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Pernicious Manipulation of Performance Measures in China's Cadre Evaluation System*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2015

Jie Gao
Jie Gao*
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore. Email: polgj@nus.edu.sg.
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Abstract

The implementation of China's reform era target-based cadre evaluation system has instigated various types of gaming behaviour on the part of local officials. How do these gaming strategies differ from each other? Why do local officials sacrifice the public interest for target fulfilment in some cases but not in others? This article argues that gaming is not monolithic and should not be treated as such. It develops a typology that distinguishes between pernicious and benign gaming, and looks into the symptoms and motives of pernicious gaming in particular. It finds that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming. In addition, the system's implementation practically compels local officials to misrepresent their performance, even though they are aware of the negative impact of such behaviour on the public interest. This study shows that to understand the strategies, motivations and implications of gaming better, a more nuanced approach is needed.

摘要

中国在市场化进程中逐步推行了以目标为导向的地方政府绩效评估制度。然而实际运行中, 该制度却引发了地方官员的各种博弈行为。这些博弈行为的区别是什么? 为什么地方官员有时会不惜损害公众利益以追求绩效目标的完成, 有时却不会如此选择? 本文认为博弈并非单一的行为模式, 因此也不能使用单一的视角来看待博弈现象。文章发展出一个理论框架, 将博弈行为区分为良性博弈与恶性博弈, 并在此基础上对恶性博弈的症状和动机进行更为深入的探讨。文章发现目标责任制的独特设计, 即自上而下分解下达的结果导向型的指标与高激励机制的结合, 为恶性博弈的产生提供了温床。此外, 目标责任制在实际运作中引发的执行困境也迫使地方官员采用恶性博弈策略, 甚至以损害公众利益为实现绩效目标的代价。本文认为我们需要一种更为细致的视角, 才能更好地了解博弈的策略、成因及影响。

Keywords

target-based responsibility systemgamingperformance measurementdata fabricationcadre managementtypology目标责任制博弈绩效评估数据造假干部管理分类
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 223 , September 2015 , pp. 618 - 637
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Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2015 

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Footnotes

*

This study is funded by City University of Hong Kong (Project No.: 7200281) and National University of Singapore (WBS No.: R-108-000-069-133). The author would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this study.

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