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The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982–1997: A Study of “Targeted” Resolutions*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Ron Wheeler
Ron Wheeler
Affiliation:
University of Saskatchewan
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Abstract

This article examines resolutions passed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights from 1982 to 1997, which targeted specific states, governments and other political actors for violations of human rights. The types of actors that were named, their regional distribution and the actions taken by the Commission are each analyzed. Among the findings presented are that the Commission's effectiveness has been limited by its inability to address most systematic government violations of human rights, by a lack of universality in its application of international standards and by a recent trend toward consensus decision making.

Résumé

Cet article examine les résolutions qui ont été adoptées par la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies de 1982 à 1997, et qui ont ciblé certains États, des gouvernements et quelques joueurs politiques pour des violations de droits de l'homme. Les joueurs politiques, leur distribution régionale et les actions prises par la Commission sont analysés. Cet article démontre que l'efficacité de la Commission a été limiteé par son incapacité de prendre en considération la plupart des violations systématiques des gouvernements contre les droits de l'homme, le manque d'alternative globale dans l'application des standards internationaux et la récente augmentation des décisions atteintes par consensus.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 75 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1999

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References

1 Articles 62(2) and 68 of the UN Charter.

2 UNDoc.E/CN.4/14.Rev.2 (1946).

3 Robertson, A. H. and Merrills, J. G., Human Rights in the World (4th ed.; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 78Google Scholar.

4 See Maher, Robin M. and Weissbrodt, David, “The 41st Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,” Human Rights Quarterly 12 (1990), 301–302CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Alston, Philip, “The Commission on Human Rights,” in Alston, Philip, ed., The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 141Google Scholar. For a good description of this period see 139–44.

6 Farer, Tom J., “The United Nations and Human Rights: More than a Whimper, Less than a Roar,” in Claude, Richard Pierre and Weston, Burns H., eds., Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (2nd ed.; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 228Google Scholar.

7 Tolley, Howard Jr., “Decision-Making at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1979–82,” Human Rights Quarterly 5 (1983), 29, 40, 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Alston, “The Commission on Human Rights,” 145; and Donnelly, Jack, International Human Rights (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 61–62Google Scholar.

8 Commission on Human Rights (hereafter CHR) Res. 1982/26, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1982/30, 143; CHR Res. 1983/30, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, 160. For Poland's criticisms of the 1982 resolution, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/SR.40/Add. 1.

9 Alston, “The Commission on Human Rights,” 138.

10 This total does not include draft resolutions which were subsequently withdrawn by their sponsor(s).

11 Motions to “take no action” on a draft resolution are introduced under rule 65, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council which provides that such a motion has priority over a motion on the draft resolution itself. Rule 49 suspends debate on a resolution and also precludes a vote (UN Doc. E/5975/Rev.l [1983]).

12 Robertson and Merrills, Human Rights in the World, 89–95.

13 For example, 10 resolutions were passed between 1983 and 1991 which condemned “Western states” as a group for providing assistance to South Africa. Philip Alston has also used the term “targeted,” but only with reference to “country-specific” resolutions (Alston, “The Commission on Human Rights,” 161).

14 Ibid., 163.

15 Donnelly, Jack, “Human Rights at the United Nations 1955–85: The Question of Bias,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), 278CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Resolutions naming specific violators of human rights may be introduced under several different agenda categories—for example, under the 1235 agenda item, as separate agenda items, or even under “Advisory Services”.

17 A 1994 resolution specifically condemned “the discriminatory measures and practices, as well as the violations of human rights, committed by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo,” This was clearly intended to address the issue of “selfdetermination” (CHR Res. 1994/76, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 219).

18 The decreased percentage of resolutions on systematic government violations in 1986 and 1987 occurred because fewer resolutions were passed on apartheid in South Africa and more were passed in the other two categories.

19 Even within the Sub-Commission, lobbying becomes so intense that members have sometimes favoured secret ballots to protect themselves from political pressures from states named in Sub-Commission draft resolutions. See Maher and Weissbrodt, “The 41st Session,” 303.

20 E/CN.4/1195/L.26, E/CN.4/1995/L.86 and E/CN.4/1995/L.100, respectively (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 386, 391,415).

21 Even in 1990, the Commission merely recommended that Paraguay apply for the Commission's advisory services. See CHR Res. 1990/161, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1990/94, 129.

22 Much has been written about the UN becoming immersed in internal conflicts, including ethnic conflict and the disintegration of states. A particularly thoughtful work is Holsti's, Kalevi J.The State, War and the State of War, Studies in International Relations 51 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 See, for example, CHR Res. 1994/72, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 203.

24 For example, the resolution passed in 1997 expressed “grave concern at the deterioration in the human rights situation in Rwanda since the beginning of January 1997,” including “arbitrary arrests” and “the killing of unarmed civilians by some elements of the security forces” (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150, 223).

25 Weiss, Thomas G., Forsythe, David P. and Coate, Roger A., The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 36–39Google Scholar.

26 There were two resolutions on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1991 and 1992), three on the situation in East Timor (1983, 1993 and 1997), and one on Yugoslavia's actions against Kosovo (1994). On the classification on the Kosovo resolution seen. 17.

27 More states alleged to be guilty of systematic government violations of human rights have been considered under the 1503 procedure than under the public 1235 one (Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights, 148). It has been suggested that states “may even deliberately seek inclusion in the 1503 procedure to avoid public scrutiny” (Maher and Weissbrodt, “The 41st Session,” 302).

28 This differentiation is consistent with the geopolitical realities enveloping Commission resolutions during the 1980s, prior to the establishment of new states in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, in Table 2, the categories “Western Europe” and “Eastern Europe” include those states that were considered to be within those regions during the Cold War, thereby avoiding the issue of where to divide “West” from “East” in the Europe of the 1990s. For a full listing of states included in each region, see United Nations Population Fund, The State of World Population 1990 (New York: United Nations, 1990)Google Scholar. The category on the “Soviet Union,” however, was altered to “USSR and Successors” in our classification to include resolutions targeting successor republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A special category for “Western States” was also created from the large number of resolutions that were passed between 1983 and 1991 to target Western states (or, euphemistically, “certain states”) as a group for aiding South Africa. This category included only these resolutions, and not those that targeted particular Western states (which were included in other regional categories).

29 Such resolutions included those on the US interventions in Grenada and Panama, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

30 See CHR Res. 1990/10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, 27.

31 Steven R. David collected data on more than 100 civil and international wars in the Third World between 1945 and 1990 (David, Steven R., “Why the Third World Still Matters,” International Security 17 [1992/1993], 131CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Dozens more have erupted since 1990 in the aftermath of the Cold War and bipolarity.

32 Representatives of many Third World states claim there is a Western bias in the Commission which ignores their different histories, cultures, economic priorities and political systems, and which leads to their being targeted unfairly in Commission resolutions. For example, during the 1997 session of the Commission, China's representative, Wu Jianmin, stated that “since 1992, the Commission has studied 72 draft resolutions—all of them against developing nations” and that “the Commission must change that bias” (“China Accuses West of Seeking Showdown,” Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997).

33 On these issues, see Gomez, Mario, “Social Economic Rights and Human Rights Commissions,” Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995), 155–169CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Arat, Zehra F., Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991)Google Scholar.

34 Partly for this reason, a spokesman for Amnesty International said that in dealing with Africa's Great Lakes region, the Commission was “almost irrelevant” in the face of “some of the worst human rights abuses since the Second World War” (quoted in “US Criticises Chinese Tactics at UN Rights Forum,” Reuters World Service, April 18, 1997).

35 Compare Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights, 163.

36 This was the case concerning El Salvador and Guatemala in 1990 (Brody, Reed, Parker, Penny and Weissbrodt, David, “Major Developments in 1990 at the UN Commission on Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 12 [1990], 570–571CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

37 UN Res. 1987/50, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60, 113.

38 See, for example, Amnesty International's Report on Human Rights around the World for 1996 and 1997. These are available at http://www.amnesty.org/ ailib/index.html. Also see “Non-Governmental Organization Claim Numerous Violations of Human Rights around the World,” M2 Presswire, April 15, 1997; and “UN Rights Commission Criticized as a Toothless Tiger,” Agence France Presse, March 3,1997.

39 For Commission condemnations of the Khmer Rouge, see CHR Res. 1995/55, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 169, and CHR Res. 1996/54, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1996/177.

40 CHR Res. 1983/8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, 129, and CHR Res. 1993/97, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, 277.

41 On Chinese lobbying in the Commission on Human Rights, see Kent, Ann, “China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989–1994,” Human Rights Quarterly (1995), 1–47Google Scholar.

42 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 389.

43 “EU Abandons US over Human Rights in China,” Agence France Presse, February 23, 1998; “U.S. Alters Rights Policy toward China,” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1998, A1.

44 CHR Res. 1983/8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, 129.

45 “Amnesty Blasts U.N. Human Rights Body as Too Soft,” Reuters, April 26, 1996; “Groups Lobby UN on Human Rights in NI,” The Irish Times, July 5, 1995; Amnesty Report on Northern Ireland (Amnesty International Report EUR 45/06/98), April 1998; and Amnesty International, Greece: Torture and Ill-Treatment (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1992)Google Scholar.

46 CHR Res. 1986/22, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/65, 69.

47 For the resolution on Grenada see CHR Res. 1984/25, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/77, 59. For the resolution on Panama, see n. 30.

48 Resolutions with the title “Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination” were passed from 1987 to 1990. The 1989 and 1990 resolutions listed Nicaragua as a victim of mercenary violence, thus indirectly faulting US support of the so-called Contras in Central America. See CHR Res. 1989/21, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/94, 69, and CHR Res. 1990/7, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, 27.

49 Draft Resolution E/CN.4/1987/L.31 accused the US government of systematic human rights violations (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60, 215). Draft Resolution E/CN.4/1995/L.26 addressed “racism and racial discrimination” in the US (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 380).

50 See. n 8.

51 CHR Res. 1993/85, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, 252, and CHR Res. 1994/59, UNDoc.E/CN.4/1994/132, 172.

52 “North-South Confrontation over Rights Worries West,” Agence France Presse, March 11, 1995.

53 Papua New Guinea was targeted from 1993 to 1995 for human rights conditions on the island of Bougainville (UN Res. 1993/76, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, 226; UN Res. 1994/81, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 230; and UN Res. 1995/65, UNDoc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 191).

54 In this study, Commission resolutions were classified in accordance with the strongest judgment (that is, the harshest language) they contained. For example, if a resolution expressed serious “concern” regarding human rights violations, but also “condemned” the government for not taking action to remedy the situation, it was classified as condemnatory. One exception was made, however. Because a 1995 resolution on Haiti condemned the previous government of Raoul Cedras but offered encouragement and assistance to the current government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, it was classified as providing “encouragement or assistance” (E/CN.4/1995/70, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 202). Because even those resolutions which offer “encouragement or assistance” often express “concern” in some manner, resolutions were classified as expressing “criticism or concern” only if they contained language which indicated that the Commission considered the human rights violations to be quite serious (for example, “grave concern,” “serious concern”).

55 The resolutions on Sudan expressed only “concern” (CHR Res. 1996/73, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177, 237; CHR Res 1997/59, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150, 32). Consistent with draft resolutions introduced in previous years, both draft resolutions on China also expressed “concern” rather than “condemnation,” but the language of each was deliberately softened in an effort to ease their passage. However, China was successful in convincing a majority of members to “take no action” (under rule 65) on each draft (E/CN.4/1996/L.90, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1996/177, 352; E/CN.4/1997/L.91, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150, 355).

56 UN Docs. E/CN.4/1996/177, 296; and E/CN.4/1997/150, 291.

57 “South Africa Takes a Step Back from Putting Nigeria in the Hot Seat,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 1996; and “U.N. Rights Body Censures Nigeria,” Reuters, April 23, 1996.

58 CHR Res. 1997/66, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1977/150, 221; and “Human Rights Takes a Dive at the UN,” Agence France Presse, April 18, 1997.

59 CHR Res. 1990/77 condemned a single murder in El Salvador, which was presumably an operation of right-wing “death squads” (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, 159).

60 On the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, see, for example, CHR Res. 1994/72, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 203. For resolutions on the Khmer Rouge, see CHR Res. 1995/55, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 169, and CHR Res. 1996/54, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177, 182.

61 Wheeler, Ron, “Introduction: The United Nations in Transition,” in Wheeler, Ron and McConnell, Howard, eds., Swords and Plowshares: The United Nations in Transition (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1997), 1–16Google Scholar. Also see Richard Falk's chapter entitled “Explaining the UN's Unhappy Fiftieth Anniversary: Toward Reclaiming the Next Half-Century,” in Ibid., 19–32.

62 “UN Raises Stronger Arm against Nations Violating Human Rights with Broadened Definition of Human Rights, More Staff, and Faster Response to Complaints,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 1990.

63 Donnelly, “Human Rights at the United Nations,” 288.

64 “China Accuses Developed Nations of ‘Confrontation’ at UN Human Rights Forum,” Xinhua News Agency, March 16, 1997, in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, March 18, 1997, FE/D2870/G.

65 “North-South Confrontation over Rights Worries West,” Agence France Presse, March 11, 1995.

66 Reuters, “Amnesty Blasts U.N. Human Rights Body as Too Soft.”

67 See the statement of Commission Chair Gilberto V. Saboia of Brazil on April 24, 1996 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177, 296).

68 Following the 1997 session, China's Alternate Representative Liu Xinsheng stated that “confrontation and cooperation cannot coexist, so the removal of the confrontation between countries should be the No. 1 task in reforms. In this regard, the 53rd session of the commission took a welcoming step” (“China Proposes Reforms in UN Human Rights Body,” Xinhua News Agency, July 22, 1997).

69 Reuters, “Amnesty Blasts U.N. Human Rights Body as Too Soft.”