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Social Choice Theory and the Reconstruction of Elections: A Comment on Levesque's Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Peter Woolstencroft
Peter Woolstencroft
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo
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Abstract

The import of social choice theory lies in its examination of the various choice rules available for the recording and weighing of preferences in an election and the consequences of those rules for democratic political life. A choice rule is a method for aggregating individual preferences into a collective determination. Choice rules vary in their capacities to maximize (and minimize) various values desired in a system of decision-making. They also vary in their capacities to reveal information about preferences.

Type
Notes
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 16 , Issue 4 , December 1983 , pp. 785 - 789
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1983

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References

1 Riker, William H., Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982).Google Scholar

2 Levesque, Terrence J., “On the Outcome of the 1983 Conservative Leadership Convention: How They Shot Themselves in the Other Foot,” this JOURNAL 16 (1983), 779–84.Google Scholar

3 For a similar analysis, see Joslyn, Richard A., “The Impact of Decision Rules in Multi-Candidate Campaigns: The Case of the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination,” Public Choice 30 (1976), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Krause and LeDuc, in their analysis of the 1976 Progressive Conservative leadership convention, have argued that while some delegates “may order the preferences from the beginning,... there is little evidence that most delegates approach voting in this way” (Krause, Robert and LeDuc, Lawrence, “Voting Behaviour and Electoral Strategies in the Progressive Conservative Leadership Convention of 1976,” this JOURNAL 12 [1979], 132).Google Scholar John Courtney, on the other hand, has argued that delegates, as politically active and well-informed people, are capable of rank-ordering preferences, and could do so if asked or required to (Courtney, John C., The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada [Toronto: Macmillan, 1973], 208).Google Scholar

5 Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, 65–66.Google Scholar

6 Smiley, D. V., “The National Party Leadership Convention in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis,” this JOURNAL 1 (1968), 395–98.Google Scholar

7 Courtney, , The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada, 206–07.Google Scholar

8 Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, 141–68.Google Scholar

9 Krause and LeDuc, “Voting Behaviour and Electoral Strategies in the Progressive Conservative Leadership Convention of 1976,” 102.