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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Modestly impressive by its lack of mention both in a recent examination of the political leadership of the prime minister and the more traditional texts of the Canadian political process, is serious notice of environmental limitations on the prime ministerial prerogative in dissolving the Legislative Assembly and announcing a general election.
1 Thus, see Hockin, Thomas, ed., Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada (Scarborough, 1971).Google Scholar Of the more traditional text approach, note Dawson, R.M., The Government of Canada, revised by Norman Ward (5th ed., Toronto, 1970), 205, 331–4Google Scholar; Mallory, J.R., The Structure of Canadian Government (Toronto, 1971), 85–6Google Scholar; Whittington, M. and Van Loon, R.J., The Canadian Political System (Toronto, 1971), 287–8.Google Scholar
2 There appears to be some debate as to the extent of the prime minister's personal power to dissolve the House without cabinet consultation and approval, despite earlier assertions that dissolution was vested as the special prerogative of the premier. For example, note Heeney, A.D.P., “Functions of the Prime Minister,” in Fox, Paul, ed., Politics: Canada (3rd ed., Toronto, 1970), 347.Google Scholar Assessing the evidence in this debate, Joseph Wearing fails to offer any definitive conclusion. “President or Prime Minister?” in Hockin, Apex of Power, 245–6. The matter is relatively tangential to the immediate concern, hence it will be sidestepped by suggesting that the decision is the prime minister's alone, acting upon such advice as he finds it politically expedient to solicit. Van Loon and Whittington find a similar convenient loophole, Canadian Political System, 288.
3 Denis Smith notes that both the parliaments of 1963–5 and 1965–8 might have gone their full term, but both were “… dissolved on the decision of the Prime Minister when he sensed the possibility of an electoral victory.” “President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada,” in Hockin, Apex of Power, 233.
4 Paltiel also argues that a much restricted campaign period (four weeks) would assist in the institutionalization and statute regulation of party finance. Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto, 1970), 141. In this he follows the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa, 1966), 37. A case can be made, but will not be in this instance, that statutory quadrennial elections would facilitate a more regular distribution of party financial solicitation, which in itself might render public supervision realistically practicable (to the extent of the reformist zeal of the government) by limiting the panic demands placed on party bagmen at frequent but irregular intervals.
5 “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965,” this JOURNAL, 1, no 1 (March 1968), 56.
6 Whether biennial, triennial, or quadrennial is, of course, another question to consider. As a more general comment one ought not, I think, to accept without serious reservation Cairns’ pessimism regarding reform of the electoral system. He argues that “… the habituation of Canadians to the existing system renders policy oriented research on the comparative merits of different electoral systems a fruitless exercise.” Ibid., 56. Yet, as T.H. Qualter indicates, there has been a variety of electoral system experimentation at the provincial level in western Canada. The Election Process in Canada (Toronto, 1970), 129–36. The possibilities for change and reform exist; probable realization is not fruitless, academic gum-beating but rather a question of political expediency, as any student of the patterns of redistribution in British Columbia can readily appreciate.
7 The year 1920 was selected, arbitrarily, as the congealing point of the modern electoral system in Canada. Coincidentally, it marks the initial appearance of the continuing third or protest party parliamentary representation. For comments on the evolution of the modern electoral period, note Dawson and Ward, The Government of Canada, 320–2; Qualter, The Election Process, 3–4; and Ward, N., The Canadian House of Commons: Representation (2nd ed., Toronto, 1963), 211–32.Google Scholar
8 The classical decision of the Judicial Committee in Russell v the Queen (1882Google Scholar), as understood by Lord Haldane in 1925, resulted of course from the fact “… that the evil of intemperance at that time amounted in Canada to one so great and so general that at least for the period it was a menace to the national life of Canada so serious and pressing that the National Parliament was called on to intervene to protect the nation from disaster.” Noted by Dawson and Ward, The Government of Canada, 93n.
9 Qualter, The Election Process, 30–1.
10 For a brief discussion of climatic stress upon the political process, note the discussion by Van Loon and Whittington, Canadian Political System, 31.
11 “President and Parliament,” 241.
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