Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2023
Does local democracy induce better service to citizens? While elected officials can be punished at the ballot box if they fail to address citizens’ needs, appointed bureaucrats may have policy knowledge that enables them to better serve citizens. Employing a multimethod design, this paper uses variation in local political institutions in Taiwan to assess the relative merits of direct election and bureaucratic appointment for local government responsiveness. While democratic institutions are often thought to induce responsiveness, I find that in Taiwan, with its historically strong bureaucracy and relatively new democratic institutions, the picture is somewhat more complicated. Elected and appointed officials face different incentives that motivate the latter to respond more quickly and effectively to online requests for help.
地方民主会更好地服务于民众吗?当民选官员不能够解决民众需求时,他们可能会在选举中落败,而官派官员可能具有更优的政策知识储备,从而更好地服务民众。本篇论文运用了多重方法设计,利用台湾政治机构的地方差异,评估民选和官派对地方政府反应能力的相对优势。本文发现,即便民主机制通常被认为能带来更有效的回应性,在台湾这样一个历史上拥有强大的官僚体系、且民主体系相对较新的地方,现状更加复杂。民选和官派官员们面对的不同激励机制使得后者更快速、有效地回应网上的求助信息。