Many authors, both in academic and political circles, consider that the National Energy Program (NEP) was responsible for the “Canadianization” of the oil and gas industry. This article challenges that interpretation and shows, supported by data, that the decline of foreign control in the Canadian oil and gas industry started well before the launching of the NEP, and that it went on after the abolition of the Program. In fact, the “Canadianization” of the oil and gas industry can be interpreted as a larger process, of the decline of bargaining power of the multinational firms in this industry. A similar process has taken place in other countries, even if the Canadian model has some dimensions of its own.

Students of Canadian politics and public policy have produced numerous studies on the importance of regionalism in Canadian politics. A wealth of essays now exists on regional political culture and numerous suggestions have been put forward to make our national political institutions more regionally sensitive. One institution—the federal public service—has been virtually ignored in this context. Yet many now recognize the considerable influence the federal public service has on the government's policy-making process. With the aid of a survey, this article assesses if senior federal officials themselves view the government's policy-making process as centralized or decentralized. The survey also seeks to assess the importance senior federal public servants attach to regional economic circumstances in policy-making. The survey is broken down on a regional basis.

More than three years ago, Professor H. F. Angus published an article entitled: “The Canadian Constitution and the United Nations Charter.” In it he sought to show that the Canadian constitution, which provides for a division of legislative powers between the federal government and the governments of the provinces, will hamper the Dominion in its conduct of foreign affairs in the post-war world. In particular, he predicted that existing constitutional arrangements will obstruct Canada from fulfilling in a responsible manner certain international obligations incurred under the Charter of the United Nations. The immediate causes of this situation are threefold: the assignation by the British North America Act of topics with which international legislation may be concerned to the exclusive jurisdiction of provincial legislatures; the obsolescence of Section 132 of that Act, which governs the treaty-making powers of the Dominion government; and the juridical opinions on the ability of the Dominion government to implement international legislation which were handed down by the Privy Council and which, with the exception of the war years, have governed the situation ever since. One other factor serves to aggravate the problem: the growing importance of international legislation since 1945. Social and economic problems, no longer local or even national in scope, are now of international importance, and require international action for their solution. The recognition by the nations of the world of this fact and its implications is in part indicated by their decision to create the United Nations, its commissions, sub-commissions and affiliated agencies. It is more imperative today than ever before that members of the United Nations be both ready and able to ratify international legislation which the world organization promulgates. Canada may be ready, but she is certainly not able, to provide such implementation.

The present status of Dominion-provincial arrangements is the consequence of the constitutional and administrative decisions made in 1867 as developed over subsequent decades and the course of economic, social, and political developments and the correlative budgetary changes in both federal and provincial fields. The purpose of this paper is to set out the historical objectives of Dominion-provincial financial policies, to examine the shifts which have occurred in these objectives from time to time, and to attempt a statement of the appropriate objectives in the Canadian system. Much of the subsequent argument has to do with the fiscal consequences of federalism in Canada and with the fact that changing circumstances have imposed on the junior levels of government, and to some extent on the federal Government also, financial responsibilities which it was not originally contemplated they would have to bear.

The allocation of functions between the Dominion and the provinces by the Act of 1867 was clearly intended to place on the Dominion those which financially were the most onerous. The heavy costs of development, including the public debt, national defence, and national government were to be borne by the Dominion, while the supposedly lighter costs of public welfare, education, provincial development, and provincial administration were given to the provinces. On the revenue side, the lucrative taxes—customs and excise—were given exclusively to the Dominion and the direct taxes also were given to the Dominion, though not exclusively, to use if it so desired. The provinces were limited to direct taxes, which, with the exception of real property taxes, it was supposed they would be reluctant to use, and to the relatively unproductive licences, fees, and fines. While the federal Government was to pay annual grants to the provinces, the Act of 1867 stipulated that “such grants shall be in full settlement of all future demands on Canada.” This interpretation of intention at Confederation is accepted generally by the historians of the period and is supported by many statements of participants in the Confederation debates. In the period immediately following Confederation these objectives were realized.

How much effort by politicians and public administrators is needed to create awareness of proposed new policies or policy changes? Is broad newspaper coverage of proposed legislation and the high visibility of a minister enough to spread a significant amount of information? This note reports a study of the effectiveness of communication by one federal department, especially of a significant bill proposed by it.

The establishment of well-accepted and useful public policy depends on an adequate flow of information. A careful assessment of the wants and needs of society is required. The best policies are established when interested parties exchange opinions and ideas. If adequate communication about proposed plans does not occur, this exchange cannot take place. Perhaps policy-makers too readily assume that communication with other significant persons is occurring.

The primary purpose of this study was to explore the degree of knowledge evinced by a group which would be significantly affected by an apparently widely publicized piece of proposed federal legislation relating to business activity. The amount of knowledge demonstrated by the group is one indication of the effectiveness of the communication efforts of the minister and the department.

In autumn 1971 and early January 1972, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs was perhaps more visible than at any other time in its history. The minister, Ronald Basford, had spent several years building and strengthening the department, as well as actively informing the public of a highly intensified orientation towards consumer protection and scrutiny of business activities.

Résumé. La vice-présidence est probablement l'institution la plus sous-estimée de la démocratie américaine. Souvent la cible de quolibets, elle a cependant réussi à se transformer et à se définir au fil des années. Aujourd'hui, les vice-présidents sont presque automatiquement pressentis à la présidence et d'ailleurs, la majorité d'entre eux ont cette ambition. Que s'est-il donc passé pour que la vice-présidence devienne une institution d'où peut émaner un éventuel président? Pour répondre à cette question, nous examinons, dans un premier temps, les changements externes qui ont contribué à modifier les fonctions vice-présidentielles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous comparons quatre vice-présidents contemporains (Nixon, Ford, Mondale et Bush) pour tenter de voir s'il existe une corrélation entre le mode de gestion qu'ils ont adopté et leur succès ou leur échec durant leur campagne présidentielle. Finalement, nous abordons d'autres pistes de réflexion afin de cerner les éléments qui permettraient d'expliquer en quoi la vice-présidence est un atout pour d'éventuels candidats à la présidence.

Abstract. The vice-presidency is probably the most unappreciated and the most underestimated institution of the American democracy. Often the target of gibes, it nevertheless achieved a radical transformation years after years. Now, vice-presidents are almost always considered for the presidency and moreover, the majority of them have the ambition to be president someday since World War II. What can explain that the vice-presidency, not ridiculed anymore, is now an institution where one can find the next president of the United States? To answer this question, we initially examine the external changes that affected the vice-presidential functions. Secondly, we compare four contemporary vice-presidents (Nixon, Ford, Mondale and Bush) in order to see if their management style is linked to their chances to be president. Finally, we talk about other considerations that could explain why the vice-presidency is a significant asset for those who want to be president.

My paper contains no theoretical aspects of physical planning; it merely recounts the progress that is being made in Great Britain in the pursuit of adequate legal and administrative measures to make physical planning a purposeful reality. The principles upon which the statutory instruments of planning have been devised are startlingly different today from the vague and somewhat superficial considerations which underlay the first planning measures enacted in 1909. In that year the purpose of planning was understood to be the preservation of amenity by regulatory control; today, planning is recognized in Great Britain to be one of the main functions of the internal affairs of government whereby the integration of public and private enterprise is to be achieved so as to insure an ordered and balanced national development. Planning is accepted as the matrix of national endeavour; as an instrument whereby positive development in the national interest may be assured.

Of the 38 million acres of land in England and Wales, about 27 million acres were embraced by planning schemes at the outbreak of the war. The schemes ranged from proposals for the safeguarding of great stretches of moorland in the interests of the preservation of natural beauty, to plans for the redevelopment of small areas of urban decay; and varied, too, from proposals of a purely advisory nature to statutory schemes operating under the planning law of the country. The operative schemes covered an area of a little over a million acres.

While the war lasts most decisions and policies can only be provisional. It has now become apparent that the view that the conflict had settled down into siege warfare, supported by the Allied blockade of Germany, has been belied by events. In the last war the long military stalemate in France gave the Allies time to organize their superior economic strength, and in the end this superiority tipped the scales. The economic strategy so far would seem to have been based upon the assumption of much the same kind of military development. If, however, the military situation is as critical as it appears to be, the economic strategy will have to alter. Our economic and financial measures are then likely to undergo a series of improvisations which will defy all attempts at precise calculations. Germany's blitzkrieg will certainly warrant new forms of economic mobilization in the United Kingdom, and probably in Canada too. In this situation careful attempts to minimize costs, involving a widespread reliance on private-initiative and the free pricing system, must and will be thrown overboard. And with them will go the framework and modes of thought of much of our traditional economic theory.

Discussion of the finance of war is also complicated by the fact that public finance—or the larger problem of war economics—is as much a problem of politics as it is of economics. And it is the political aspect of the subject which surrounds war finance with most of the controversy which it possesses. Whether a particular form of taxation, or the decision to do by government decree what is normally done by taxation, is desirable or not, turns more and more on the state of political sentiment, and less and less on questions of economic analysis. In this domain of politics the economist has no particular jurisdiction; and for the politician himself the condition of public opinion changes so rapidly during war that measures deemed impolitic today may be universally demanded tomorrow.

For institutions as well as for people, turning 50 invites reflection on what's gone before and what's to come. This special 50th anniversary issue looks at Canadian political science and the profession—past and present—from a number of perspectives and explores ways in which they might or should change.

In the study of consumer spending a wide variety of factors, ranging from age, sex, and family size, through occupation, religion, and class background, to future expectations, advertising and personal influence, and compulsiveness, have been shown to have some influence on consumer taste and demand. Yet the precise influence these factors have, and the value which they should be assigned are still largely unknown. This paper offers a theoretical framework as one possible way of treating factors involved in consumer spending in a systematic manner. The approach is still in the process of formulation so that only the general structure of the theory can be presented.

Two assumptions are made about factors which influence consumer spending. First, it is assumed that factors may be treated as aspects of social systems or sub-systems. They may be viewed as contributing to one or other of the problems which all social systems must solve, to what have been called the adaptive, the goal attainment, the integrative, and the pattern-maintenance-tension-management problems. Thus factors are related to one another, in the first instance, by means of their functioning for the solution of system problems. Secondly, it is assumed that all factors do not have the same order of influence on consumer spending. Rather, factors are related to one another in a hierarchical way so that some can be treated as more general in their influence than others, and as unifying the more specific factors in some way. This view is derived from the more general assumption that social systems are composed of a number of distinct levels of structural organization.

« Dès que nous prétendons, écrivait un jour P.-H. Simon, découvrir au delà de nos désaccords, une ligne de convergence possible, nous sommes fatalement conduits à parler d'humanisme. Humanisme avec ce que le mot implique assez confusément de confiance dans l'espèce humaine, d'attachement à son passé, d'espérance en son progrès et de disposition à vouloir son bien, semble désigner le carrefour par où passent tous nos itinéraires spirituels… Seulement, quand on veut presser le sens du mot, on s'aperçoit que les difficultés demeurent. Humanisme est une de ces abstractions, dangereuses à force d'être commodes, où l'on peut tout mettre, Marx et l'Evangile, le libre examen et le sentiment de l'autorité, la tradition et la révolution. »

Cependant malgré l'infinie et souvent contradictoire variété des définitions que les auteurs ont jusqu'ici essayées de l'humanisme, il semble qu'on puisse clarifier un peu le sujet en les ramenant toutes à trois types principaux selon qu'on envisage l'humanisme comme philosophie des humanités, comme métaphysique de l'homme ou comme attitude humaine.

If for any national income and its given distribution we could estimate the amount of annual savings, we should be able to tell how much investment is necessary to make the aggregate receipts of entrepreneurs (plus the value of any additions to the inventories) equal to their outlay and thus avoid entrepreneurs' losses and shrinkage of output, and keep national income at a given level.

The relationship between national income and savings has been estimated in three ways: (1) by studying the relationship between incomes and savings of families, leaving the undistributed corporation incomes out of the picture; (2) by studying separately savings of wage-earners and of profit-receivers out of their respective incomes (distributed or not); (3) by confronting, through time, national income and investment. Only the first method will be discussed here.

If people adjusted their behaviour to changes in their income more quickly than they actually do, the family budget statistics could give an answer as to how a change in the total national income affects the national savings, apart from the undistributed profits of corporations. Actually, there is probably a time lag between income changes and changes in consumption and savings, which should be studied separately.