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State Autonomy and Provincial Policy-Making: Potato Marketing in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Grace Skogstad
Grace Skogstad
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

Nordlinger's thesis regarding the capacity of state officials to act autonomously is examined by focussing upon the behaviour of elected officials in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island during a debate to reform the potato marketing system. The article argues that Nordlinger overstates the autonomy of elected officials by failing to appreciate that dominant societal groups can deploy many of the same autonomy-enhancing instruments available to state officials. Their relative success in doing so is a function of the political economy of the geographic unit, and in particular the extent to which it is market-oriented, relatively underdeveloped and characterized by a traditional political culture. Federalism and the nature of the policy issue under debate are additional factors which affect elected state officials' steering capacity.

Résumé

La thèse de Nordlinger quant à la capacité d'action autonome des fonctionnaires d'État est examineé au moyen d'une étude du comportement de fonctionnaires élus au Nouveau-Brunswick et à l'Île du Prince Edouard au cours d'une débat visant la réforme du système de mise en marché des pommes de terre. Nous tenterons de démontrer que Nordlinger exagère l'autonomie des fonctionnaires élus en ne reconnaissant pas que les groupes dominants d'une société peuvent utiliser, afin d'accroître leur autonomie, bien des instruments disponibles aux fonctionnaires d'état. Le fait qu'ils aient eu un certain succès est tributaire de l'économie politique de l'unité géographique, et en particulier de son orientation vers l'accroissement du marché, relativement sous-développé, et caracterisé par une culture politique traditionnelle. Le fédéralisme ainsi que la nature de la question de politique considerée constituent des facteurs supplémentaires affectant la capacité de direction des fonctionnaires d'état élus.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 1987 , pp. 501 - 524
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1987

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References

1 Nordlinger, Eric A., On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 3.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., 32.

3 Ibid., 90–91, 110–13, 139.

4 See Cairns, Alan C., “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism,” this JOURNAL 4 (1977), 699Google Scholar. Cairns discusses the capacity of governments “to mould their environment in accordance with their own governmental purposes.” Further, “studies of Canadian politics have suffered from a disciplinary mobilization of bias which grossly underestimates the autonomy of elites, the weight of government, and the moulding effect of institutions on political behaviour. A form of sociological reductionism common to North American political scientists has stressed society at the expense of the polity and either devalued, ignored, or denied an autonomous role for government” (724–25). Donald Smiley is also a proponent of Nordlinger's thesis: “The state-centered view of liberal democracy is a valuable prism through which we might investigate federalism and state-society relations in democratic nations more broadly, and ... suggests that the structures and processes that prevail within the state apparatus are important determinants of the macrodistribution of power within these nations”Google Scholar (“Federal States and Federal Societies with Special Reference to Canada,” International Political Science Review 5 [1984], 453).

5 Lindblom, Charles, “The Market as Prison,” in Ferguson, Thomas and Rogers, Joel (eds.), The Political Economy (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), 6.Google Scholar

6 PEI, Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 1982, 20; New Brunswick, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Statistics 1983, 11; Spatial Planning Inc., Final Report: Potato Marketing Board, Producers Association Study Prepared for Prince Edward Island Department of Agriculture (Charlottetown, April 26, 1984), Table 3, for Prince Edward Island data; Senopi Consultants Ltd., A Report on the Situation of New Brunswick Potato Farmers for the National Farmers Union (May 1980), Table 13, for New Brunswick data; Transport Canada, Potato Distribution System: The First Report of a Working Group on the Prince Edward Island v. New Brunswick Potato Distribution System (July 1977), 5.

7 About 10 per cent of employment in northwestern New Brunswick is dependent on the potato industry (Ibid.); the Senopi report estimates that 96 per cent of total potato acreage is in Carleton, Victoria and Madawaska counties (5).

8 David J. Glover, “Contract Farming and the Transnationals” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 1983), 58.

9 McCain Produce Co. Ltd., “Brief for Presentation at the National Farm Products Marketing Council Public Hearing at Perth-Andover, N.B., September 4, 1980,” 4; Glover, “Contract Farming,” 74; Senopi Consultants Ltd., Report, 33–34.

10 Glover, “Contract Farming,” 84.

11 Ibid., 144.

12 Marie Burge, “Potato Production: Prince Edward Island” (unpublished paper, University of Prince Edward Island, June 28, 1983), 18.

13 Under the authority of the Combines Investigation Act, the federal government appointed a one-man Commission of Inquiry in 1925 to investigate the New Brunswick charges. The interim report of Commissioner Harry Hereford concluded that farmers' charges were well-placed and that McCain Produce, among others, had manipulated prices to their advantage for a period of five years. In PEI, the Agricultural Committee of the PEI Legislature found it difficult to determine the truth of allegations by the Potato Growers Association that growers of certified seed potatoes had suffered “considerable loss in the marketing of their potatoes due to price cutting among dealers of the province.” But it concluded that “a marketing board, or marketing through one salesman” was necessary “to eliminate the destructive competition that exists today”—a conclusion similar to that of the Hereford Commission in New Brunswick. See Potato Marketing Inquiry, “Report of the Agriculture Committee of the Provincial Legislature of PEI,” submitted March 27, 1934, as it appeared in The Guardian (Charlottetown), April 5, 1934.Google ScholarPubMed

14 The Potato Board, acting as a single-desk agency, entered an agreement with the federal government by which the Marketing Board guaranteed specified prices for potatoes delivered to it, and the federal government, in turn, guaranteed the Board these prices plus handling charges. When a large influx of American potatoes caused 1953 prices to drop below their record 1951 and 1952 levels, the minimum price guarantee cost the federal government $2.4 million. The federal government's waning enthusiasm for the Board was matched by producers' displeasure and they subsequently voted to retain the Potato Marketing Board but to eliminate its compulsory buying powers. Once the Board lost its monopoly authority, dealers successfully undercut its prices. The private traders regained control over potato pricing and the Board confined its role to that of a promotional agency. See The Tariff Board, “Report Relative to the Investigation Ordered by the Minister of Finance Respecting the Production, Consumption, Marketing, Imports and Exports of Potatoes,” Reference No. 117 (Ottawa, 1955), Schedule E, Marketing Legislation and Marketing Boards; Errol Sharpe, A People's History of Prince Edward Island (Toronto: Steel Rail Publishers, 1976), 192–93Google Scholar; and Russell, Peter, Leading Constitutional Decisions (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965)Google Scholar, “PEI Potato Marketing Board v. H. B. Willis,” 271.

15 Senopi Consultants Ltd., Report, 39; Matheson, Neil A., “Potato Marketing Board Given Sharp Criticism: Resolution Requests Industry Conference,” Charlottetown Guardian, January 11, 1967Google Scholar; Matheson, Neil, “Hot Potato for Growers,” Globe and Mail, February 25, 1967.Google Scholar

16 Romahn, Jim, “Spud Farmers Split on Marketing Board Idea,” Kitchener-Waterloo Record, September 9, 1980Google Scholar, quoting the testimony of an Island farmer before the National Farm Products Marketing Council; “Potatoes: PEI Expects a Better Future,” Family Herald, May 11, 1967; National Farm Products Marketing Council, Potatoes—Report of Public Hearings (Ottawa: December 19, 1980), unnumbered, 12.Google ScholarPubMed

17 Surette, Ralph, “A Real Life Maritime Potato Drama,” Halifax 4th Estate, August 4, 1976.Google Scholar

18 Garland, Robert and Machum, Gregory, An Almanac of New Brunswick Elections, 1870–1980Google Scholar, Social Science Monograph Series, Special Issue No. 2, 132. See as well Elkins, David J. and Simeon, Richard, chap. 2, “Provincial Political Cultures,” in Elkins, David J. and Simeon, Richard (eds.), Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1980).Google Scholar

19 Fitzpatrick, P. J., “New Brunswick: The Politics of Pragmatism,” in Robin, Martin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics (2nd ed., Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 128Google Scholar.

20 Milne, David A., “Politics in a Beleaguered Garden,” in Smitheram, Verner et al., The Garden Transformed: Prince Edward Island, 1945–1980 (Charlottetown: Ragweed Press, 1982), 68Google Scholar; and MacKinnon, Frank, “PEI: Big Engine, Little Body,” in Robin, (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics, 229.Google Scholar

21 Garland and Machum, Almanac, 132; Thorburn, Hugh G., Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 72, 76.Google Scholar

22 Glover, “Contract Farming,” 121–22. For positive producer views of McCain see Nelson, Robert, “McCain's Equals Spud Power,” Atlantic Insight, December 1979Google Scholar; and “Farmers to Get $5.05 a Barrel,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, March 13, 1975, which quotes James Patterson, the acting secretary of the New Brunswick Potato Producers' Association: “We don't want anything to happen that would jeopardize the future of McCain Foods Ltd. We need them as they need us.”

23 For data on potato prices see Burge, “Potato Production Prince Edward Island,” 6, and Senopi Consultants Ltd., Report, Table 6. Descriptions of the producer protest include “Potato Diversion,” The Grower, April 1967; “Ottawa Grants Additional Aid to NB Potato Men,” Charlottetown Guardian, May 5, 1967; “Threat to Dump Potatoes Ends,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, May 5,1967; and “Potato Growers Seek a Union,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, January 16, 1968.

24 “Potato Industry Act Proves Controversial,” The Telegraph-Journal, November 22, 1969; “NFU States Case,” Bugle, January 8, 1970; “Potato Industry Act Again Under Fire,” The Cataract Weekly, April 9, 1970, 1; “Members in New Brunswick Concerned About Potato Bill,” Union Farmer, September 1969. The powers of the Joint Potato Council are described in “Potato Industry Act Proves Controversial,” The Telegraph-Journal, November 22, 1969.

25 The NFU proposal is outlined in The National Farmers Union, “Open Letter” (Perth, N.B., February 1980); NFU, “The Prince Edward Island Potato Marketing Board,” no date; Burge, “Potato Production,” 26–28.

26 The NFU proposal was branded as an attempt to “replace a system of free enterprise” with “a restrictive one.” See “Defeat Seen for Potato Marketing Plan,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, March 8, 1973. The NFU reported “undue pressures” being exerted on producers and quoted one member as saying: “If you think the dirty work is in elections then try a potato plebiscite—they [the dealers, Board and traditional farm unions] pulled out all stops.... People got scared and they got confused... there were powerful people who didn't want it.” See NFU, “The Prince Edward Island Potato Marketing Board,” 4, 2, and 3, respectively.

27 See Dorrell, Martin, “Last-Ditch Stand on Spuds,” Globe and Mail, August 9, 1975Google Scholar: “The uncharacteristic display of toughness is part of the board's last-ditch attempt to stay in business and to regain the respect of both the growers and the provincial government.” See as well “Potato Board Aims at Price Stability,” Ottawa Citizen, July 6, 1973; “Potato Marketing Board Finalizes Details: Marketing Proposals to be Taken to Growers,” Charlottetown Guardian, August 1974.

28 “Shipments of PEI Spuds to be Controlled After August 1st,” Journal Pioneer, June 20, 1975.

29 Nemetz, Donald, “Managing Development,” in Smitheram et al., The Garden Transformed, 155–76.Google Scholar

30 “Premier Notes Agricultural Lag,” Charloltetown Guardian, March 8, 1972Google Scholar; Yeo, Lome, “Evaluation Report Claims Stagnation in Agriculture: Critical Assessment Revealed in Development Plan Progress,” Charlottetown Guardian, April 25, 1974Google Scholar; Watkins, Lyndon, “PEI Feeling Effects of Depressed Potato Industry,” Globe and Mail, July 8, 1972Google Scholar; Matheson, Neil A., “Government Agriculture Policy Draws Criticism from Federation,” Charlottetown Guardian, December 31, 1970.Google Scholar

31 “Shape Up or Lose Federal Help,” Hartland Observer, December 2, 1976; “$21 Million Needed to Provide Aid to Potato Farmers,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, March 26, 1975. In spite of Whelan's warning, the federal Agricultural Stabilization Board paid out $21 million in 1977, $6.8 million in 1978 and $122.6 million in 1979 to support potato prices.

32 The Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick, Trial Division, Judicial District of Woodstock, Between New Brunswick Potato Agency and Harold Culberson and Sons Ltd., and Between New Brunswick Potato Agency and Conrad Toner (Fredericton, December 31,1982), 23. The transcript of this decision also serves as the source of the plebiscite data and description of the step-by-step implementation of the NBPA.

33 Glover, “Contract Farming,” 133–34; Foster, David, “Potato Farmers Boiling,” Globe and Mail, May 10, 1975Google Scholar. The potato plan defeated in the province-wide plebiscite in 1977 was one recommended by an advisory committee composed of all groups in the potato industry except the NFU, which boycotted it.

34 McCain, “Brief,” 9.

35 Desmond Morley, then secretary-manager of the N.B. Potato Agency, in an interview with the author, May 31, 1984, Moncton, N.B.

36 In its “Proposal for a Potato Marketing Agency for Eastern Canada” presented to the National Farm Products Marketing Council, July 16,1980, the ECPPC noted that since mid-1977 as a provisional council, and since April 1979 when it was incorporated, it had served as a “medium” for “provincial potato producers' organizations, potato marketing organizations and individual producers, with the support of their respective provincial departments of agriculture” (2).

37 National Farm Products Marketing Council, Potatoes—Report of Public Hearings, Ottawa, December 19, 1980, 5–7; McCain, “Brief,” 2.

38 National Council, Potatoes, 6.

39 “PEI Potato Agency Wins by Narrow Margin,” Union Farmer (September 1982), 2.

40 This description of the PEI Potato Board's strategy draws upon interviews with a number of individuals, including interviews with the general manager of the Board, an advisor to the premier during the talks, and a producer who was also then a member of the Board, June 1984. See transcript of CBC, “The World at Six,” September 2,1980, quoting the Potato Board's suggestion that “too much power” would shift to some bureaucrats in Ottawa if the agency were implemented.

41 See Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, A Study of the Potato Industry of Prince Edward Island (Ottawa, 1983), which argued that this market shift could result if quotas and price protection under the agency gave producers in central Canada the “security” to expand production (54). Since the DREE study was based on interviews with brokers, dealers, wholesalers and retailers, it is not clear whether the idea was that of the authors of the report, the PEI Marketing Board, or others. People interviewed for this study were aware of DREE's conclusions.

42 Adamson, Agar and Stewart, Ian, “Party Politics in the Mysterious East,” in Thorburn, Hugh G. (ed.), Party Politics in Canada (5th ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 325Google Scholar; Nemetz says of the CDC: “in the view of the Islanders, the plans were ‘theirs, not ours’” (“Managing Development,” 173).

43 Norman Clarey, spokesman for the producers during the talks and also a member of the Potato Board, to the author, June 20, 1984, Westville, PEI. Clarey had been a supporter of the regional agency until the breakdown over the interim pricing agreement and was described by many as a “main actor” during the talks.

44 Clarey, Norman, as quoted in Lewis, Ginny, “Clarey Defends Industry,” Agri-book Magazine, Vol. 10, No. 5 (March 1984), 30.Google Scholar

45 Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, 93.Google Scholar

46 Ibid., 113–14.

47 Spatial Planning Inc., “Final Report,” 50–51.

48 Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, 96.Google Scholar

49 MacKinnon, Frank, “PEI: Big Engine, Little Body,” in Robin, (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics, 228.Google Scholar

50 McConnell, Grant, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 106.Google Scholar

51 Coleman, W., “A Comparative Study of Language Policy in Quebec: A Political Economy Approach,” in Atkinson, M. M. and Chandler, M. A. (eds.), The Politics of Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 25.Google Scholar

52 Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, 113.Google Scholar

53 McCain, “Brief,” 6.