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Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the Imperial German Navy, 1914–1918

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Holger H. Herwig
Holger H. Herwig
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University
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Extract

The recent controversy over Germany's war aims during World War I has centered primarily around the positions taken by the Kaiser, the Foreign Office, and the army high command. The views of the navy have been largely neglected. This is unfortunate because the navy was, in a way, the status symbol of the German Empire. It was not, like the various armies, a divisive, particularist force, but rather a national Reich institution—the “melting pot” of Germany. It flew the Imperial black-white-red banner, was funded by the Reichstag, had a state secretary in the Imperial cabinet under the chancellor, recruited its officer cadets from all the German states and cities, trained them in the national naval school at Mürwik, and swore an oath of allegiance to the German Kaiser. Yet as the junior service, the navy struggled to escape from the shadow of the Prussian army and to establish its own identity. The issue of war aims provided it with just such an opportunity.

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Articles
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Central European History , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , September 1972 , pp. 208 - 233
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1972

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References

This project was supported through the Klaus Epstein Memorial Fellowship of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.

1. For a discussion of the historiography of the war-aims controversy see especially Jarausch, K. H., “The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914,” Central European History, II (03 1969), 48–76;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSchieder, W., ed., Erster Weltkrieg. Ursachen, Entstehungen und Kriegsziele (Cologne, 1969);Google ScholarKlein, F. et al., eds., Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg (East Berlin, 1968), vol. I;Google Scholar and Wernecke, K., Der Wille zur Weltgeltung. Aussenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland am vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf, 1969).Google Scholar The major monographs on this subject include Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/1918 (Düsseldorf, 1964);Google ScholarRitter, Gerhard, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland (Munich, 1965–1968);Google ScholarHillgruber, Andreas, Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege (Göttingen, 1967);Google Scholar and, more peripherally, Fischer, Fritz, Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (Düsseldorf, 1969).Google Scholar

2. von Tirpitz, Alfred, Erinnerungen (Leipzig, 1919), p. 127.Google Scholar

3. I use the term “executive officers” only for the Seeoffiziere, thus excluding the various other officer corps of the Imperial German Navy: engineer, torpedo, medical, naval infantry officers, and so on.

4. See Herwig, Holger H., “Soziale Herkunft und wissenschaftliche Vorbildung des Seeoffiziers der Kaiserlichen Marine vor 1914,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1971, No. 2, pp. 81–111.Google ScholarThese matters are dealt with in detail in my dissertation, “The German Naval Officer Corps. A Social and Political History 1890–1918,” which will soon appear with the Clarendon Press of Oxford University.Google Scholar

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6. See Wortmann, Karl, Geschichte der deutschen Vaterlands-Partei 1917–1918 (Halle/Saale, 1926);Google Scholar Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, pp. 565–68; and Etue, George E. Jr., “The German Fatherland Party 1917–1918” (unpub. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1959).Google Scholar With the military collapse in September-October 1918, the party quickly collapsed; its members mostly made their way into German National Peoples' Party (DNVP).

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9. See Berghahn, Volker R. and Deist, Wilhelm, “Kaiserliche Marine und Kriegsausbruch 1914. Neue Dokumente zur Juli-Krise,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1970, No. 1, pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

10. Cited ibid., p. 46. Tirpitz to Hopman, n.d.

11. Ibid., p. 53. Protocol by Rear Admiral Paul Behncke about his discussion on July 20, 1914, with State Secretary von Jagow.

12. Ibid., p. 56. Hopman to Tirpitz, July 22, 1914.

13. See Steinberg, Jonathan, “The Copenhagen Complex,” Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (07 1966), 23ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On September 2, 1807, the British had launched a surprise attack on Copenhagen and seized seventy-five ships of the still neutral Danish navy to prevent a possible Franco-Danish naval alliance.

14. Berghahn, and Deist, , “Kaiserliche Marine und Kriegsausbruch,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1970, No. 1, p. 58.Google Scholar

15. BA-MA, Nachlass Behncke, F 7585, “Aus der Zeit meiner Tätigkeit als stellv. Chef des Admiralstabs 1914/15.” Behncke to Tirpitz, Sept. 2, 1914.

16. Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart (hereafter cited as HA-Stuttgart), Nachlass Haussmann, J 47, vol. 114. Ballin to Haussmann, Oct. 28, 1915. See also Cecil, Lamar, Albert Ballin; Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888–1918 (Princeton, 1967), pp. 269–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 178, p. 30. Was the Kaiser also hinting at a “Third Punic War” (149–146 B.C.) between Germany and Great Britain?

18. See especially BA-MA, F 3580/PG 68122, Kais. Marine-Kabinett. Krieg 1914/15, vol. I, pp. 11–12. Protocol of a meeting between Tirpitz, Bethmann Hollweg, Jagow, and Pohl.

19. BA-MA, Nachlass Hollweg, F 5790, vol. III, 1915. Tirpitz's marginal notes on Captain Hollweg's memorandum on the possibility of a separate peace with Russia.

20. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 19, vol. 2. Memorandum of Feb. 1916. For earlier naval considerations concerning the United States, see Herwig, Holger H. and Trask, David F., “Naval Operations Plans between Germany and the United States of America 1898–1913. A Study of Strategic Planning in the Age of Imperialism,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1970, No. 2, pp. 5–32.Google Scholar

21. BA-MA, Nachlass Vanselow, F 7612, “Kriegsziele der Marine.“ Memorandum by Admiral von Holtzendorff, Nov. 26, 1916. Italics in the original.

22. The “risk theory” argued that the ultimate strength of the German fleet would deter any naval opponent from risking an all-out naval encounter with Germany, because even after a victorious outcome such an opponent would be left at the mercy of a strong third naval power or coalition of naval powers. See Hubatsch, Walther, Die Ära Tirpitz. Studien zur deutschen Marinepolitik 1890–1918 (Göttingen, 1955)Google Scholar, for an early treatment of this topic. More recent is Berghahn, Volker R., Der Tirpitz-Plan. Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II. (Düsseldorf, 1971).Google Scholar

23. HA-Stuttgart, Nachlass Haussmann, J 47, vol. 52. “An das deutsche Volk!” Appeal by the “Unabhängiger Ausschuss für einen deutschen Frieden,” Aug. 23, 1916.

24. BA-MA, Nachlass Vanselow, F 7612, “Kriegsziele der Marine.” Memorandum by Holtzendorff, Nov. 26, 1916. See also Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, pp. 416–18.

25. BA-MA, F 3476/PG 67694, Kais. Marine-Kabinett. Deutscher Flottenverein, vol. III, p. 107. Admiral Hans Koester to William II, Jan. 11, 1917.

26. BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 178, p. 100. Tirpitz to Ludendorff, Dec. 30, 1916.

27. See Trotha's Denkschrift, “Welche Stellung an der See braucht Deutschland für seine nationale Entwicklung?” ibid., p. 119. See also BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 19, vol. 2, Apr. 21, 1917.

28. BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 279. Tirpitz to Count Platen, Apr. 4, 1917.

29. See especially Spindler, Arno, Wie es zu dem Entschluss zum uneingeschränkten U-Boots-Krieg 1917 gekommen ist (Göttingen, n.d.);Google ScholarBirnbaum, Karl E., Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare. A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United States April 18, 1916–January 9, 1917 (Stockholm, 1958);Google ScholarBauer, Hermann, Reichsleitung und U-bootseinsatz (Lippoldsberg, 1956);Google ScholarGibson, R. H. and Prendergast, Maurice, The German Submarine War, 1914 to 1918 (London, 1931);Google ScholarLaurens, A., Histoire de la guerre sous-marine allemande (1914–1918) (Paris, 1930);Google ScholarMichelsen, Andreas H., Der U-Bootskrieg 1914–1918 (Leipzig, 1925);Google Scholar and Naudé, Kurt, Der Kampf um den uneingeschränkten U-Boot-Krieg 1914 bis 1917. Ein Beitrag zu dem Problem “Politik und Kriegführung” (Hamburg, 1941).Google Scholar

30. BA-MA, Nachlass Vanselow, F 7613, “Erwerb strategischer Stützpunkte.” Holtzendorff to William II, May 18, 1917. The document is also in Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages, 4. Reihe, , Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918 (Berlin, 1925–1930), XII, Pt. 1, 209–10.Google Scholar

31. BA-MA, F 3580/PG 68124, Kais, Marine-Kabinett. Allgemeine Erwägungen, vol. III. Admiral von Müller to Holtzendorff, June 2, 1917.

32. BA-MA, Nachlass Souchon, N 156, vol. 20. Souchon to his wife Violet, May 23, July 9, and July 13, 1917.

33. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 19, vol. 2. Trotha's memorandum, “Aufgaben der Marine nach dem Kriege,” July 1, 1917.

34. See Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, vol. III; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht; Stegemann, Bernd, Die Deutsche Marinepolitik 1916–1918 (Berlin, 1970);Google Scholar and Ziekursch, Johannes, Politische Geschichte des neuen deutschen Kaiserreiches, III (Frankfurt, 1930).Google Scholar

35. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BA-Koblenz), Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschland, R. 1. Berichte v. Holtzendorffan Ballin, vol. 13. Arndt von Holtzendorff to Albert Ballin, July 20, 1917.

36. For the peace initiative of Pope Benedict XV between June and Sept. 1917, see Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, pp. 545ff., and Ritter, , Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, III, 556ff.Google Scholar

37. “Aufzeichnungen Wilhelms II., ” September 10, 1917. Cited in Michaelis, W., “Päpstliche Friedensaktion. Neue Dokumente,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XII (1961), 433–34.Google Scholar See also Michaelis, Wilhelm, Für Volk und Staat. Eine Lebensgeschichte (Berlin, 1922), pp. 345–47.Google Scholar

38. See Ritter, , Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, IV, 70;Google Scholar and Kühlmann, Richard, Erinnerungen (Heidelberg, 1948), pp. 480, 482.Google Scholar

39. Gatzke, Hans, Germany's Drive to the West. A Study of German War Aims During the First World War (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 229–30.Google Scholar

40. BA-MA, Nachlass Vanselow, F 7614. The Kaiser's marginal comments on Admiral Hintze's letter of Sept. 28, 1917.

41. BA-MA, F 7864, Belgien. Bülow to Ludendorff, Dec. 17, 1917.

42. BA-MA, F 2022/PG 65983, Admiralstab der Marine. Immediatvorträge, vol. 30, p. 180. Dec. 20, 1917.

43. BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 283. Tirpitz to General Ernst von Eisenhart-Rothe, Feb. 8, 1918.

44. Ibid., vol. 167. Memorandum of Feb. 19, 1918, entitled “Kriegslage.” For a rebuttal of the “conspiracy” thesis see Herwig, Holger H. and Trask, David F., “The Failure of Imperial Germany's Undersea Offensive Against World Shipping, February 1917–October 1918,” The Historian, XXXIII (08 1971), 611–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45. In the summer of 1912, after the failure of the Haldane Mission, the British withdrew their Mediterranean fleet from Malta and concentrated their naval forces in home waters and at Gibraltar. The French, by prior agreement, withdrew their Atlantic fleet from Brest and stationed it at Toulon. The French agreed to patrol the Mediterranean for Great Britain, and the latter safeguarded the French channel ports against Germany. As a result of this arrangement, the British overnight gained a crushing naval supremacy in the North Sea vis-à-vis Germany.

46. BA-MA, F 2022/PG 65984, vol. 31, pp. 62–63.

47. BA-MA, F 4055/PG 64726, Anlage zum KTB der Seekriegsleitung. Protocol of the Holtzendorff-Ludendorff discussion of Apr. 8, 1918.

48. “I consider the conclusion of a military convention with Turkey horrible, and believe it ridiculous to conclude a naval convention with this power, to which we will probably have to yield for good the Goeben and the Breslau so that the most important thing, namely the fleet, will not be missing from the naval convention! These are jokes [Ferienscherze] within this incomparably cruel and bloody war.” BA-Koblenz, Berichte von Holtzendorff, R. 1., vol. 13. Ballin to Arndt von Holtzendorff, Oct. 29, 1917. The Goeben and the Breslau had been “loaned” to Turkey on Aug. 16, 1914. See Trumpener, Ulrich, “The Escape of the Goeben and Breslau: A Reassessment,” Canadian Journal of History, VI (1971), 171–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49. BA-MA, F 3444/PG 67476, Kais. Marine-Kabinett. Militärpolitische Fragen. Holtzendorff to Hindenburg, Apr. 13, 1918.

50. BA-MA, F 4055, KTB Kommando der Hochseestreitkräfte. Entry for Mar. 23, 1918.

51. See Baumgart, Winifred, Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918. Von Brest-Litovsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (Vienna and Munich, 1966), p. 65.Google Scholar

52. BA-Koblenz, Berichte von Holtzendorff, R. 1., vol. 15. Arndt von Holtzendorff to Ballin, Apr. 2, 1918. The reference is to the German colony Kiaochow, founded in China in March 1897, which never became a profitable undertaking for Germany. For a general treatment of the Black Sea area see Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 156–74. A number of documents pertinent to the conflict between Holtzendorff and Ludendorff are in Baumgart, Win-fried, “Neue Quellen zur Beurteilung Ludendorffs. Der Konflikt mit dem Admiralstabschef über die deutsche Schwarzmeerpolitik im Sommer 1918,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1969, No. 2, pp. 161–77.Google Scholar

53. BA-MA, F 591/PG 69257, Admiralstab der Marine. Schwarzes Meer. Holtzendorff to Hopman, May 2, 1918.

54. See Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 158.

55. Hopman, Albert, Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers (Berlin, 1925), pp. 284–85.Google Scholar See also BA-MA, F 7864, Ukraine, and BA-MA, F 7678, A. 2. Akten des Marinemitgliedes der Ukrainedelegation. Report to the Naval Office, May 18, 1918.

56. BA-MA, F 4055, KTB der Hochseestreitkräfte. Entry for May 4, 1918.

57. BA-MA, F 591/PG 69257. See also BA-MA, F 3444/PG 67476, for the protocol of Ludendorff's discussion with Bülow.

58. BA-MA, F 591/PG 69257, vol. 2. Admiralty Staff to Bülow, May 14, 1918. The Admiralty Staff stated that it would require at least 1700 men to operate the Russian vessels in the Black Sea.

59. Loc. cit. Admiralty Staff memorandum for a discussion of the Black Sea region with army leaders on May 7, 1918.

60. BA-MA, F 7864, Band Krim. Bülow to Holtzendorff, May 21, 1918.

61. Loc. cit. Zencker to Holtzendorff, June 5, 1918.

62. Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 156. See also Hopman, Kriegstagebuch, p. 293.

63. BA-MA, F 7864, Ukraine. Memorandum dated June 19, 1918.

64. Tirpitz, however, in August 1918 favored naval activity in the Black Sea in addition to an aggressive maritime policy in the west. See BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 160, for his “Bemerkungen zum Seekrieg August 1918.” “We must take all usable ships from the Russian fleet.” The admiral wanted to staff the vessels with Russian nationals from the “border states” or, failing this, to dissolve German naval infantry units and use these sailors on the ships. By October 1918, there were 254 sailors from the inactivated cruiser Kolberg, 203 from the First Naval Infantry Division, and 198 from the First Shipyard Division in the Black Sea area. See BA-MA, F 3974a/PG 63919, Kommando der Marinestation der Ostsee. KTB, vol. IV.

65. BA-MA, F 591/PG 69257. Hopman to Vanselow, May 27, 1918.

66. Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 87ff.

67. BA-MA, Nachlass Keyserlingk, N 161, vol. 3, pp. 19–30.

68. BA-MA, F 7864, Band Krim. Bülow's memorandum of July 1, 1918.

69. Loc. cit. Holtzendorff's notes of July 13, 1918, for the Crown Council. See also Görlitz, Walter, ed., Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller 1914–1918 (Göttingen, 1959), p. 392.Google Scholar

70. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 22, vol. 1, p. 81. KTB der SKL. Anlage 2. Scheer's notes for a discussion with William II of Sept. 12, 1918. BA-MA, F 7864, Ukraine, lists the following vessels commissioned by the Germans in the Black Sea: May 13, the cruiser Mejidie, given to Turkey; June 11, two small and two large destroyers; June 19, two submarines; July 8, the auxiliary ship Fleiss; October 15, the first cruise of the battleship Volja. By October 26, the Volja was seaworthy, but her guns were still inoperable.

71. BA-MA, Nachlass Behncke, F 7581, vol. 1. Report by Lieutenant Commander Gartzke of September 17, 1918. See also Hopman, Kriegstagebuch, pp. 307–308.

72. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 22, vol. 3. “G. G. Akten der Seekriegsleitung,” Oct. 1, 1918. Hopman, Kriegstagebuch, p. 322, claims that the French Rear Admiral Lejay later informed him that the French had been waiting for months in the Mediterranean Sea expecting the German naval forces to break out of the Black Sea through the Dardanelles. The Breslau had been lost in January 1918, when she struck four mines.

73. After the war, the Germans wanted to return the ships to the Russians because they feared they might be forced to repay the Russians for the ships if the vessels were turned over to the Allies. But according to Article 29 of the armistice, the ships were given to the Entente powers; on November 25, 1918, the British took possession of the Volja and six destroyers in Sevastopol. The ships were used by Generals Denikin and Wrangel against the Bolsheviks and later taken by the French, who allowed them to rust at Bizerta. See Hopman, Kriegstagebuch, pp. 315–16, 322; and Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 174.

74. BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 160. “Bemerkungen zum Seekrieg August 1918.”

75. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 18, vol. 1, 42–43. Trotha to Captain Bülow, July 9, 1918.

76. BA-MA, F 4055/PG 64725, KTB der SKL. 2.9.18–7.11.18. See also BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 22, vol. 17. Protocol of the September 21, 1918, meeting between Levetzow and Bartenwerffer.

77. BA-MA, Nachlass Tirpitz, N 253, vol. 64. Tirpitz to Trotha, Oct. 16, 1916.

78. Ibid., vol. 279. Tirpitz to Vice Admiral Oskar Count von Platen-Hallermünde, Lord Chamberlain (Hofmarschall) to William II, Apr. 4, 1917.

79. Ibid., vol. 276. Protocol of the Apr. 24, 1917, discussion between Tirpitz and General August Count zu Eulenburg, Minister of the Royal Household.

80. See especially Kehr, Eckart, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894–1901. Versuch eines Querschnitts durch die innenpolitischen, sozialen und ideologischen Voraussetzungen des deutschen Imperialismus (Historische Studien, CXCVII, Berlin, 1930);Google ScholarHerzfeld, Hans, Johannes v. Miquel (2 vols., Berlin, 1938–1939);Google ScholarBerghahn, , Der Tirpitz-Plan; and Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks, Parteien und Verbände in der Spätphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands: Sammlungspolitik 1897–1918 (Cologne, 1970).Google Scholar

81. Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, pp. 52–53. Tirpitz to General Albrecht von Stosch, Dec. 21, 1895.

82. Papers of Ernst von Weizsäcker, letter to his father, Oct. 5, 1918. Professor L. E. Hill of the University of British Columbia, Canada, is presently editing these papers for publication. I am indebted to him for making them available to me at this time.

83. Cited in Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, p. 1.