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Petitioning Beijing: The High Tide of 2003–2006*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2012

Lianjiang Li ,
Mingxing Liu  and
Kevin J. O'Brien
Lianjiang Li*
Affiliation:
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Mingxing Liu
Affiliation:
Peking University.
Kevin J. O'Brien
Affiliation:
University of California at Berkeley.
*
Email: lianli@cuhk.edu.hk (corresponding author).
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Abstract

What precipitated the 2003–06 “high tide” of petitioning Beijing and why did the tide wane? Interviews and archival sources suggest that a marked increase in petitioners coming to the capital was at least in part a response to encouraging signals that emerged when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao adopted a more populist leadership style. Because the presence of tens of thousands of petitioners helped expose policy failures of the previous leadership team, the Hu-Wen leadership appeared reasonably accommodating when petitioners arrived en masse in Beijing. Soon, however, the authorities shifted towards control and suppression, partly because frustrated petitioners employed disruptive tactics to draw attention from the Centre. In response to pressure from above, local authorities, especially county leaders, turned to coercion to contain assertive petitioners and used bribery to coax officials in the State Bureau of Letters and Visits to delete petition registrations. The high tide receded in late 2006 and was largely over by 2008. This article suggests that a high tide is more likely after a central leadership change, especially if a populist programme strikes a chord with the population and elite turnover augments confidence in the Centre and heightens expectations that it will be responsive to popular demands.

Keywords

petitioningprotestrepressionleadership changesocial stability
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 210 , June 2012 , pp. 313 - 334
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2012

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Footnotes

*

This paper was presented at the Conference on the State of the Local State in China at Oxford University in November 2010. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, we would like to thank Victor Shih, Vivienne Shue, Fubing Su, Sun Tao, Jeremy Wallace, Wojtek Wolfe and three anonymous reviewers. Financial support for fieldwork was provided by the Research Council of Hong Kong Government and the South China Program of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We thank Tao Yu for administering and transcribing most of the interviews.

References

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3 Zhiyong, Xu, Yao, Yao and Yingqiang, Li, “Xianzheng shiye zhong de xinfang zhili” (“Petition management from the perspective of constitutionalism”), Gansu lilun xuekan (Gansu Journal of Theory), No. 3 (2005), p. 16Google Scholar.

4 Jianrong, Yu, “Xinfang zhidu gaige yu xianzheng jianshe” (“The reform of the petition system and the construction of constitutionalism”), Ershiyi shiji (The 21st Century), No. 89 (2005), pp. 72–78Google Scholar; Shukai, Zhao, “Xinfang gaige” (“Reforming the petition system”), Gaige neican (Inside Information on Reform), No. 22 (1 August 2009), pp. 23–26Google Scholar.

5 Altogether 101 petitioners were interviewed. Each interview had three parts. The first focused on petitioners' life history. The second explored their experiences during and after making their first visit to the capital. The last examined their political attitudes. Most interviews were conducted in Beijing by the second author and his research assistants in 2007 and 2008 according to a detailed outline designed by the first author. Several particularly well-informed and articulate petitioners were interviewed a number of times. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed. See the Appendix for a list of quoted interviewees.

6 See Ocko, Jonathan K., “I'll take it all the way to Beijing: capital appeals in the Qing,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1988), pp. 291–315CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fang, Qiang, “Hot potatoes: Chinese complaint systems from early times to the Late Qing (1898),” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 68, No. 4 (2009), pp. 1105–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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12 For the number of petitioners visiting the Secretariat of the State Council during these four high tides, see Diao Jiecheng, A Brief History, pp. 54, 75, 118, 164–69, 212–13, 230, 260, 272.

13 Ibid. pp. 300–01.

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19 The actual number of visits received by the SBLV is not available. For reports on the high tide, see Kui, Hu and Shu, Jiang, “Xinfang hongliu” (“A torrent of petitioners”), Liaowang dongfang zhoukan (Oriental Outlook Weekly), No. 4 (11 December 2003), pp. 30–35Google Scholar. Zhan, Sun, “‘Jiefang zhanyi’ nengfou huajie xinfang hongfeng” (“Can the ‘reception campaign’ mitigate the torrent of petitions”), Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (China Newsweek), No. 19 (30 May 2005), pp. 30–31Google Scholar. The reports are corroborated by government sources, see e.g. Zhou Zhanshun, “Zai 17 sheng qu shi zhujing gongzuozu zuzhang he youguan zhongyang guojia jiguan xinfang bumen fuze tongzhi huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech at a meeting with directors of liaison offices from 17 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and responsible leaders of letters and visits offices of relevant central and national authorities”), 1 September 2003, typescript, pp. 4–5; “Yanjiu bushu tuoshan chuli feizhengchang shangfang wenti de huiyi jiyao” (“Minutes of the meeting on studying and arranging proper handling of non-normal petitioning”), typescript, 2 May 2006, p. 2. On the first signs of a receding high tide, see Xijie, Zhang, “Dang de qunzhong luxian yu xin xingshi xia de xinfang gongzuo” (“The Party's mass line and letters and visits work in new circumstances”), Lilun qianyan (Theory Frontiers), No. 6 (15 March 2007), p. 11Google Scholar. For data on the number of petitions to the central government in selected years from 1961–2005, see Cai, Yongshun, Collective Resistance in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 23Google Scholar.

20 Yu Jianrong, “The petition system,” p. 30.

21 On worsening corruption, see Gong, Ting, “Dangerous collusion: corruption as a collective venture in Contemporary China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2002), pp. 85–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Manion, Melanie, Corruption by Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004)Google Scholar. On widening inequality, see Gustafsson, Bjoern A., Shi, Li and Sicular, Terry, Inequality and Public Policy in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on problems with the legal system, see Diamant, Neil J., Lubman, Stanley B. and O'Brien, Kevin J. (eds.), Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

22 For analysis of the Sun Zhigang incident and its aftermath, see Hand, Keith J., “Using law for a righteous purpose: the Sun Zhigang incident and evolving forms of citizen action in the People's Republic of China,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2006), pp. 114–95Google Scholar.

23 Interviewee 32. Similar observations were made by other petitioners, including 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 16, 20, 25, 26 and 31.

24 Interviewee 6. A number of other “old hand” petitioners made similar comments, including interviewees 1, 8, 11, 14, 16, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35. Three officials in Beijing (interviewees 36, 37 and 38) also affirmed this point.

25 In the past, receptionists issued a receipt, but the SBLV stopped doing so after a computerized registration system was introduced in 2004.

26 Interviewees 3, 9, 12, 14 and 27.

27 Interviewee 10; also interviewees 3, 5, 8 and 9.

28 See Li, Lianjiang, “Political trust in rural China,” Modern China, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2004), pp. 228–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 On tactical escalation, see O'Brien, Kevin J. and Li, Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006), ch. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Personal communication with a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 11 July 2009. On the Hanyuan protest, see Chung, Jae Ho, Lai, Hongyi and Xia, Ming, “Mounting challenges to governance in China: surveying collective protestors, religious sects and criminal organizations,” The China Journal, No. 56 (2006), pp. 1–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Interviewee 42.

32 Chen, “Collective petitioning and institutional conversion.”

33 See Xu Zhiyong et al., “Petition management,” p. 16. Also see Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting guowuyuan mishuting (The General Office of the Central Party Committee and the Secretariat of the State Council), “Guanyu renmin laixin laifang gongzuo de qingkuang he gaijin yijian de baogao” (“A report about the work on people's letters and visits and its improvement”), 15 August 1963; Wang Dongxing, “Zai shiyi sheng shi qu xinfang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the conference on letters and visits work in eleven provinces, cities and administrative regions”), 16 June 1978; Beijing shi renmin zhengfu bangongting xinfangchu (The letters and visits division of the General Office of the People's Government of Beijing city), “Beijing shi dui laijing shangfang qunzhong zhong wuli qunao deng renyuan de guanjiao banfa yu jianyi” (“Beijing city government's management methods and suggestions about how to handle the people who come to Beijing to lodge complaints and wilfully make trouble”), typescript, 1982. For a recent study of how sent-down youth resorted to disruptive tactics when they came to Beijing to petition, see Yang, Bin, “‘We want to go home!’ the great petition of the Zhiqing, Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, 1978–1979,” The China Quarterly, No. 198 (2009), p. 409CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Interviewees 3, 8, 11 and 12.

35 For more on “troublemaking tactics,” including placing the character “wronged” on white cloth and creating a commotion or blocking gates at government offices, see Xi Chen, “The power of ‘troublemaking’,” pp. 456–62.

36 Interviewees 3, 4, 12.

37 Petitioners have even attempted to appeal directly to visiting dignitaries. On 25 May 2009, hundreds of petitioners gathered at the gate of the Press Bureau of the State Council, displaying a banner that read: “Welcome Pelosi to visit China and to take care of human rights in China SOS.” See Guangnai, Shan, “2009 nian shang ban nian quntixing shijian de taishi he tedian” (“Situation and characteristics of mass incidents in the first half of 2009”), Lingdao canyue (Leadership Reference), No. 28 (5 October 2009), p. 12Google Scholar.

38 Interviewees 5, 9. Some petitioners disapproved of “petitioning foreigners,” arguing that petitioning was strictly a domestic affair or a “family dispute.” Interviewees 12, 20.

39 Interviewees 36, 37 and 38.

40 Interviewees 36, 37 and 38; also interviewees 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 14, 16 and 18.

41 Interviewees 37, 36 and 38; also interviewees 3, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 19 and 23. Local authorities also had to pay for meals and sometimes lodging for petitioners, reportedly at a high rate. One petitioner was told that local authorities paid 50 yuan for one steamed bun.

42 For more on petition ranking, see Cai, “Managed participation,” p. 438.

43 See Sun Zhan, “Can the ‘reception campaign’ mitigate the tidal wave of petitions?” Before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, another nationwide campaign was launched in which all county secretaries were instructed to personally deal with petitioners who had visited Beijing.

44 Interviewees 36, 37 and 38.

45 See Yu Jianrong, “The reform of the petition system”; The Central Political-Legal Committee, “Shefa shesu xinfang zeren zhuijiu guiding” (“Regulation on responsibilities regarding petition cases relating to law and litigation”), No. 10 (2006), typescript, p. 2; “Minutes of the meeting” (2 May 2006), p. 4.

46 Chang Wenguang, “Zai chongfu shangfang zhuanxiang zhili gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the meeting on special handing of repeat petitioning”), typescript, 17 October 2006, p. 6. On the effects of responsibility contracts on petition work, see Minzner, “Xinfang,” pp. 151–58.

47 On the cadre responsibility system, see Edin, Maria, “State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre management from a township perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003), pp. 35–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Whiting, Susan H., “The cadre evaluation system at the grass roots: the paradox of party rule,” in Naughton, Barry J. and Yang, Dali L. (eds.), Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 101–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Minzner, Carl F., “Riots and coverups: counterproductive control of local agents in China,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2009), pp. 53–124Google Scholar; O'Brien, Kevin J. and Li, Lianjiang, “Selective policy implementation in rural China,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1999), pp. 167–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Personal communication with a deputy county head in Guizhou, May 2010.

49 Hebei Provincial Joint Committee, “Gongzuo tongbao” (“Work briefing”), typescript, No. 7 (6 November 2006).

50 “Pingdingshan shi chuli xinfang tuchu wenti ji quntixing shijian lianxi huiyi wenjian” (“Document of the Pingdingshan City Joint Committee on handling prominent issues in petitioning and mass incidents”), No. 6 (9 October 2006) and No. 12 (18 October 2006).

51 Interviewee 24. Similar observations were also made by interviewees 3, 6 and 25.

52 See Brehm, John and Gates, Scott, Working, Shirking, and Sabotage (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53 Interviewees 36, 37, 38 and 39.

54 Interviewee 40.

55 On local officials, as early as the 1950s, resisting “the time consuming and tedious tasks associated with complaint work,” see Luehrmann, “Facing citizen complaints in China,” p. 850.

56 Interviewee 18.

57 Interviewee 26.

58 A prominent Beijing University psychiatrist notoriously made (and later insisted that his remark was taken out of context) a statement that “99 per cent of professional petitioners are mentally ill.” See Ivan Zhai, “Petitioners decry ‘99pc mentally ill’ remark,” scmp.com, 2 April 2009, accessed 3 April 2009. Hundreds of petitioners staged a week-long protest about this at the gate of Beijing University, during which one petitioner stabbed himself.

59 Interviewee 28.

60 Interviewee 41.

61 Interviewee 40. On why local officials encounter difficulties dealing with petitions, see Jian, Chi, “Shangfang zuixin tedian, nandian, zhongdian” (“Newest characteristics, difficulties, and emphases of petitioning”), Shixian lingdao canyue (Reference for City and County Leaders), No. 4 (25 February 2007), pp. 15–20Google Scholar; Zhao Shukai, “Reforming the petition system,” pp. 23–24.

62 Interviewee 22.

63 Interviewees 8 and 17.

64 Interviewee 15.

65 Interviewee 4.

66 Interviewee 21. There are many stories about entrapment of petitioners. One Hunan petitioner, for instance, was charged with “blackmailing the government” and was later found guilty for signing a petition termination agreement prepared by local officials.

67 Interviewee 41.

68 Interviewees 36, 37, 38, 40 and 41. Some petitioners indeed took money and continued to petition. A Henan man, for instance, accepted compensation and signed an agreement, but then started petitioning about mistreatment during his previous petition effort. Interviewee 2. An official at a district procuratorate in Nanjing argued that petitioners who “blackmail the government” must be stopped, see Xiaoning, Gu, “Gongmin shehui bu neng fangzong ‘efang’” (“A civil society must not tolerate ‘ill-meaning petitioning’”), Gaige neican, No. 25 (1 September 2008), pp. 37–39Google Scholar.

69 Interviewee 27; also interviewee 21.

70 Interviewee 3; also interviewees 2, 18, 22 and 27. The danger that rival local leaders might use petitions against each other became even graver with the introduction of the “public consultation system,” which requires that proposed appointments and promotions be publicized for a period of time (usually four to eight weeks) to solicit comments, suggestions and objections. On this system, see Yang, Dali, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 181–82Google Scholar.

71 The official media did not acknowledge “dark jails” and the practice of petitioner retrieval until late 2009.

72 Personal communication with a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, March 2007.

73 Interviewees 14, 26. On “retrievers” and local detention facilities in the late 1990s, see Cai, “Managed participation,” pp. 446–47. For accounts of petition interception, retrievers, Majialou and “black jails” since the 2003–06 high tide subsided, see Andrew Jacobs, “Seeking justice, Chinese land in secret jails,” New York Times, 9 March 2009; Jamil Anderlini, “Punished supplicants,” Financial Times, 5 March 2009, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d13197e-09bc-11de-add9-0000, accessed 17 July 2009; Clifford Coonan, “They come in search of justice – but end up thrown in jail,” The Independent (UK), 12 November 2009.

74 Interviewees 5, 8, 28 and 29; personal correspondence with rural researchers in Beijing, Sichuan and Hunan. On “stabilizing” petitioners, see Lihong, Wang, Aiping, Wang and Yingjia, Wang, “Nongcun xinfang huodong feizhixuhua zhi xiaoji yingxiang yu duice” (“Non-normal petitioning activity in the countryside, its negative impact and countermeasures”), Hebei keji shifan xueyuan xuebao (shehui kexue ban) (Journal of Hebei Normal University of Science and Technology) (social sciences edition), Vol. 7, No. 2 (2009), p. 51Google Scholar; also “Document of the Pingdingshan City Joint Committee.” For 100 cases in which petitioners were sentenced to education through labour, see Yu Jianrong, Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang zhidu pipan (A Critique of China's Re-education Through Labour System) (Hong Kong: Zhongguo wenhua chubanshe, 2009)Google Scholar.

75 Interviewees 39, 40 and 41.

76 Interviewees 3, 27 and 30.

77 Chang Wenguang, “Speech at the work conference”; also see Zhao Handong, “Zai quanxian xinfang wending gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the county conference on letters, visits and stability”), 13 April 2007.

78 Zhang Xijie, “The party's mass line,” p. 11.

79 Interviewees 6, 16; also interviewees 36, 37 and 38.

80 Kelliher, Daniel, Peasant Power in China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 63Google Scholar.