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Setting the Environmental Agenda in Canada and the United States: The Cases of Dioxin and Radon*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Kathryn Harrison  and
George Hoberg
Kathryn Harrison
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
George Hoberg
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Abstract

This article uses the case of toxic substance regulation to examine the process of governmental agenda-setting. Two kinds of comparisons are employed: across-national comparison of Canada and the United States, and a comparison of two toxic substance controversies. In the case of dioxins from pulp mills, the issue emerged on the two Countries' agendas at approximately the same time. In contrast, the issue of indoor air pollution from radon reached the US regulatory agenda in 1986, but as of mid-1990 had yet to emerge as a significant regulatory issue in Canada. The comparative case analysis yields four major conclusions: (1) changes in science and technology can be important driving forces behind the emergence of an issue, but as necessary, not sufficient conditions for agenda-setting; (2) the interdependence of the two countries produces an interdependence of their regulatory agendas; (3) policy entrepreneurs play a fundamental role in forcing issues onto the governmental agenda; and (4) the incentives and influence of policy entrepreneurs is shaped by the institutional structures and political cultures of the two countries.

Résumé

Cet article évalue la formation de l' « agenda » politique en etudiant la réglementation des substances toxiques. Les auteurs comparent la reglementation de deux substances toxiques, la dioxine et la radon, au Canada et aux États-Unis. Le problème du rejet de la dioxine des moulins a papier est apparu simultane merit dans les deux pays. Au contraire, les risques d'exposition au radon ont atteint l'agenda des offices de réglementation américains en 1986 alors qu'en 1990, ils n'avaient pas encore attiré l'attention des offices canadiens. Quatre conclusions se dégagent de cette étude: (1) les changements dans la science et la technologie peuvent mener á l'émergence d'un enjeu mais ces éléments sont insuffisants en soi quoique nécessaires; (2) l'interdépendance des deux pays conduit à l'interdépendance de leur agenda de réglementation; (3) les entrepreneurs en politiques publiques jouent un rôle fondamental dans la mise á l'agenda des problémes; (4) les institutions et les cultures politiques des deux pays façonnent à la fois les stimuli et l'influence de ces entrepreneurs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 3 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1991

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References

1 The most prominent studies have been Cobb, Robert W. and Elder, Charles D., Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972)Google Scholar; Nelson, Barbara, Making an Issue of Child Abuse: Political Agenda-Setting for Social Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Kingdon, John, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little-Brown, 1984)Google Scholar. Agenda-setting is given prominence in the basic US texts on public policy, for example, Jones, Charles O., An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (3rd ed.; Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole, 1984)Google Scholar, and Peters, Charles, American Public Policy: Promise and Performance (2nd ed.; Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 None of the major Canadian policy texts includes systematic discussions of agenda-setting. See Brooks, Stephen, Public Policy in Canada: An Introduction (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989)Google Scholar; Atkinson, Michael and Chandler, Marsha, eds., The Politics of Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983)Google Scholar; and Doern, Bruce and Phidd, Richard, Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Methuen, 1983)Google Scholar. A partial exemption is Doern and Phidd's chapter on priority-setting, but it focusses exclusively on prime ministers and is not tied to the broader literature on agenda-setting. Also, Stanbury's, W. T.Business-Government Relations in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1987)Google Scholar, reviews some of the agenda-setting literature, but is pre-occupied with “issue management” from a business perspective. One major exception is Bruce Doern's The Politics of Risk, a study prepared for the Royal Commission on Matters of Health and Safety Arising from the Use of Asbestos in Ontario, January 1982. However, Doern does not refer to the literature on agenda-setting.

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5 Ibid., 86.

6 Kingdon, Agendas.

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8 See, for instance, arguments by the American Paper Institute in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Dioxin Pollution in the Pigeon River, North Carolina and Tennessee, 100th Congress, 2nd sess., July 13, 1988, 378.

9 For a review of the state of knowledge of health effects of dioxin, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Health Assessment Document for Polychlorinated Dibenzo-p-dioxins,” EPA/600/8–84/014F, 1985.

10 Ibid.

11 Laboratory tests have found guinea pigs to be thousands of times more sensitive to 2,3,7,8-TCDD than hamsters. See Lowrance, William W., Interpretive Summary of the Symposium, in Lowrance, William W., ed., “Public Health Risks of the Dioxins,”Proceedings of a Symposium held in New York City, Life Sciences and Public Policy Program of the Rockefeller University,October 19–20, 1983 (New York: Rockefeller University, 1984), 3–15.Google Scholar

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15 Consent Decree Civil Action 85-0983, District Court of DC.

16 See Memorandum from Hanmer, Rebecca W., Acting Assistant Administrator for Water, to Water Management Division Directors, “Interim Strategy for the Regulation of Pulp and Paper Mill Dioxin Discharges to the Waters of the United States,” 08 9, 1988Google Scholar, and US EPA, Region V, “USEPA Bench Scale Wastewater Treatability Study, Proposed Interim Control Measures, Interim NPDES Permit Strategy,” Preliminary Report, October 1988.

17 “2 E.P.A. Studies Confirm Threat to Fish of Dioxin from Paper Plants,” New York Times, March 14, 1989; Environmental Reporter, July 7, 1989, 507–08; and Whittemore, Ray C., LaFleur, Larry E., Gillespie, William J., Amendola, Gary A. and Helms, Jennie, “USEPA/Paper Industry Cooperative Dioxin Study: The 104 Mill Study,” unpublished paper available from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1989.Google Scholar

18 “2 EPA Studies Confirm Threat of Fish to Dioxin from Paper Plants.”

19 Ferguson, Jock, “Low Levels of Dioxins Found in Diapers, Food Containers,” Globe and Mail, September 23, 1987, A4Google Scholar. The story was first reported, in a less complete form, in August by Bohn, Glenn, “Deadly Dioxin Alert Sounded for BC Mills,” Vancouver Sun, 08 21, 1987, Bl.Google Scholar

20 “Pulp Firm Says No Reason to Fear Traces of Dioxin,” Globe and Mail, December 18, 1987, B8, and Canadian Environmental Control Newsletter, January 25, 1988, no. 356, 2948.

21 Bohn, Glenn, “Dioxin in Seafood Charge Disputed,” Vancouver Sun, 01 6, 1988, A3Google Scholar.

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23 Food and Drug Regulations, B.01.046.

24 Food and Drug Regulations, B.01.047. Paradoxically, the amendment allows higher levels of contamination by the most toxic of the dioxins, while maintaining an absolute prohibition of less toxic congeners.

25 Hume, Mark, “Dioxins in Fish Spark a Warning by Greenpeace,” Vancouver Sun, 05 18, 1988.Google Scholar

26 A Greenpeace representative had attended an international conference at which the Health and Welfare Canada findings were presented. The government's findings did not receive publicity until the coalition issued a press release following the conference. See Matas, Robert, “Toxic Chemicals Found in Carton Milk Sample During Federal Testing,” Globe and Mail, 10 26, 1988, AlGoogle Scholar, and Noble, Kimberly, “Pulp Firms to Spend $500 Million to Eliminate Dioxin,” Globe and Mail, 11 2, 1988Google Scholar.

27 Toronto Star, October 27, 1988.

28 “Pulp Mills Face Tough Controls on Dioxins,” Vancouver Sun, December 1, 1988, B19.

29 In March 1989, the province extended the commitment for new regulations to include all organochlorines. See Bohn, Glenn, “Quick Mill Cleanup a Must, Minister Says,” Vancouver Sun, 03 17, 1989.Google Scholar

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31 The province announced that mills will be required to reduce organochlorines in effluent to 1.5 kg/tonne pulp by December 31, 1994, as well as meeting interim requirements for 1991. See “B.C. Rules on Toxic Chemicals to Cost Pulp Firms $800 Million,” Globe and Mail, May 13, 1989.

32 The announcement came after a highly publicized leak of an Environment Canada report which reported embarrassingly low levels of compliance with existing federal pulp mill regulations. See Bohn, Glenn, “Study Reveals Majority of Pulp Mills Break Law,” Vancouver Sun, 03 15, 1989, AlGoogle Scholar, and Sinclair, William F., “Controlling Pollution from Canadian Pulp and Paper Manufacturers: A Federal Perspective,” Environment Canada, Conservation and Protection, 07 1988Google Scholar.

33 B.C. Ministry of Environment Press Release, December 1, 1988.

34 Even this discovery should not have come as a surprise. Two years earlier, in 1983, EPA had detected dioxins in fish downstream from a Wisconsin pulpmill at more than 50 ppt 2,3,7,8-TCDD, leading the state to close the commercial fishery in that reservoir. Initially, regulators suspected that the source was use of dioxincontaminated chlorophenols as “slimicides” on pulp mill machinery, rather than formation of dioxins during the process. See Van Strum, Carol and Merrell, Paul, No Margin of Safety: A Preliminary Report on Dioxin Pollution and the Need for Emergency Action in the Pulp and Paper Industry, Greenpeace USA, 1987, v-7Google Scholar.

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36 Letter from Alex McBride, EPA, to Patricia K. Hill, API, January 13, 1987, reproduced in Van Strum and Merrell, No Margin of Safety, X-8.

37 Interestingly, one of the only mentions of the ongoing study prior to release of the results in September 1987 was contained in an Ontario Ministry of Environment press release in July 1986, which noted that an “intensive in-mill sampling program, designed to pinpoint the source of dioxin, has been initiated by the U.S. EPA and the pulp and paper industry.… The results of this 10 month long study will be applicable to Ontario mills.” See Ontario Ministry of Environment, “Dioxin Test Results from Ontario Pulp and Paper Mills,” July 17, 1986, reproduced in Van Strum and Merrell, No Margin of Safety, X-14.

38 Van Strum and Merrell, No Margin of Safety, at VI-1.

39 API hired a public relations firm to formulate a strategy to deal with the anticipated public reaction to the dioxin issue, and offered training for company representatives. See Noble, Kimberly, “Pulp, Paper Mills Linked to Dioxin Contamination,” Globe and Mail, 10 14, 1987, B4Google Scholar.

40 The ministry issued a press release, “Ministry Testing Rainy River Fish for Dioxins,” in October 1985.

41 Ontario Ministry of Environment, Press Release, “2,3,7,8-TCDD Dioxin in Fort Frances Paper Mill Sludge,” May 2, 1986.

42 Ontario Ministry of Environment, Press Release, “Dioxin Test Results from Ontario Pulp and Paper Mills,” July 17, 1986.

43 Personal communication.

44 Noble, “Pulp, Paper Mills Linked to Dioxin Contamination.”

45 Ferguson, “Low Levels of Dioxins Found in Diapers, Food Containers.”

46 Kingdon, Agendas, 81.

47 For a review of available control techniques, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies for Reducing Dioxin in the Manufacture of Bleached Wood Pulp, OTA-BP-0-54, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1989.

48 See Canadian Pulp and Paper Association press release, November 1, 1988.

49 Of course, Health and Welfare Canada's statements reflecting certainty that levels below 20 ppt 2,3,7,8-TCDD are “safe” could simply reflect uncertainty about the safety of levels above 20 ppt, rather than equal certainty that such levels are “unsafe.” However, Health and Welfare's statements assuring the public of absolute safety did not invite sophisticated public debate about the implications of scientific uncertainty.

50 For a recent review of the evidence, see Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Research Council, Health Risks of Radon and Other Internally Deposited Alpha-Emitters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988)Google ScholarPubMed.

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52 Mazur, Allan, “Putting Radon on the Public's Risk Agenda,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 12 (1987), 86.Google Scholar

53 Ibid., 92.

54 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Health Risks Due to Radon in Structures: A Strategy and Management Plan for Assessment and Mitigation,” September 1985.

55 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, A Citizen's Guide to Radon, OPA-86–004, August 1986.

56 Krimsky and Plough, Environmental Hazards, 140–41.

57 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Radon Reduction Methods: A Homeowner's Guide, OPA-86-005, August 1986. Its public information efforts were further supported by a special radon issue of the agency's public interest periodical, The EPA Journal, published in August 1986.

58 New York Times, August 5, 1987, 14.

59 Shabecoff, Philip, “Major Radon Peril is Declared by U.S. in Call for Tests,” New York Times, 09 13, 1988, AlGoogle Scholar.

60 Congress was particularly concerned that “the public is made aware of the risks that remain at levels below 4 picocuries per liter” (U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 1988, 3618–19).

61 The agency estimated that 10 per cent of all American homes have radon levels higher than the 4 pCi/1 action level, with some areas having considerably higher levels. For instance, 70 per cent of the homes tested in the state of Iowa had levels higher than the action levels (Environment Reporter, October 27, 1989, 1127–28).

62 “Invisible Menace,” Maclean's, October 29, 1984, 16. This story was only one paragraph long.

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76 This figure is equivalent to a lifetime risk of 1 in 100. Canada banned the pesticide alachlor in 1988, when excess lifetime cancer risk was projected to between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10,000.

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89 This strategy, however, was less effective in diffusing conflict in the dioxin case because of the aggressiveness of entrepreneurs in Canada. Where entrepreneurship is lacking, as in the radon case, the strategy can be much more effective.