation of the environment” as the second of five “aspirations and concerns we all share in common” mentioned by “rank and file Canadians” (Manning, “Navigating toward a New Canada,” 3). See also the sections on “environmental reform” in the Blue Book.

45 See Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, chaps. 3 and 5Google Scholar.

46 Blue Book (1991), 1, 5Google Scholar.

47 Reform Party of Canada, A Proposed Draft Constitutional Amendment to Reform the Senate of Canada (Calgary, May 1988)Google Scholar.

48 “Analysis of the Consensus Report on the Constitution,” The Reformer, special edition (Fall 1992), sec. 3, 1. Interestingly, this analysis does not suggest giving the elected Senate the power to introduce money bills. See Proposed Draft Constitutional Amendment, sec. 28, 3.

49 For indirect evidence of the party's motivations on the Triple-E Senate, see the editorials of Ted Byfield in Alberta Report and BC Report. While not an official party spokesman, Byfield is undoubtedly more influential than anyone save Manning as an articulator of Reform party themes and justifier of Reform policy. A good selection of these editorials can be found in O'Neill, Act of Faith.

50 See “Analysis,” The Reformer, sees. 4–6, 1Google Scholar.

51 Proposed Draft Constitution Amendment, sec. 23.3, 2Google Scholar.

52 Manning, The New Canada, 320–321Google Scholar. This phrase has been popularized by Milton Friedman.

53 “Preamble,” Constitution, 1Google Scholar.

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55 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), Vol. 1, chaps. 3–5, and Vol. 2, chap. 5Google Scholar.

56 Reform Party Constitution Amendments and Final Draft Election Platform, October 1992, 37, Plank 14Google Scholar: Better Representation in Parliament, reads: “If elected, a Reform Government will change the practices of the House of Commons to allow MPs to more freely represent their constituents' wishes by ensuring that the defeat of a government measure does not automatically mean defeat of the government.”

57 “Rationale and Comments,” in ibid., 37.

58 Manning, The New Canada, 323Google Scholar.

59 Reform Party, Final Report of Task Force on Democratic Populism (August 1992), 37–38 (hereafter Task Force)Google Scholar.

60 This Election Don't Just Buy the Packaging, 3. This passage in the pamphlet is preceded by an imaginary quotation from a concerned citizen: “My MP and other MPs rammed the GST through even though most people didn't want the tax,” implying that opposition to the GST is part of the party agenda. Preston Manning convinced his party to reverse its passionate opposition to the GST at the 1991 party assembly.

61 Task Force, 38Google Scholar.

62 In a 1991 paper Thomas Flanagan argued that Reform expresses a synthesis of the most important and anti-elitist themes in Canada's “populist democracy” tradition since the early nineteenth century. See Flanagan, T. and Lee, M., “The Roots of Reform,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, 1992Google Scholar.

63 Task Force, 38. This is consistent with an earlier definition of populism provided by Stephen Harper, then chief policy advisor to Manning: “The purpose of populism is to represent and involve people more fully in decisions. However, once decisions are taken, its purpose is to enhance the ability of the government to govern on behalf of the majority.” Cited in “Reform Party's New-Look Populists Gird for March to East,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 06, 1991Google Scholar.

64 Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943), chaps. 22–23Google Scholar.

65 See Irvine, William, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1920)Google Scholar; and Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, chap. 2Google Scholar.

66 Manning, The New Canada, 321–322Google Scholar.

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68 Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, chaps. 3 and 4Google Scholar.

69 “Preamble,” Constitution, 1Google Scholar.

70 For suggestive findings in support of this contention, see Dryzek, and Berejikian, , “Reconstructive Democratic Theory,” 56Google Scholar.

71 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, Reforming Electoral Democracy, 223Google Scholar.

72 This is argued in a compelling manner by Boyer, Patrick in Direct Democracy in Canada: The History and Future of Referendums (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

73 This is not to say that other appeals for politicization of issues such as environmental degradation and regulation, or a broad range of women's issues, will not mobilize large numbers of people. But for those who are not recruited into the “postmaterialist” concerns of new social movements, disaffection and alienation can easily lead to depoliticization and a flight from public life.

74 Reform Party Constitution Amendments, 38.

75 ibid., 52.

76 ibid., 38.

77 Manning, The New Canada, 325–327Google Scholar.

78 ibid., 325.

79 ibid., 326.

80 This Election Don't Just Buy the Packaging, 3. The passage continues: “Recall will make MPs more concerned about their constituents and less concerned about party, perks and pensions.”

81 Marx, Karl, The Civil War in France (1871)Google Scholar.

82 Mallory, , Social Credit and the Federal Power, 79Google Scholar. For an explanation of why the 1936 recall legislation was inconsistent with Social Credit's theory of representation, see Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, 230–234Google Scholar.

83 Manning, The New Canada, 326Google Scholar.

84 Constitution, 10.

85 For a Useful but brief account of the difficulty in deducing populist consistency in Manning's approach to his party, see “The Paradox of Manning,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), October 20, 1993Google Scholar. This article notes the July 1993 memorandum to candidates and campaign teams outlining the need for a “loyalty oath” to prevent the media from amplifying the significance of divisions within the party on policy matters.

86 Manning, Ernest, Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 32–36Google Scholar.

87 ibid., 41.

88 Macpherson, C. B., Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), 158Google Scholar; and Laycock, , Populism and Democratic Thought, 218–219Google Scholar.

89 Preston Manning defends this practice in The New Canada, 333–35, in terms that are far from offensive or upsetting. But whatever other laudable goals this process accomplishes, central control over the party is enhanced.

90 Task Force, 12.

91 Presumably the message will be clearer in the wake of revelations that party headquarters staff ignored or shredded most questionnaire responses for much of the time that this form of “grass-roots consultation” has been practised. See “Reform Party Secretly Shredded Thousands of Questionnaires,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), March 22, 1993Google Scholar.

92 Both Milton Friedman and, to a lesser extent, Friedrich Hayek display a cynicism about politics that rules out the possibility that rational persons can learn from and co-operate with each other regarding allocative issues in the political process. This rejection of all but market mechanisms for legitimate social decisions emerges clearly in the sympathetic account of each author in Green, David G., The New Right: The Counter Revolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987)Google Scholar.

93 See, among others, Cohen, Joshua and Rogers, Joel, “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance,” Politics and Society 20 (1992), 393–472CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dryzek, John, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Mansbridge, Jane J., “A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation,” in Petracca, Mark P., ed., The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 32–57Google Scholar.

94 This argument is by no means typical only of marginalia in recent democratic theory. It can be found in a compelling form in Dahl, Robert, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

95 The report of the party's Task Force on Democratic Populism notes a commonly expressed concern regarding unidirectional communications between the national office and constituency associations, especially regarding platform development. See Task Force, 10.