Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
In light of the increased risks nowadays faced by much greaternumbers of peacekeepers in hostile environments, the author surveysthe legal sources for their safety and protection. The article firstdescribes the kinds of personnel that may be engaged in peacekeepingoperations before exploring the legal rights of protection thatattach to each of them. It shows that many conventions, especiallythose relating to immunities of United Nations personnel as well ashumanitarian and human rights treaties, contain general provisionsthat may be interpreted to include peacekeepers, but that none areaimed directly at thdr problems and protection. None, that is, untilthe United Nations adopted the Convention on the Safety of UnitedNations and Associated Personnel in the fall of 1994. When thatConvention comes into force, it will impose affirmative duties onstates to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and willapply criminal sanctions against individuals who attack them ortheir property. The article concludes that the new convention castsa wide net of protection over peacekeepers but suffers from twosignificant lacunae. It will not cover peacekeepers who arecombatants (and the criteria for that characterization are unclear)or personnel engaged in non-United Nations peacekeepingoperations.
À la lumière des risques croissants auxquels sont exposés aujourd’huiun plus grand nombre de gardiennes et gardiens de la paix quioeuvrent dans des milieux hostiles, l’auteur passe en revue lessources juridiques relatives à leur sécurité et à leur protection.En premier lieu, l’auteur énonce les catégories de personnel quipeuvent prendre part à des opérations de maintien de la paix etexamine ensuite la protection que le droit leur offre. Il démontreque de nombreuses conventions, notamment celles concernantl’immunité du personnel des Nations Unies ainsi que les traitésportant sur le droit humanitaire et les droits de la personne,renferment des dispositions générales pouvant être interprétées demanière à viser les gardiennes et gardiens de la paix. Mais aucuneconvention ne traitait directement de leurs problèmes et de leurprotection jusqu’à ce que les Nations Unies adoptent, à l’automne1994, la Convention sur la sécurité du personnel des Nations Unieset du personnel associé, (hiand cette convention sera en vigueur,elle imposera des devoirs positifs aux États afin d’assurer Lasécurité et la protection des gardiennes et gardiens de la paix etelle appliquera des sanctions pénales contre les individus quiattaquent leur personne ou leurs biens. L’auteur conclut que Lanouvelle convention assure une large protection aux gardiennes etgardiens de la paix, mais il est d’ams qu ’elk comporte deux lacunesimportantes. Elle ne s’appliquera pas aux gardiennes et gardiens dela paix qui sont des combattants (et les critères servant àdéterminer ce statut ne sont pas clairs), ni au personnel qui prendpart à des opérations de maintien de la paix ne relevant pas desNations Unies.
This comment is based on lectures delivered at the Lester B.Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre,Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, in September 1995.
1 In total, 115 peacekeepers lost their lives in the service of United Nations Operations in Somalia II.
2 See United Nations secretary general, “An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992,” UN SCOR, 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277, S/24111, (1992) 31 I.L.M. 953.
3 Cf. Ogata, S., “The Interface between Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Action” in Warner, D. (ed.), New Dimensions of Peacekeeping 119 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, GA Res. 49/59, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/49/59 (1995).
5 See SC Res. 678 (1990), UN SCOR, 45th Sess., UN Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
6 For a review of the United Nations Protection Forces, see Ghebali, V.-Y., “UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia: The Misuse of Peacekeeping and Associated Conflict Management Techniques” in Warner, D. (ed.), supra note 3 at 13.Google Scholar
7 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
8 For a brief review of this operation, see Baratta, J.P., International Peacekeeping: History and Strengthening 42 (Washington: Center for U.N. Reform Education, 1989).Google Scholar See also Pelcovits, N.A., Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).Google Scholar
9 Article 52.
10 Article 53. Except possibly in collective self-defence under Article 51.
11 For a short review of NATO’s role, see Marcuse, E., “The Former Yugoslavia: NATO’s Role,” in Warner, D. (ed.), supra note 3 at 173.Google Scholar
12 Retroactively franchised might be a more apt description of the United Nation’s action. See United Nations-Cyprus Status of Forces Agreement, SC Res. 788 (1992), UN SCOR, 47th Sess., UN Doc. S/RES/788 (1992).
13 See, e.g., UN-Cyprus Agreement 1964, 492 UNTS 57.
14 Convenient collections of these international humanitarian laws may be found in Roberts, A. and Guelfi, R. (eds), Documents on the Laws of War, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)Google Scholar and Schindler, D. and Toman, J. (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflict, 3rd rev. ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
15 For the simple reason that peacekeeping had not been invented by the United Nations when the conventions were concluded in 1949. See also Green, L.C., The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 325 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).Google Scholar
16 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 2d ed. 408 (1990). See also UN-Cyprus Status of Forces Agreement, supra note 13, Art. 23.
17 (1949) 43 AJ.I.L. Supp. 1.
18 Art. 7, sections 24 and 26 respectively.
19 Art. 4, section 28.
20 33 UNTS 261, 290 (1947).
21 Art. 10, section 24.
22 1035 UNTS 167 (1973), 1977 Can. T.S. No. 43.
23 Supra note 14. See also Pictet, J.S. (ed.), Commentary, vol. 1 (Geneva: ICRC, 1952).Google Scholar
24 Geneva Convention I, supra note 14, Art. 24.
25 See Pictet, supra note 23.
26 Supra note 14.
27 UNGA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, p. 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter UDHR).
28 999 UNTS 171 (1966); 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47 (hereinafter ICCPR).
29 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1987 Can. T.S. No. 36; reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 and 24 I.L.M. 535. (hereinafter Torture Convention)
30 UDHR Art. 3, ICCPR Art. 9.
31 UDHR Art. 9, ICCPR Art. 9.
32 UDHR Art. 5; ICCPR Art. 7; Torture Convention passim.
33 See the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts on Aircraft 704 UNTS 219 ( 1963), 1970 Can. T.S. No. 5; Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 860 UNTS 105 (1970), 1972 Can. T.S. No. 23; Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 974 UNTS 177 (1971), 1973 Can. T.S. No. 6; Montreal Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation ( 1988) 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988) 27 I.L.M. 672; and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988) 27 I.L.M. 685.
34 1316 UNTS 205 (1979).
35 Protection of Peace-Keeping Personnel, UNGA Res. 47/72, Annex UNGAOR, 47th Sess., Doc. A/RES/47/72 (1993).
36 UNGA Res. 49/59 Annex, UNGAOR, 49th Sess, UN Doc. A/RES/49/59 (1995). See Kirsch, P., “Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel” (1994) 23 Can. Council Int’l L. Proc. 182.Google Scholar
37 Arts 24 and 27.
38 Art. 8 reinforces the general obligation in Art. 7(1) not to interfere with UN peacekeepers by specific directions in the event of their capture or detention. It reads:
Except as otherwise provided in an applicable status-of-forces agreement, if United Nations or associated personnel are captured or detained in the course of the performance of their duties and their identification has been established, they shall not be subjected to interrogation and they shall be promptly released and returned to the United Nations or other appropriate authorities. Pending their release such personnel shall be treated in accordance with universally recognized standards of human rights and the principles and spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
39 Art. 9(2).
40 Arts, 10, 13–15.
41 Arts. 11, 12, 16.
42 Art. 17.
43 Art. 6.
44 The official view seems to be that the use of force in these circumstances was only a backup measure for the fulfilment of UNPROFOR’s humanitarian objectives. See the comments in V.-Y. Ghebali, supra note 6 at 20.
45 During the negotiations, some states wanted to exclude NGO personnel altogether, even when working under contract to a UN agency. See Ad-Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of an International Convention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Work Carried Out during the Period from 28 March to 8 April 1994 Annex, UNGAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 22, at p. 21 para. 44, UN Doc. A/AC.242/2 and Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of An International Convention Dealing with the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, UNGAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 22, p. 17, UN Doc. A/AC.242/2 (1994). The difficulties encountered in negotiation are described by P. Kirsch, supra note 36, 182 at 185.
46 why immunities for military and policy personnel are singled out is not obvious. Civilian peacekeepers are equally in need of immunities and presumably will be included since the operative clause of Art 4 refers to “all personnel engaged in the operation.”
47 See Kindred, H.M. et al., International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1993)Google Scholar at Chap. 9 — State Responsibility.
48 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174 (Adv. Op.).
49 In the Reparations case, ibid., the International Court of Justice determined that the United Nations has “objective international personality and not merely personality recognized by [member states] alone.” Other IGOs of lesser universality in membership and purposes cannot assert objective personality.
50 Supra note 36, Art 20(e).