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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
Late in October 1923, troops of the German Reichswehr removed the government of Saxony and in the process touched off yet another political crisis in Berlin, one which nearly destroyed the Weimar Republic. This event in Saxony was not unprecedented, for the Reich had used force to remove state (Land) governments in 1919. But while the earlier interventions demonstrated a new republic's determination to enforce order, the intervention in 1923 reflected the weakness and confusion of a political system prematurely aged by five years of dissension and economic collapse. Gustav Stresemann's Great Coalition, in power at the time of the intervention, appeared to some knowledgeable observers, including Stresemann, the last chance to save the republic during the chaos produced by French intrusion into the Ruhr and the collapse of the currency. Talk of a dictatorship was in the air as men, groping for adequate words to measure catastrophe, went about gravely intoning “finis Germaniae.” Although this time both Germany and the republic escaped doom, the Saxon affair destroyed the Great Coalition and later ended Stresemann's career as chancellor. Since the men responsible understood something of the risks involved for the republic, it seems worthwhile to inquire into the way in which the dispute grew between Saxony and the Reich government and into the process by which the Reich reached its decision to intervene.
1. Gessler, Otto, Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit, ed. Sendtner, Kurt (Stuttgart, 1958), p. 250.Google Scholar This issue is discussed in numerous primary and secondary accounts, e.g.: Brüning, Heinrich, Memoiren, 1918–1934 (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 103;Google Scholar and Gordon, Harold J. Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Princeton, 1972), p. 239.Google Scholar
2. Hohlfeld, Klaus, Die Reichsexekution gegen Sachsen im Jahre 1923 (Erlangen, 1964), pp. 13, 14;Google ScholarRenger, Ewald, Kriminalität, Preis und Lohn: Eine kriminalstatistische Untersuchung für Sachsen von 1882 bis 1929 (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 10–15.Google Scholar
3. Lipinski, Richard, Der Kampf um die politische Macht in Sachsen (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 3–12.Google Scholar
4. Ibid., pp. 12–15, 53; Morgan, David, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917–1922 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), pp. 168–71.Google Scholar
5. Morgan, Socialist Left, pp. 170–73.
6. Election results for the constituent assembly, Feb. 19, 1919, were: Independent Social Democrats (USPD), 15 seats; Social Democrats (SPD), 42; Democrats (DDP), 22; People's Party (DVP), 4; Nationalists (DNVP), 13. The Communists (KPD) did not participate. Figures from Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, p. 15. Lipinski, Kampf, pp. 16–17; Morgan, Socialist Left, pp. 219, 231, 239.
7. Morgan, Socialist Left, pp. 332–34. Hoelz, Max, From White Cross to Red Flag: The Autobiography of Max Hoelz, Waiter, Soldier, Revolutionary Leader, trans. Voigt, F. A. (London, 1930), pp. 34–102.Google Scholar
8. Figures for the elections to the diet, Nov. 14, 1920, were: KPD, 6; left USPD, 3; right USPD, 13; SPD, 27; DDP, 8; Center, 1; DVP, 18; DNVP, 20. Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, p. 16. The figures show that the SPD lost ground to the right as well as to the left. The left USPD soon joined the KPD.
9. Ibid., p. 16. Lipinski, Kampf pp. 17, 21–31.
10. Lipinski, Kampf, pp. 21–22, 25–28, 30, 32–43.
11. Minister-President Johann Wilhelm Buck to Chancellor Cuno, Jan. 4, 1923, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Alte Reichskanzlei R 43 I, Band 2307, Blätter 228–31 (hereafter cited as BA, R 43 I/2307/228–31). Prussia was involved because Upper Silesia was part of Prussia. A version of the letter in Severing, Carl, Mein Lebensweg, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1950), 1: 430–31, omits, among other things, the activities of Prussia about which Buck com plained.Google Scholar Cf. also Wochenblattes, Verlag des Bayerischen, Die Todfeinde der Republik (Munich, n.d. [1922]), in Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 48, pp. 41–43; and Lipinski, Kampf, pp. 43–47, 61. Organizations referred to as illegal were usually outlawed under provisions of the Laws for the Protection of the Republic; Orgesch had been outlawed by an earlier decree of the Reich president.Google Scholar
12. Lipinski, Kampf, pp. 55–56.
13. Ibid., pp. 56–58.
14. Ibid., p. 58. Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, pp. 24–26. Schulthess's Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1922, Neue Folge 63 (Munich, 1928), p. 146.Google Scholar
15. Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, p. 27. Lipinski, Kampf, pp. 57–60. Landtagsfraktion, Socialdemokratische [Saxony], Vier Jahre sächsische Politik (Dresden, 1926), pp. 7–11.Google Scholar Lipinski had supported the Control Committees and auxiliary police in response to a reactionary threat which he perceived after Rathenau's assassination. Cf. Jasper, Gotthard, Der Schutz der Republik: Studien zur staatlichen Sicherung der deutschen Revolution (Tübingen, 1963), pp. 65–66.Google Scholar Schulthess, 1922, p. 83.
16. For Zeigner's personality and background, cf. Radbruch, Gustav, Der innere Weg: Aufriss meines Lebens (Stuttgart, 1951), pp. 171–72;Google Scholar statement by Hermann Müller at the 1924 SPD Party Congress, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag: Protokoll mit dem Bericht der Frauenkonferenz (Berlin, 1924), p. 86;Google ScholarStampfer, Friedrich, Die 14 Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik, 2d ed. (Offenbach/Main, 1947), p. 332;Google Scholar Severing, Lebensweg, 1:431–33.
17. Lipinski, Kampf, p. 61.
18. Ibid., p. 60.
19. It should be noted that the SPD and DDP together controlled 48 seats, precisely half of the diet and not a majority. The Center had lost its one seat. Relations between the Saxon SPD and DVP were hostile in part because Lipinski had accused the Verband sächsischer Industrieller, which was closely connected to the DVP, of subsidizing front groups of the radical right. Cf. “Todfeinde,” BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 48, pp. 41–43.
20. Regarding the plans and general intentions of the KPD, this article is based principally on Angress, Werner T., Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–23 (Princeton, 1963). Cf. chaps. 10, 11.Google Scholar
21. Cited in Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, pp. 34–37.
22. Memorandum, Reichskanzlei to Cuno, Apr. 12, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2307/257. Minutes of the actual meeting are missing.
23. Schmädeke, Jürgen, Militärische Kommandogewalt und parlamentärische Demokratie: Zum Problem der Verantwortlichkeit des Reichswehrministers in der Weimarer Republik, Historische Studien, no. 398 (Lübeck, 1966), pp. 94–98.Google Scholar
24. von Schleicher, Kurt, writing for Otto Gessler, June 30, 1920; reply, Erich Koch-Weser to Reichswehr Ministry, Zentrales Staatsarchiv, I, Potsdam: Reichsministerium des Innern 13424/16–17, 15, 18–19 (hereafter cited as ZSA, I, RMdI 13424/16–17). Erich Koch was a leading member of the DDP, former mayor of Kassel, and Reich minister of the interior under Bauer, Müller, and Fehrenbach.Google Scholar
25. Letter from Wehrkreiskommando IV, Apr. 12, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2307/292. The report concerning a breakdown in the command of the Saxon police was based on information from an unnamed Saxon police officer, formerly an officer of the General Staff. Wehrkreiskommando IV predicted that Zeigner's government would not retain its following, was unsure whether the bourgeoisie could reorganize the government, and concluded: “Mit der Notwendigkeit des Eingreifens der Reichsregierung wird gerechnet werden müssen.”
26. Dr. Johannes Marx, Syndikus, led the delegation which called on Cuno, Apr. 19, 1923. BA, R 43 I/2307/309–10. Oeser was a member of the DDP and former railroad minister and diet member in Prussia. Heinze, chairman of the DVP Reichstag delegation, also served as vice-chancellor.
27. A letter from Reichskanzlei to Dr. Haniel von Haimhausen, Reich emissary in Munich, Apr. 19, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2217/208, stated: “If a few major criminals were arrested … that would be a great relaxation of tension. It would be an even greater one if the Bav. [sic] government would act against the Storm Division [emphasis sic; the Nazis’ Sturm Abteilung is meant] … the Reich government does what it can against Communism, but the most convenient weapon, that of a decree against formation of Hundreds, Bau. does not allow [bietet nicht; emphasis sic].” An undated, unsigned report of a consultation with Knilling, ibid., pp. 215–16, contained the suggestion that Bavaria on its own act against some of the more notorious offenders of the extreme right. Knilling refused to allow any interference by the Reich in Bavaria's sovereignty and argued that Bavaria was too weak anyway to control the Storm Division. Cuno complained in a letter to Consul-General Scharrer in Bernries, May 2, 1923, ibid., p. 232, that he was prevented from acting against Communist manifestations in Saxony and Thuringia by “certain right-radical manifestations” which “provide a certain justification for counter movements on the left.” On the situation in Prussia, cf. Severing, Lebensweg, 1:386.
28. The most thorough account of the agreements is Gessler's from the Reich cabinet meeting of Oct. 6, 1923, Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Reichskabinettsprotokolle, U.S. National Archives Microfilm, microcopy T-120, reel 1749, frames 757024—26. Evidence regarding abolition of the “self-defense” is in a statement by Zeigner to Cuno, July 10, 1923, and in letters by General Müller and Major Uth of “the General Staff,” July 20, 1923, in BA, R 43 I/2308/10, 61. Miiller's letter also indicated that the agreement called for consultations between the Reichswehr and the Saxon government. Müller to Zeigner, June 28, 1923, BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 57/79, and Schleicher to Zeigner, July 14, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/27, indicate that public attacks on the Reichswehr violated the agreement to settle differences by direct discussion. Zeigner in a public statement confirmed that Saxony cooperated with the Reichswehr in organizing a “border defense.” Cf. Vorwärts, Sept. 8 (A.m.), 1923, p. 3. Since border patrol was normally a state, not an army, function, such a “border defense” constituted an army unit formed to evade the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Regarding the earlier agreement between the Reichswehr and Prussia, cf. Caro, Kurt and Oehme, Walter, Schleichers Aufstieg: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Gegenrevolution (Berlin, 1933), pp. 156–57.Google Scholar Zeigner's meeting with Cuno, Gessler, and Minister-President Otto Braun is mentioned in a note by the Saxon foreign ministry, Aug. 7, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/186, and in a speech by Zeigner quoted in Caro and Oehme, Schleichers Aufstieg, p. 162. Major Uth's letter, cited above, suggested a connection between the Reichswehr's settlement with Prussia and that with Saxony.
29. Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, pp. 47–48, saw the Socialists’ refusal to form Hundreds in Leipzig in cooperation with the Communists as the cause for the disturbance there. Lipinski, Katnpf, p. 65. Zeigner's speech to the diet is in Landtagsbeilage zur Sdchsischen Staatszeitung, Nr. 62, 1923, pp. 257–58, in BA, R 43 I/2308/108.
30. Clipping from Sächsisches Volksblatt, June 19, 1923, in BA, R 43 I/2308/42. A lengthy correction by Zeigner, clipped from Sächsische Staatszeitung, June 24, 1923, ibid., p. 44.
31. This interpretation of the way Zeigner used the issue of the Reichswehr and the right is in agreement with that of Gordon, Harold J. Jr., “Die Reichswehr und Sachsen,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, trans. Roseler, Joachim, 11: 679. Regarding the KPD's appeals to members of the middle class, cf. Angress, Stillborn Revolution, pp. 318ff.Google Scholar
32. 47. Sitzung, Landtagsbeilage zur Sächsischen Staatszeitung, Nr. 70–71, Nr. 149–50 des Hauptblattes, pp. 289–300, in BA, R 43 I/2308/52.
33. Kaiser's warning, in memorandum by Hamm, July 7, 1923, with marginal note by Cuno, BA, R 43 I/2308/16.
34. Reichskanzlei memoranda on Zeigner's Planitz speech, n.d.; memorandum by Staatssekretär Hamm, July 5, 1923; Zeigner to Reichskanzlei, June 22, 1923; speech by Cuno, June 25, 1923, DVP interpellation in Reichstag, July 7, 1923; notes on meeting of Cuno and Zeigner, July 10, 1923; telephone call, Georg Gradnauer to Reichskanzlei, July 12, 1923; transcript of diet speeches, July 12, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/80–81, 78–79, 75, 44, 104, 9–12, 100, 116–17; press release, ibid., p. 74.
35. Statement by Maj. von Schleicher to members of Verband Sächsischer Industrieller, July 19, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2307/311; Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik, p. 262; Maj. von Schleicher to Zeigner, July 14, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/61, 27; statement by Major Uth and letter by Gen. Müller, June 28, 1923; Zeigner's statement on the “Grenzschutz” is in Vorwärts, Sept. 8 (A.m.), 1923, p. 3. The Saxon government collected information from several Prussian administrators and from employees of the post office and the nationalized railroads, in addition to its own police and civil servants and at least one administrator in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The Reichswehr discovered the full extent of this espionage only after it had occupied the state; cf. report from Freiherr von Seutter, chief of staff, IV Division, to Reichswehr Ministry, Truppenamt, Jan. 22, 1924, ZSA, I, RMdI 13217/39–41. Some historians, e.g. Harold J. Gordon, Jr., “Die Reichswehr und Sachsen,” have raised the question why Zeigner never presented evidence to substantiate his charges against the military. Clearly the fear of reprisals against himself and his informants by employers, the courts, and possibly even terrorists must have been one of the reasons for his reticence. For a brief discussion of right-wing murder organizations, cf. Waite, Robert G. L., Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918–1923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952; reprint ed., New York, 1969), pp. 212–27.Google Scholar
36. Report by Wehrkreiskommando IV, Apr. 12, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2307/292. Undated report May 1923) by Wehrkreiskommando IV, BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 57/36–39; Hohlfeld, Reichsexekution, p. 55; Müller to Zeigner, June 28, 1923; Gessler to Müller, July 7, 1923; reply by Schützinger, July 25, 1923; note, Müller to Gessler, July 30, 1923, BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 57/79, 78, 80. Memorandum by Hamm, July 5, 1923, noting that Schützinger “slandered” the army and Gessler “hat … Strafantrag … gestellt,” BA, 43 I/2308/78.
37. Vorwärts, Aug. 4 (P.m.), 1923, p. 2; Aug. 5, 1923, p. 3.
38. Waite, Vanguard, pp. 191–96; Leipziger Volksblatt, Aug. 8, 1923, pp. 2–3, in BA, R 43 I/2308/193–94.
39. Note, Schleicher to Stresemann, Aug. 13, 1923; note, Gessler to Stresemann, Aug. 22, 1923; memorandum, Reichswehr Ministry, n.d. (ca. Aug. 20, 1923), BA, R 43 I/2308/190, 216, 221. Zeigner's statement on the “border guard,” Vorwärts, Sept. 8 (A.m.), 1923, p. 3. Letter, Untersuchungsrichter Dr. Richter, Sept. 18, 1923, responding to Gessler's inquiry concerning the leak of information, BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 57/198. Note, Gessler to Wilhelm Sollmann, Oct. 21, 1923, demanding the firing of Dr. Haentzschel, BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 18, Bd. 1/114. Haentzschel was listed as a Ministerialrat in, Germany, Handbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1924, p. 123. Regarding Gessler's attempt to have Zeigner prosecuted, cf. note, Gessler to Gustav Radbruch, Aug. 22, 1923; note, Radbruch to Gessler, Aug. 27, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/225, 244.
40. Sächsische Staatszeitung, Sept. 3, 1923, in BA, R 43 I/2308/251. Bernhard, Henry, Das Kabinett Stresemann (Berlin, 1924), p. 16. Gustav Stresemann is the actual author of main this booklet;Google Scholar cf. Sutton, Eric, ed., Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters and Papers, 3 vols. (New York, 1935–1940), 1:85. Severing, Lebensweg, 1:433, reported that Zeigner fled to Berlin because demonstrations by the radical right on Aug. 11, Constitution Day, had made his own capital unsafe for him.Google Scholar Local SPD organizations invited him to speak in Berlin, thus providing an effective cover for his presence there. No confirmation for Severing's story seems to exist, though Zeigner's rather frenetic behavior makes it seem credible.
41. Note by the groups' representatives, Aug. 14, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/189. Stresemann had founded the League in 1902, cf. Görlitz, Walter, Gustav Stresemann (Heidelberg, 1947), p. 26,Google Scholar remained an official in it after entering national politics, cf. Turner, Henry Ashby, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1963), p. 29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Regarding negotiations for a Saxon coalition, cf. correspondence between Saxon DVP General Secretary Dieckmann and Stresemann's personal secretary, Aug. 24 and Sept. 10, 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, v. 87, U.S. National Archives microfilm, microcopy no. T-120, reel 3159/H171288–90, H171300–01. An undated typescript of an editorial, ibid., v. 262/3099/H146078, discussed the League's negotiations with Zeigner and praised Stresemann for his receptiveness to the League. For Stresemann's version of the meeting on Aug. 22, 1923, with Zeigner, cf. letter to Otto Wels, BA, R 43 I/2308/235–38.
42. Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, p. 16. Eric Sutton, ed., Gustav Stresemann, 1:5ff. Regarding the Great Coalition: “… his idealistic view of the conception of the Great Coalition as an expression of the community as a whole, could only conceive the restoration of the Fatherland as possible on the basis of the unity of all social classes and social strata….” Ibid., p. 84. His desire to involve the Socialists in governmental affairs, therefore, arose from a realization of practical political necessities, rather than sympathy for workers or Socialists.
43. Stresemann to Wels, Aug. 27, 1923; Brüninghaus to Stresemann, Aug. 30, 1923, with marginal note to Sollman in Rheinbaben's hand, BA, R 43 I/2308/237–38, 271–72.
44. Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 393. Sitzung, Nov. 23, 1923, pp. 12255–63.
45. Stresemann to Wels, Aug. 27, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2308/235–38. Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, p. 16; memoranda on Zeigner's speech, BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 57/169, and R 43 I/2309/44; resolution against Gessler by Saxon SPD, BA, 2308/355, and Vorwärts, Sept. 2, 1923, p. 2; attack by Zeigner on Gessler, Sächsische Staatszeitung, Sept. 3, 1923, in BA, 2308/251; Gessler's replies, Vorwärts, Sept. 6 (A.m.), p. 2, and Sept. 9 (A.m.), p. 2.
46. Notes on meeting of Sept. 11, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/97.
47. For discussions with the Bavarian representative Dr. von Preger prior to the end of passive resistance, cf. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D756730–35. The Bavarian decree conferred upon Gustav von Kahr authority over all agencies of the state, communities, and the Reich. BA, R 43 I/2218/120. The Reich on Sept. 26 sent a circular to Reich officials instructing them to obey only the Reich authorities, cited in Zeigner to Reich government, Oct. 10, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/159.
48. Note, Saxon Mission (Gesandtschaft) to Reich Chancellery, Sept. 27, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/120. Gessler's appointments under the decree, ZSA, I, RMdI 13470/84.
49. An examination of emergency decrees issued after Nov. 9, 1918, has shown that the republic granted the guarantees set forth in the Kriegzustandsgesetz of 1916: Reichsgesetzblatt, 1916, pp. 1329–31. Reports on suspension of newspapers, prohibition of meetings, etc., under the decree of Sept. 26, 1923, ZSA, I, RMdI 13470/79–85. Reports on a quarrel between Zeigner and Gen. Müller over the latter's authority, ibid., RMdI 13440/196, and 13447/102–03.
50. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757024–30; cabinet minutes in BA, R 43 I/2309/138. Regarding the Reichswehr's associations with unofficial bodies in 1923, cf. Carsten, F. L., The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918–1933 (Berkeley, Calif., 1973), pp. 153–85.Google Scholar
51. Memorandum by Staatssekretär Rheinbaben, Oct. 7, 1923, in ZSA, I, RMdI 13440/146–46a. Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik, p. 263.
52. Landtagsfraktion, SPD [Saxony], Vier Jahre sächsische Politik, (Dresden, 1926), p. 22.Google ScholarAngress, Werner T., Stillborn Revolution, pp. 426–31.Google Scholar
53. Ibid., p. 431. Gen. Müller to Police President Schützinger, Oct. 1923; Saxon government to Reich Chancellery, Oct. 17, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/180, 174.
54. Angress, Stillborn Revolution, pp. 430–38.
55. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757226–27. Sollmann's misguided statement shows, among other things, how poorly his intelligence system was operating.
56. Stresemann wrote that the various disagreements with Zeigner would have been bearable, “wenn nicht gleichzeitig unter der sozialdemokratischen Herrschaft in Sachsen ein unerträglicher Terror nicht nur gegen die Arbeitgeberschaft, sondern auch gegen das ganze nichtsozialistische Beamtentum betrieben worden wäre.” He discussed a flood of material from the employers and repeated visits by their representatives, finding particularly memorable a report by the League of Saxon Industrialists containing “geradezu erschreckendes Material von der Rechtslosigkeit der sächsischen Arbeitgeberkreise,” Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, pp. 16–17. The Socialists of Saxony were aware of these attempts to influence Stresemann; cf. SPD Landtagsfraktion, Vier Jahre, p. 20; and Lipinski, Kampf, p. 49. The latter blamed the employers for causing the intervention.
For reports from the various employers’ associations, cf. ZSA I, RMdI 13217/54–58, 60–64, 90–92, 95–97, 99–100, 113–18, 124, 134–39, 158–60, 163–64; and BA, R 43 I/2308/135–51, 156–68, 163–64. Regarding the situation in Plauen, Rheinbaben on Aug. 21, 1923, called Stresemann's attention to a report by the local chamber of commerce, ibid., 214. Regarding Aue, cf. report from Syndikus Ilgen, Aug. 21,1923, ibid., 197–206. Pressure on Stresemann from the DVP is evident, inter alia, in the Reichstag delegation meeting of Sept. 12, 1923, Stresemann, Gustav, Vermächtnis: Der Nachlass in drei Bänden (Berlin, 1932), 1: 117.Google ScholarThe Prussian chargé in Dresden reported on Oct. 16, 1923, that industrialists were fleeing Saxony to escape kidnapping by leftists, BA, R 43 I/2309/157. For the events of 1919–20, cf. Hoelz, White Cross, pp. 53–66, 89–91.Google Scholar
57. Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik, pp. 270–71. The (London) Times, Oct. 30, 1923, p. 12, attributed its estimate to both the Reichswehr and Zeigner.
58. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757256.
59. Ibid. Stresemann wrote: “The march of the Reichswehr into Saxony took place with the full agreement of the Social Democratic members of the Reich cabinet.” Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, p. 17.
60. Regarding the military threat posed by Bavarian rightists, cf. testimony by Thomas Kuenzer, Reich commissioner for the surveillance of public order, to the Feme Committee, Feb. 26, 1929, cited in Schüddekopf, Otto-Ernst, ed., Das Heer und die Republik: Quellen zur Politik der Reichswehrführung, 1918 bis 1933 (Hanover and Frankfurt a.M., 1955), p. 135.Google Scholar
61. Angress, Stillborn Revolution, p. 439, cited from Verhandlungen des sächsischen Landtages, 1923, 2:1760.
62. Press release, Oct. 24, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/200.
63. Angress, Stillborn Revolution, pp. 440–53. Report by the Hamburg Mission in Berlin, ZSA, I, RMdI 13440/159, 165–67. Report by Bremen police, ibid., pp. 247–51.
64. Cabinet discussions on Bavaria took place Oct. 19, 21, 22, 23, and 26, 1923. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757257–58, 277–82, 283–86, 304, 434–41. The cabinet strenuously debated whether Gessler had authority under the presidential state of emergency to force Bavaria into lifting its own state of emergency. Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 179.
65. SPD Landtagsfraktion, Vier Jahre, p. 12, mentioned a certain Schulze, member of the DVP, Ministerialdirektor in the Saxon chancellery and interior ministry. Removing him from office seemed, to the Socialists, the key to creating a bureaucracy loyal to the republic. Zeigner therefore relieved him of responsibility for police and community affairs. Although none of the sources mentions the individual's first name, he is obviously the same retired administrator whom Gessler found so attractively nonpartisan.
66. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757443–450. When the Socialists threatened to resign, Stresemann was absent. He returned and presumably learned of the threat. The minutes took note of a long discussion at the end of the meeting but did not record it.
67. Translation is from Sutton, ed., Stresemann, 1:185. The German text is in Stresemann, Vermächtnis, 1:186–87.
68. Otto Wels referred to this suggestion at a meeting of party leaders on Oct. 20. It appears from the context that the suggestion had been made earlier. BA, R43 I/2309/220.
69. Lipinski, Kampf, p. 71. The three Socialist emissaries were Gustav Radbruch, Rudolf Hilferding, and Wilhelm Dittman. Hohlfeld, Reichsexecution, p. 102; Dittman's brief account, given at a meeting of party leaders, Oct. 29, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/222; Zeigner's formal refusal, ibid., p. 213; memorandum by Stresemann, n.d., ibid., p. 236; Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, pp. 18–19; Heinze's statement to DVP Reichstag delegation, Nov. 6, 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, v. 87/3159/H171438.
70. Telephone call, Stresemann to Gessler, Vermächtnis, 1:187. Stresemann recalled that he had spoken to Heinze, informing him only that Ebert's decree was not yet ready, but Heinze's account, cited above, seems clearly to deny any instructions at all from Stresemann; Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, p. 19; Ebert's decree, Oct. 29, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/242; the time of the decree and Ebert's stipulations are in Vorwärts, Oct. 30 (A.m.), 1923, p. 1.
71. Minutes in BA, R 43 I/2308/1220–22.
72. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757505–08; The New York Times, Oct. 28, 1923, p. 2, reported that a mob had attacked an army battalion in Freiberg. The troops opened fire, killing thirteen. A telephoned report from Dresden from “Arbeiterkreisen,” Oct. 30, 1923, to the Reich Chancellery, added that the troops had continued firing as the crowd dispersed. There was a later incident in Freiberg where troops fired without provocation on a crowd, killing an additional 27 and wounding about 50. BA, R 43 I/2309/260–62. The (London) Times, Oct. 30, 1923, reported that in Pirna troops had ordered a group of unemployed, lined up to collect the dole, to disperse. They fired before the men could comply and killed one person, wounded three.
73. Minutes, DVP Reichstag delegation meeting, Nov. 6, 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, v. 87/3159/H171438.
75. Bernhard, Kabinett Stresemann, p. 20; telephone call, Stresemann to Heinze, Oct. 29, 1923, BA, R 43 I/2309/255; telephone call Heinze to Stresemann, Oct. 29, 1923, ibid., 254; Heinze's statement at DVP Reichstag delegation meeting, Nov. 6, 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, v. 87/3159/171438–39; Stresemann's statement, Nov. 1, 1923, Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757564. Ebert obviously did not approve Heinze's action; cf. Stresemann's note in his journal: “R[eichs]. President], very disturbed, confidence of the working class lost,” Vermächtnis, 1:187. Wilhelm Sollman stated in summer 1924: “I know, too, that Ebert in no way approved the forceful removal of the Saxon government.” SPD Parteitag, 1924, p. 115.
76. Heinze's statement, meeting of DVP Reichstag delegation, Nov. 6, 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, v. 87/3159/H171439.
77. Dr. Becker at DVP Reichstag delegation meeting, Nov. 6, 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, v. 87/3159/H171442.
78. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, 1749/D757511–16.
79. Ibid., D757563–66.
80. Ibid., D757581–86.
81. Schmädeke, Kommandogewalt, p. 25. Even after Ebert and Gustav Noske had in effect given up trying to form a republican military force, the law did keep the army under ministerial control until after the Kapp Putsch; ibid., pp. 83–84, 94–109.
82. Annelise Thimme made the point that the Saxons were punished for a “disciplinary infraction” because it was committed by the left. Gustav Stresemann: Eine politische Biographie zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (Hanover, 1957), p. 59.Google Scholar
83. Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik, p. 264. This conflict with Stresemann which Gessler mentioned escaped the notice of other memoirists. Presumably they missed it because the antagonists carefully avoided direct confrontation. Stresemann saw no choice but to accept the outcome of events in Saxony though he had tried to avoid a conflict there. He went to his overthrow defending what had happened, never blaming Gessler or the army. His biographer Antonina Vallentin-Luchaire, Stresemann (New York, 1931), p. 143, wrote that he suspected Heinze had betrayed his instructions, let power go to his head, and assumed the “role of dictator.” (Stresemann had not been present when Heinze told his story to the DVP.) Regarding the accusation against Heinze, Severing, Lebensweg, 1:444, wrote that Heinze was not capable of betrayal but instead unquestioningly trusted the military and considered everyone on the left a disturber of the peace.Google Scholar
84. Reichskabinettsprotokolle, Sept. 27, 1923, 1749/756855. The interpretation in Henry Ashby Turner's Stresemann, p. 126, seems to be based on a misreading of the evidence, particularly that in Das Kabinett Stresemann where there seems to be no notion of a connection between the disturbances in Hamburg and the crisis in Saxony. Stresemann on p. 28 did assert that the Reich took action against Saxony because Communism was nurtured and paid by Moscow, but this was a rationalization after the fact. Moscow was never mentioned in the recorded discussions of Oct. 1923. In 1953, Otto Wenzel, a Ph.D. candidate, asked Gessler whether he had known at the time that the Communists were planning to start a revolution in Saxony. Gessler could not remember. BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 39/Heft 13/57–58. The most accurate account of Zeigner's removal published previously is that of Thimme, Roland, Stresemann und die deutsche Volkspartei, Historische Studien, no. 382 (Lübeck und Hamburg, 1961).Google Scholar
85. Memorandum, n.d. (after Feb. 29, 1924), BA, Nachlass Gessler, Nr. 57/219–23. Referring to the Socialists' demands and their leaving the Great Coalition, Hermann Müller commented: “We could not, however, deceive ourselves [by believing] that all the bourgeois parties were not ready to play what they have called … the 66 game.” SPD, Parteitag, 1924, p. 86. In other words, the proposal to decentralize Germany was well known, and the SPD opposed it.
86. Lipinski, Kampf, pp. 76–80. Radbruch, Innere Weg, p. 172. SPD Landtagsfraktion, Vier Jahre, p. 24, observed that the military fired administrators and teachers.
87. Rohe, Karl, Das Reichsbanner Schwartz Rot Gold: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der politischen Kampverbände zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Düsseldorf, 1966), pp. 29–41.Google Scholar The Hundreds were one of several predecessors to the Reichsbanner. Otto Horsing, the Reichsbanner's leading organizer, had contributed information to the Saxon spy network against the Reichswehr in 1923 while he was governor of Prussian Saxony; cf. General Hans von Seeckt to Prussian Interior Minister Carl Severing, Dec. 29, 1923, ZSA, I, RMdI 13447/127–28.