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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
One of the ideological appeals which the Nazis used to capture the petit-bourgeois and peasant vote in Germany was that of “middle-class socialism.” In this catchall term, the alienated “little man” in modern German industrial society saw an expression of both his strong anticapitalist feelings and his yearnings for economic independence. The concept also reflected a romantic proclivity for a preindustrial artisan economy. In directing themselves to these people who felt most ill at ease in modern industrial society, the Nazis promised low interest rates, curbs on big business, benefits to the small entrepreneur, and a return to a society free of large industry, department stores, and a vocal proletariat. The Nazis made this appeal partly for reasons of political expediency, partly because many of Hitler's followers took the tenets of middle-class socialism quite seriously. Several years in power, however, indicated to the more realistic Nazi leaders that it was quite impossible to reincarnate a utopian past in highly industrialized society gearing for war. As a result, after abortive attempts at realizing some of the ideas embodied in middle-class socialism, the Nazi regime made the necessary compromises with big business, and middle-class socialism became pretty much a dead letter. What is seldom realized, however, is that the Nazi regime betrayed middle-class socialism not once, but twice: initially, to economic exigency in the Reich, and then, once again, to political expansion among German ethnic groups outside Germany's borders.
1. See Schweitzer, Arthur, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Ind., 1964)Google Scholar, chapters III–V, for his account of the development of middle-class socialism in Germany and its betrayal by the Nazis.
2. Ernst Bohle, head of the Nazi Auslandsorganisation, was one of the first Nazis to grasp the possibilities of exploiting ethnic Germans as tools for Nazi expansion. See Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933–1938 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 103–107;Google Scholar see also von Rimscha, Hans, “Zur Gleichschaltung der deutschen Volksgruppe durch das Dritte Reich,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXXII (1956), 29–63Google Scholar, which illustrates Nazi attempts to “coordinate” the ethnic Germans in Latvia.
3. For a general overview of the social and economic conditions out of which these organizations grew, see Whiteside, Andrew Gladding, Austrian National Socialism before 1918 (The Hague, 1962).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4. Behm, Max-Richard, Die Kreditgenossenschaft als Typus der an Volk und Raum gebundenen Regionalbank (Prague, 1943).Google Scholar Although the book is typical of the very tendentious scholarship produced in Nazi Germany, it nevertheless gives valuable information and affords insights into the mentality of the völkisch-oriented banking and credit institutions. A similar, but far less useful treatment of the German credit institutions in Czechoslovakia is Karmasin, Franz, War es so richtig, Vater Raiffeisen? Das deutsche Genossenschaftswesen in der Slowakei (Munich, 1956).Google Scholar
5. One of the most successful of the Czech national financial institutions was the Živnostenska Banka. Even Nazi historians acknowledged the German debt to this Czech example. See Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, pp. 56f. Also, Kiesewetter, Anton, “Die Geschichte der KdD,” series of articles in Der Sudetendeutsche, Nos. 7–42 (1957), esp. No. 8, no page.Google Scholar
6. Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, pp. 51–57, outlines these institutions.
7. For background on the Kreditanstalt der Deutschen see Kiesewetter, “Geschichte der KdD”; also Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, pp. 85–87, 90–97, 102–103.
8. With regard to the Sudeten Germans, I use the term “völkisch socialism” interchangeably with “middle-class socialism” reflecting the strong ethnic cast in an area overshadowed by the nationalities struggle.
9. Collecting offices (Sammelstellen) only collected the savings of the local populace. Paying offices (Zahlstellen) did the same, but also handled withdrawals. Branch offices (Zweigstellen) handled the actual funding of credits, had their own independent bookkeeping, and took care of the books of the other offices as well. Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, p. 102.
10. Ibid., p. 103.
11. On the 1925 crisis see Kiesewetter, Anton, 25 Jahre KdD (Prague, 1935), pp. 11–15;Google Scholar also Kiesewetter, , “Geschichte der KdD,” Der Sudetendeutsche, No. 18 (1957), p. 7, and No. 21 (1957), p. 7.Google Scholar
12. On the administrative changes in the Kreditanstalt, see Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, pp. 106ff.
13. See the VDA apologia, Verpflichtendes Erbe: Volkstum im Ringen um seinen Bestand und seine Anerkennumg (Kiel, 1954).Google Scholar
14. For a brief survey of the situation after the First World War see Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, pp. 160–66. For a contemporary treatment, Boehm, Max-Hildebert, Volkstheorie und Volkstumspolitik der Gegenwart (“Wissenschaftliche Forschungsberichte zum Aufbau des neuen Reiches,” No. 4, Berlin, 1935);Google Scholar also Rohrbach, Paul, Deutsches Volkstum als Minderheit (Berlin, 1926).Google Scholar
15. The two main desks in the Cultural Department which dealt with ethnic Germans were “A,” which handled political, and “B,” which handled economic affairs—the latter concentrating especially on credits. For a detailed Geschäftsverteilungsplan, see Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn, Büro Chef AO/No. 87, memo (Schwager) of Oct. 5, 1936 (hereafter cited as PA).
16. A review of the founding and organization of OSSA is given in a memo of Apr. 6, 1940 (Grosskopf), in PA/Kult B/242/No. 2/Blatt 165.
17. See Grosskopf Aufzeichnung of Sept. 8, 1939, in PA/Kult B/Inland II-g/242/No. 2/Bl. 121.
18. The incident is described in a note from Grosskopf to Twardowski, Mar. 29, 1940, in PA/Kult B/242/No. 2/Bl. 160.
19. See unsigned, undated note in PA/Kult A/231/No. 12/no page no.
20. From a report of the Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reiches to the Cultural Department of the Auswärtiges Amt, Mar. 29, 1939. PA/Kult B/242/No. 2/Bl. 049–050.
21. Memo (Schwager), n. 15, above.
22. See OSSA to Kult B (Seiler), Oct. 12, 1933, in Bundesarchiv (hereafter BA), R2/15678; also Aufzeichnung, undated but ca. 1938, in PA/Inland II-D/64–01–09/Bl. 061 and 071–072. The fund was also referred to as the Sondermasse Prag.
23. See Vereinigte Finanzkontore (Winkler) to Reich Ministry of Finance, Nov. 24, 1938, in PA/Inland II–D/64–03.
24. For a general treatment of this aspect of ethnic German politics in Nazi Germany see Smelser, Ronald, “Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy: The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938” (unpub. diss., Wisconsin, 1970), chapters II–III.Google Scholar
25. See Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, p. 173. The abortive Deutschtumsamt should not be confused with Rosenberg's actual power base, his Aussenpolitisches Amt.
26. Ibid., pp. 89–160, for a similar exhaustive treatment of Bohle's Auslandsorganisation.
27. On the structure and personnel of the Volksdeutscher Rat, ibid., pp. 179–97.
28. See Seiler Aufzeichnung, Nov. 30, 1993, in PA/Geheimakten-Tschecho-Slowakei/P025/vol. 2. Winkler also apparently had wider ambitions in cultural affairs. According to Albrecht Haushofer, he joined the party in an attempt to become “Reich Plenipotentiary for Culture Abonnements.” A. Haushofer to his father, Feb. 13, 1938, BA/Haushofer Nachlass/833/vol. 7.
29. Kiesewetter, for his part, was trying to build the Kreditanstalt empire to a point where it would be the single völkisch credit institution in German Czechoslovakia. To this in German Czechslovakia. To this end he tried to avail himself of Reich aid in absorbing smaller banks. See Seiler (Kult A) to Prague Embassy, Dec. 12, 1934, and Burmeister (Finance Ministry) memo of Apr. 1, 1935, in BA/R2/15678/Nos. 54–55 and 95–96 respectively.
30. OSSA to Auswärtiges Amt (Seiler), Oct. 12, 1933, BA/R2/15678/ Nos. 15–19.
31. Kult A (Grünau) to OSSA, Nov. 7, 1933, in BA/R2/15678/ Nos. 25–29.
32. See “Niederschrift über die Vorstandssitzung am 29. November 1933,” in BA/R2/15678/ Nos. 29–35. Also Seiler Aufzeichnung of Nov. 30, 1933, in PA/Geheimakten-Tschecho-Slowakei/P025/vol. 2.
33. OSSA to Seiler, Nov. 30, 1933, BA/R2/15678/No. 36.
34. See Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, pp. 47–48, 71–72.
35. For general treatments of the Henlein movement see Luža, Radomir, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York, 1964),Google Scholar and Brügel, Johann Wolfgang, Tschechen und Deutsche (Munich, 1967).Google Scholar
36. Already in October 1933, soon after the Henlein party had been founded, three directors of the Kreditanstalt—Kiesewetter, Hubert Baumann, and Paul Hach—were placed under arrest in connection with the highly publicized “Volkssport” trial, but were released shortly thereafter. (The “Volkssport” was a Sudeten radical youth organization patterned after the SA.) See article in the Prager Presse, Nov. 22, 1934, in PA/Pol. IV/Politik 6/Nationalitäten-Fremdvölker-Rassenfrage/vol. 23. Also KdD records, Verhandlungsschrift über die Präsidialsitzung of Nov. 9, 1933, No. 8564, in Správa pro věci majetkove a devisove, Prague (Administration for Affairs of Property and Foreign Exchange, hereafter SVMD); also Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, p. 116.
37. A contemporary wrote: “As the political situation in the Sudeten lands reached the crisis stage, the Anstalt was not only an economic, but also a political power factor. Its branch offices were centers of völkisch sentiment. From the ranks of its employees came a number of collaborators with the Sudeten German Party and all the important protective associations.” Cited in Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, p. 117.
38. See Prager Presse article of Nov. 22, 1934, PA/Pol. IV/Politik 6/Nationalitäten-Fremdvölker-Rassenfrage/vol. 23.
39. Ibid.
40. See unsigned Aktenvermerk in the Cultural Department of June 5, 1934, PA/Kult A/Deutschtum im Ausland/vol. 18. Also Hendl (Ortsgruppe Pilsen of the Henlein party) to Sudeten German Party Arbeitsamt, no date but probably 1935, in Státny Ústřední Archiv, Prague (hereafter SUA), 18AA/WA/No. 31; also representative of the Parlamentarischer Klub (Sudeten German Party) to Neuwirth, Peters, Herrmann, and Oekonomius, Sept. 13, 1935, SUA/18AA/WA/No. 31.
41. See Aufsichtsratsitzung (Kreditanstalt) of Feb. 15 and Mar. 1, 1936, SVMD/No. 8633; which reference to credits to other publishers see Vorstandssitzung of Aug. 5, 1936, SVMD/No. 8576, and Oct. 6, 1937, SVMD/No. 8623.
42. Kreisleitung IV (Gustav Obrlik in Gablonz) to Richard Lammel (Stabschef der SdP) of Apr. 30, 1938, SUA/1–KH/No. 5. In the areas where there were as yet no branch offices of the KdD, the organization worked closely in conjunction which local völkisch associations such as the Bund der Deutschen, the Turnverband, etc. See Aufsichtsratsitzung (Kreditanstalt), June 18, 1938, SVMD/No. 8633.
43. See memorandum of the Hauptleitung der Sudetendeutschen Heimatfront of Jan. 28, 1935, SUA/2KKH/No. 6.
44. For details on the funding of the successful 1935 election campaign, see Smelser, “Volkstumspolitik” pp. 327–29.
45. The most recent, and to date best treatments of Nazi foreign policy are Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, and Weinberg, Gerhard, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, 1933–1936 (Chicago, 1970).Google Scholar
46. See Smelser, “Volkstumspolitik,” pp. 413–52; also Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, pp. 234–52, for aspects of SS involvement in ethnic German politics.
47. Smelser, “Volkstumspolitik,” pp. 450–52; Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, pp. 225–34.
48. For the above development see Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, pp. 234–42.
49. For the text of Hitler's decree of July 2, see PA/Kult A/Inland II–G/232/vol. 13.
50. See Smelser, “Volkstumspolitik” p. 496.
51. Stieve (Kult B) to Vomi, July 7, 1938, BA/R2/15718.
52. On the Troppau incident see Altenburg (AA) to Hencke (German embassy in Prague), June 20, 1938, PA/Pol.IV/IV/Politik 6/Nationalitäten-Fremdvölker-Rassenfrage/vol. 11. Karl Hermann Frank admitted that large amounts of money were coming from Vomi. Frank, Karl Hermann, Zpověd K.H. Franka (Prague, 1946), p. 45.Google Scholar By 1943 Vomi had completely taken over the OSSA work. See Rechnungshof to Finance Ministry, Feb. 27, 1943, PA/Inland II–D/64–01–9/Bl. 002.
53. See Senator Enhuber memo (Sudeten German Party Arbeitsamt) of May 6, 1938, SUA/26 HA–I/No. 44.
54. On Kreditanstalt support of the Carpathian German Party, see police report of Mar. 10, 1938, SUA-Bratislava/PR No. 247; for the Rixi Hotel development see BA/R2/15078.
55. Behm, Kreditagenossenschaft, p. 118.
56. Himmler's SS took over a number of economic enterprises in the Sudetenland, as well as later in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; in doing so it often worked hand in glove with the big German banks, in particular with the Dresdner Bank which had close relations with the SS. See Georg, Enno, Die wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der SS (“Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,” No. 7, Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 72–83, 133–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the Economics Ministry, see Reichswirtschaftsministerium to Kreditanstalt, Nov. 3, 1938, in SVMD/ No. 9599-Konsortialkredit.
57. On the following, see Behm, Kreditgenossenschaft, pp. 120f.
58. Kiesewetter, , “Geschichte der KdD,” in Der Sudetendeutsche, No. 38 (1957).Google Scholar