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The Chinese Amigo: Implications for the Development of Equatorial Guinea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2009

Mario Esteban
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Abstract

In the last five years China has dramatically increased its presence in Africa. Despite its abundant natural resources, the notoriety of its political regime and its close relationship with Beijing, Equatorial Guinea is a glaring omission in the China–Africa literature. This article intends to fulfil that gap by analysing the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Malabo at both the official and the social levels to assess its impact on the development of Equatorial Guinea. As bad governance is the main obstacle for the development of Equatorial Guinea, the article compares the role played by Chinese companies and government in reinforcing Obiang's authoritarian regime with that played by their Western counterparts. It concludes that Chinese extractive firms play a marginal role in the financial extraversion that strongly links the Obiang regimen with US oil companies. Conversely, the Chinese government offers Obiang more extensive and stable support than Western governments to the extent that most of the undeniable developmental potential of Chinese co-operation is wasted through clientelist networks.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 199 , September 2009 , pp. 667 - 685
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2009

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References

1 I thank Eduardo Soler and Alicia Campos for their helpful comments and their help with finding contacts for my research. I am also indebted to all the Chinese and Equatoguinean people who kindly discussed issues with me. I thank the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (I + D project HUM2007-60125) for supporting this research.

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68 These figures are based on the estimations made by the Home Office of Equatorial Guinea and the Chinese embassy in Malabo. None of them has accurate data on the number of Chinese immigrants established in Equatorial Guinea, but both sources make similar approximations.

69 It must be also taken into account that this Chinese immigration wave has taken place within a broader immigration flow towards Equatorial Guinea, triggered by the discovery and exploitation of its hydrocarbon reserves.

70 There are no surveys to analyse the views of the Equatoguinean people on the Chinese presence in their country, so most of the evidence employed in this section is extracted from the interviews I conducted during field research in Equatorial Guinea and also in Spain.

71 All these deficiencies were confirmed by my visits to many of these clinics and interviews with their staff and customers.

72 This was revealed to me in January 2008 by one of the high ranking officials who attended the closed meeting where the minister made this statement.

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