This study examines perceptions of party competence in four issue areas: inflation, unemployment, international affairs and Canadian unity. Using Gallup poll data from a 35-year period, the study shows that in three of the four issue areas Canadians clearly distinguish between parties. These distinctions do not merely reflect party popularity and are durable rather than immutable; perceptions change slowly but do respond to government performance. Canadians see the greatest differences between parties with respect to international affairs and Canadian unity; the Liberals enjoy a substantial lead on these two questions. On inflation, perceived competence tends to reflect popularity while on unemployment, Canadians have greater confidence in the New Democratic party. On all issues, the Conservative party image has substantially improved under the Mulroney government.

Many interpretations of the Social Credit movement in Alberta are based on assertions regarding the class basis of its popular support. Since no previous study of Social Credit has offered an empirical account of its popular class base, such an account is provided here. The author analyzes the provincial election of 1935, in which Social Credit first gained power, by comparing party support in the cities, towns and countryside. Within the cities, a district-by-district analysis measures the pattern of class voting in urban areas. Class is found to have been a powerful determinant of voting in this election.

There is substantial disagreement over the extent to which political parties in Canada can be distinguished on ideological grounds. Research on mass publics has usually concluded that ideology plays only a modest role in structuring orientations towards parties. However, a growing body of survey data on party activists suggests a greater degree of ideological clarity and policy cohesiveness. This note extends earlier research by Blake, Johnston and Perlin on Liberal and Conservative convention delegates and compares them with delegates to the 1987 federal New Democratic party convention. Survey data on convention delegates suggest that political activists array themselves in a relatively consistent manner across a range of issues in ways that are compatible with a left/right ideological typology. Our findings also suggest that New Democrats display the greatest consensus and ideological distinctiveness of the three parties studied.

In 1946, after visiting Russia, Harold Innis remarked that the time had come to broaden the range of political economy by studying, first, the struggle for social supremacy between states, churches and commerce; and, second, the related competition between languages, religions, cultures and communications media. This, I argue, is what Innis accomplished. His early studies of Canadian economic history transcended conventional economics and laid the groundwork for a later political theory of communications. It expressly took up the 1946 challenge to address competing monopolies of knowledge and power, hence manipulating the space and time-binding properties of communications media. Innis' work reflected a materialist model of communications, a social ecology, a soft determinism or philosophic naturalism and it linked knowledge, freedom and power. Finally, I conclude, these insights permitted Innis to transcend bias and to search for a balanced culture.

In a recent article in this Journal, Paul Sniderman, Joseph Fletcher, Peter Russell and Philip Tetlock characterize the patterns of support for language rights among anglophones and francophones as reflecting the practice of a “double standard,” whereby each group recognizes these rights more readily for themselves than for the other official language group. The authors conclude that two factors, strategic calculation of interests and core political values, are central to understanding support for language rights. This comment focusses on two of their key concepts, “language rights” and “strategic calculation.” It suggests that their discussion of language rights is rather narrowly limited to those recognized in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, thereby neglecting more controversial claims to language rights. Furthermore, “strategic calculation” is open to at least two mutually contradictory deductions regarding the anticipated patterns of support, both of which can be supported by their evidence. I conclude that the authors have presented an intuitively plausible hypothesis to explain support for language rights in Canada, but have not explored their key concepts in sufficient detail to sustain their case.

This study challenges the claim that foreign-owned firms do not differ significantly from Canadian-owned firms with respect to political donations. Tests for association and correlation show that overall, foreign-owned firms are significantly less inclined to contribute money to Canadian parties. Behaviour varies according to nationality, so that British firms are most likely to contribute, followed by Canadian and then American companies. Japanese firms are least likely to contribute.