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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 May 2021
Globalization has effectively enabled Canada’s domestically incorporated mining companies to escape the jurisdiction of the courts of the world, allowing them to carry out human rights abuses abroad with impunity. In February 2020, however, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a landmark judgment, Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, which attempted to address this jurisdictional gap. This decision held that Canadian corporations could potentially be liable under domestic law for breaches of customary international law perpetrated abroad. The decision has been criticized for straying too far from a classically positivist conception of international law. This article argues that such criticisms are well founded insofar as the majority’s judgment implicitly relies on progressive human-centric theories of international law without adequately addressing how these are reconcilable with international law as it is currently applied. It then explores the ideas that drive the majority’s opinion in order to propose two alternative approaches to holding corporations accountable that are more readily reconcilable with traditional state-centric conceptions of international law. Adopting these revised approaches could less contentiously lead to corporate accountability before future domestic courts. Finally, this article considers the potential international developments and repercussions to which this and other forward-looking decisions could lead.
La mondialisation a permis aux sociétés minières constituées au Canada d’échapper à la juridiction des tribunaux du monde entier, leur permettant de commettre impunément des violations des droits de la personne à l’étranger. En février 2020, cependant, la Cour suprême du Canada a rendu un arrêt historique, Nevsun Resources Ltd c Araya, qui tente de combler cette faille juridictionnelle. Selon cet arrêt, les entreprises canadiennes pourraient éventuellement être tenues responsables, en vertu du droit national, pour leurs violations du droit international coutumier perpétrées à l’étranger. Cette décision a été critiquée puisqu’elle s’éloigne d’une conception positiviste du droit international. Cet article soutient que ces critiques sont justifiées dans la mesure où le jugement majoritaire s’appuie implicitement sur des théories progressistes du droit international, centrées sur l’individu, sans aborder de manière adéquate la question de comment celles-ci sont compatibles avec le droit international actuel. L’article explore ensuite les idées qui animent l’opinion de la majorité afin de proposer deux approches alternatives pour tenir les entreprises responsables, approches qui sont plus facilement conciliables avec une conception traditionnelle du droit international centrée sur l’État. L’adoption de ces approches alternatives pourrait conduire à une responsabilité moins contestable des entreprises devant d’autres instances à l’avenir. Enfin, cet article discute des développements internationaux potentiels et des répercussions que pourraient entraîner cette décision et d’autres jugements similairement progressistes.
1 Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5 at para 70 [Nevsun].
2 Coumans, Catherine, “Alternative Accountability Mechanisms and Mining: The Problems of Effective Impunity, Human Rights, and Agency” (2010) 30 Can J Development Studies 27 at 32–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Miles Pittman & Rick Williams, “Canadian Companies and the Effects of Foreign Operations: Out of Sight, Front of Mind” (7 April 2017), online: CanLII Connects <https://canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/45340>.
4 Coumans, supra note 2 at 33.
5 “Forced labour regime” is also known as modern slavery. International Labour Organization (ILO), “What Is Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking” (2020), online: ILO <www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en/index.htm>.
6 Nevsun Resources has since been acquired by Zijin Mining.
7 Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd, 2017 BCCA 401 at para 51.
8 The “plain and obvious” test is used in determinations of whether to strike pleadings on the ground that they do not disclose a reasonable cause of action. Ibid at para 29.
9 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 70.
10 Ibid at para 72.
11 Phillip Saunders et al, Kindred’s International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 9th ed (Toronto: Emond Publishing, 2019) at 186; R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at paras 36, 39 [Hape].
12 Nevsun, supra note 1 at paras 100–03.
13 Ibid at para 105. William S Dodge, “Corporate Liability under Customary International Law” (2012) 43 Geo J Intl L 1045.
14 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 106.
15 Ibid at para 111.
16 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has referred to the doctrine of the separation of powers as one of the essential features of the Canadian constitution. Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at para 104, 1985 CanLII 74.
17 See e.g. Global Affairs Canada, Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad (July 2019); Global Affairs Canada, News Release, “Minister Carr Announces Appointment of First Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise” (8 April 2019); Global Affairs Canada, “Responsible Business Conduct Abroad: Questions and Answers” (16 September 2019); Aftab, Yousuf & Mocle, Audrey, Business and Human Rights as Law: Towards Justiciability of Rights, Involvement, and Remedy (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2019) at 47–48.Google Scholar
18 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 115.
19 Ibid at para 117.
20 Ibid at para 118.
21 Ibid at para 120.
22 Ibid at paras 123–25.
23 Ibid at para 127.
24 Ibid at para 128.
25 Ibid at para 132. However, Abella J did not establish a clear basis upon which this could be done and relied on an example from the United States without acknowledging that the United States has a statutory basis for such causes of action, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (1789).
26 Crawford, James, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 9th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) at 101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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29 Joseph Magnet, “Separation of Powers in Canada” (2013), online: Constitutional Law of Canada <www.constitutional-law.net/>.
30 Richard, John D, “Separation of Powers: The Canadian Experience” (2009) 47 Duq L Rev 731 at 738–40.Google Scholar
31 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 227.
32 Ibid at para 225.
33 Ibid at para 148.
34 Crawford, supra note 26 at 101.
35 Tzanakopoulos, Antonios, “Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial Function of National Courts” (2011) 34 Loy LA Intl & Comp L Rev 133 at 137.Google Scholar
36 Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 60; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, art 38(1)(d) (entered into force 24 October 1945) [ICJ Statute].
37 ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art 38(1)(a)–(c).
38 Ibid, art 38(1)(b).
39 International Law Commission (ILC), “Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, with Commentaries” (2018) 2:2 ILC Yearbook 122 at 125 [ILC, “Draft Conclusions”].
41 ILC, “Draft Conclusions,” supra note 39 .
42 Jus cogens, or “peremptory norms,” are rules of international law that have been accepted and recognized by the international community of states as norms from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Can TS 1980 No 37, art 53 (entered into force 27 January 1980) [VCLT].
43 Nevsun, supra note 1 at paras 190–91.
44 ILC, “Draft Conclusions,” supra note 39 at 132.
45 Ibid at 149.
46 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 200.
47 Ibid at para 78.
48 See e.g. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), [2012] ICJ Rep 99 at para 55 [Germany v Italy].
49 The law of immunities is an important exception here. Gib van Ert, “The Domestic Application of International Law in Canada” in Bradley, Curtis A, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019) 501 at 509.Google Scholar “Outward looking” norms regulate interstate behaviour. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 35 at 138.
50 Some international organizations have been granted a certain measure of legal personality. Individuals have gained international legal personality in areas of human rights protection and groups of people around the world have been afforded collective rights. Corporations do not have international legal personality. Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 71, 109, 131, 149.
51 Baker, Roozbeh B, “Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization” (2016) 41:2 Brook J Intl L 440 at 454.Google Scholar
52 Crawford, supra note 26 at 65.
53 Ibid.
54 “Inward-looking” norms aim to regulate state conduct within the domestic jurisdiction. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 35 at 138.
55 Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 658.
56 Ibid at 659.
57 Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62 at para 104.
58 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011), online: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights <www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf>.
59 Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 658–59.
60 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 105, relying on Dodge, supra note 13 at 1046, and Koh, Harold Hongju, “Separating Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility Litigation” (2004) 7 J Intl Econ L 263 at 265–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
61 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 106; Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 QB 529 (Eng CA).
62 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 205.
63 Ibid at para 191.
64 Ibid at para 269.
65 Silberman Abella, Hon Rosalie, “International Law and Human Rights: The Power and the Pity” (2010) 55:4 McGill LJ 871 at 881.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
66 Antonio Cassese, “States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the International Community” in Fassbender, Bardo & Peters, Anne, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 49 at 65–68 [Cassese, “States”].Google Scholar
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68 Marcos D Kotlik, “Defying the Theoretical Constraints of State-Centric Approaches: A Review of Non-State Actors in International Law” (2017) 50:1 Israel LR 87 at 98. As another commentator has pointed out, “[w]hile there appears to be a great deal of recognition of the enhanced power of transnational corporations, it is unaccompanied by effective efforts to regulate them. In many matters, international law is silent.” Claire Cutler, “Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy” (2001) 27 Rev Intl Studies 133 at 146.
69 Quoted in Julianne Hughes Jennett & Marjun Parcasio, “Corporate Civil Liability for Breaches of Customary International Law: Supreme Court of Canada Opens Door to Common Law Claims in Nevsun v Araya” (29 March 2020), online: Blog of the European Journal of International Law <www.ejiltalk.org/corporate-civil-liability-for-breaches-of-customary-international-law-supreme-court-of-canada-opens-door-to-common-law-claims-in-nevsun-v-araya/>.
70 Weiser, Irit, “Nevsun and Civil Liability within the Arsenal of Human Rights Strategies” (2020) 4 PKI Global Justice J 13.Google Scholar
71 Altwicker, Tilmann, “Transnationalizing Rights: International Human Rights Law in Cross-Border Contexts” (2018) 29:2 EJIL 581 at 598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
72 Ibid. See also Knox, John H, “Horizontal Human Rights Law” (2008) 102 AJIL 1 at 10–14 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, “General Comment no 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,” UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 1326 (29 March 2004) at para 8.8 (observing that the ICCPR, infra note 76 does not have “direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law” as such); UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,” UN Doc A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007) at para 34.
73 Cassese, “States,” supra note 66 at 15.
74 Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 634.
75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71 [UDHR]; Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN Charter].
76 Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 638; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976).
77 UN Charter, supra note 75, art 1(3).
78 René Provost, “Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law” (1994) 65 Brit YB Intl L 383.
79 Kotlik, supra note 68 at 93. This approach has been advanced by leading authors in the field. See e.g. Bianchi, Andrea, “Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors” in Teubner, Gunther, ed, Global Law without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 179 at 179Google Scholar; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 271. Others have identified “an ‘all-round’ effect of human rights” in a review of non-state actors in international law. Manfred Nowak & Karolina Miriam Januszewski, “Non-State Actors and Human Rights” in Math Noortmann et al, Non-State Actors in International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 113 at 129–32.
81 “All” as quoted in the preceding sentence. Ibid.
82 See Nowak & Januszewski, supra note 79 at 118–23.
83 This was the view espoused by Brown and Rowe JJ, as described above.
84 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 105.
85 Giovanni Sartori was a political scientist who created the ladder of abstraction to explain the relationship between the meaning of concepts and the range of cases to which they apply. Baker, supra note 51 at 454.
86 While it could be said that the emergence of modern custom makes it possible to make a case for emerging norms based solely on opinio juris, this only points to further disagreement regarding customary law’s formation and would be a shaky, controversial basis upon which to base an argument.
87 ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art 38(1)(b). Whether this is truly how customary international law is formed is another question.
88 See e.g. Roucounas, Emmanuel, A Landscape of Contemporary Theories of International Law (Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2019) at 588CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A Gómez Robledo, “Le ius cogens international: sa genèse, sa nature, ses fonctions” (1981) 172 Rec des Cours 9.
89 Cassese, Antonio, “For an Enhanced Role of Jus Cogens” in Cassese, Antonio, ed, Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 158 at 165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
90 Clapham, supra note 79 at 88.
91 Ibid at 90.
92 ICTY, Furundžija, Case no IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Judgment (10 December 1998) at para 156.
93 See Roucounas, supra note 88 at 586; Tams, Christian, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)Google Scholar; Eric A Posner, “Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in International Law” (2009) 165 J Institutional & Theoretical Economics 5.
94 Roucounas, supra note 88 at 586.
95 Ibid at 589.
96 See e.g. Anthea Roberts, “Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law” (2011) 60 ICLQ 57 at 59. See also Gérard V La Forest, “The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law Issues” (1996) 34 Can YB Intl L 89 at 98; ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art 38.
97 ILC, “Draft Conclusions,” supra note 39 at 132.
98 Law creation here refers only to the incremental development of the law by judges.
99 ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art 38(1)(d).
100 See Schwartz, Osnat Grady, “International Law and National Courts: Between Mutual Empowerment and Mutual Weakening” (2015) 23:3 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 1 at 7.Google Scholar
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102 Schwartz, supra note 100 at 3.
103 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 27 at 60.
104 Ibid.
105 Roberts, supra note 96 at 59.
106 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 27 at 64.
107 Schwartz, supra note 100 at 5.
108 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, UN Doc ECOSOC 2006/23 (2006).
109 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 27 at 59.
110 Roger O’Keefe, “The Doctrine of Incorporation Revisited” (2009) 79:1 Brit YB Intl L 7 at 58.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid at 60.
113 Crawford, supra note 26 at 64; James L Brierly, “International Law in England” (1935) 51 Law Q Rev 24 at 31.
114 Lillich, Richard B, “The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order” (1970) 11:1 Va J Intl L 9 at 14.Google Scholar Lebel J also writes of the qualified and limited nature of the incorporation doctrine in England. Louis Lebel, “A Common Law of the World: The Reception of Customary International Law in the Canadian Common Law” (2014) 65 UNBLJ 3 at 9.
115 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 87.
117 O’Keefe, supra note 110 at 60.
118 Ibid at 61.
119 Ibid at 60.
120 Ibid at 61.
121 Fraser, Julie, “Challenging State-centricity and Legalism: Promoting the Role of Social Institutions in the Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Law” (2019) 23:6 J Human Rights 974 at 978.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
122 See e.g. ICSID, Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case no ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 2002) at para 113; Mileva, Nina, “The Role of Domestic Courts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law: How Can We Learn from Domestic Interpretive Practices?” in Merkouris, Panos et al, eds, The Theory, Practice and Interpretation of Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) 5, online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3598255>.Google Scholar
123 VCLT, supra note 42.
124 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 27 at 60.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Roberts, supra note 96 at 92.
128 Ferrini v Germany, Cass no 5044/04, Appeal Decision, ILDC 19 (IT 2004).
129 Germany v Italy, supra note 48.
130 Roberts, supra note 96 at 67.
131 See ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art 35(1), confining the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction to states.
132 “Civilized nations” is referred to in art 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 36 and is understood to refer to “municipal systems of law that have reached a comparable stage of development.” Yet, in practice, this often limits the development of international law to reflect only a fraction of the nations of the world (historically Western European states), barring those not deemed “civilized” enough. Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 45; ICTY, Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic, Case no IT-96-22-A, Appeal Judgment, Appeals Chamber (7 October 1997).
133 Joel Slawotsky, “The Clash of Architects: Impending Developments and Transformations in International Law” (2017) 3 Chinese J Global Governance 83 at 88.
134 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation” (2017), online: FMPRC <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml>.
135 Ibid.
136 The primary working rule is that the state in whose territory a crime is committed has jurisdiction over the offence, which is Eritrea in this case. However, the nationality of the offender is also accepted as a basis for jurisdiction in international law. Saunders et al, supra note 11 at 321, 328.
137 Slawotsky, supra note 133 at 144.
138 For example, China’s top judge has reportedly urged judges to “bare [their] swords towards false western ideals like judicial independence.” Lucy Hornby, “China’s Top Judge Denounces Judicial Independence,” Financial Times (17 January 2017), online: <www.ft.com/content/60dddd46-dc74-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce>; Slawotsky, supra note 133 at 154.
139 Nevsun, supra note 1 at para 1.