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The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in the Post-Mao Era, 1977–87*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Jae Ho Chung
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Analyses of rural reform in post-Mao China have focused mainly on changes in the production unit, the incentive system and the expanded decision-making power of the rural household in production and marketing. They have largely neglected the evolution in policy toward the- inputs of agricultural production: farm machinery, fertilizer, soil, irrigation, seed and plant improvement, and so on. There have been few studies about the relationship between the changes in rural production organizations and incentive systems on the one hand, and peasant choices among various production input options on the other. On the whole, post-Mao agricultural policies slighted what could be called the mechanical package of agricultural inputs in favour of the biological package. Yet no Western analyses have dealt exclusively with this, which is quite surprising, given the enormous significance attached to the mechanical package in general and mechanized farming in particular during the whole period of Mao's rule.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 134 , June 1993 , pp. 264 - 290
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1993

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References

1. Agricultural production inputs can be divided broadly into two categories, mechanical and biological. The former includes the mechanization of farming, irrigation, transport and land reclamation, while the latter refers to the application of organic and chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, the improvement of soil, and the betterment of seeds and plants.

2. Most studies on post-Mao agriculture do not mention mechanization at all, while the few that do give it only a cursory few paragraphs. Two excellent studies are available for the earlier period: Stavis, Benedict, The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; and On Tarn, Kit, China's Agricultural Modernization: The Socialist Mechanization Scheme (London: Croom Helm, 1985)Google Scholar; And for a commentary on the radically reduced role of mechanization in post-Mao China, see Hinton, William, The Great Reversals: The Privatization of China, 1978–1989 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990)Google Scholar; ch. 6.

3. Nongye xiandaihua (Agricultural Modernization) (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1983), p. 1Google Scholar;

4. Jianming nongye jingji cidian (Concise Dictionary of Agricultural Economy) (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 52Google Scholar;

5. As will be discussed later, mechanization was by no means abolished. While the newly-added areas for mechanization, especially rural transport, animal husbandry and food processing, have received relatively favourable policy attention, the conventional area of “mechanized farming” (zhongzhiye jixiehua) was severely downgraded.

6. It is worth noting that almost all Chinese discussions also take tractors as the primary indicator of agricultural mechanization.

7. I have used the general label of “reformers” because there were no discernible disagreements among different groups of the reformers with regard to the mechanization issue.

8. For a similar view, see Stavis, , The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization, pp. 49Google Scholar; 261.

9. Tarn, , China's Agricultural Modernization, p. 171Google Scholar;

10. In addition, the number of agricultural machinery enterprises was reduced from 83 to 41 between 1960 and 1962, which resulted in a comparable decrease in the production of machinery from 61,000 to 30,000 for the same period. See Dangdai zhongguo de nongye jixie gongye (Agricultural Machinery Industry in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1988), pp. 27–28Google Scholar; 75, 372–73. I am grateful to Michel Oksenberg who made this material available to me.

11. Despite the post–1966 increase in both state capital investment (with annual average of 319 million yuan) and the number of enterprises (from 47 in 1966 to 714 in 1971), actual effects of such quantitative expansion on China's agricultural mechanization remains to be qualified. For the cited figures, see ibid. pp. 84, 374.

12. Perkins, Dwight and Yusuf, Shahid, Rural Development in China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 61Google Scholar;

13. On the ad hoc distribution of machinery, see Renpu, Bai and Tianfu, Liu, “Lun nongye jixie de heli toufang wenti” (“On the issue of rationally distributing agricultural machinery”) in Nongye jishu jingjixue wenxuan (Selected Essays on Agricultural Technology and Economics) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1981), pp. 100–101Google Scholar;

14. For instance, in 1979 Xinzhou County of Hubei Province had 1, 663 units of farm machinery of which only 163 were operable due to the lack of repair parts. See Zhenkun, Xia, “Shilun nongye jixiehua de jingji fenxi” (“An economic analysis of agricultural mechanization”) in Nongye jishu jingjixue wenxuan, p. 80Google Scholar; The problem of supplying parts was so serious that in 1976–77 Jilin Province's Yushu County, for instance, had to spend one million yuan on the errands searching for parts alone. See Guoyao, Yu, Mengxiang, Cao, and Yousheng, Luo, “Jilin Yushuxian nongye jixiehua de diaocha” (“A survey on agricultural mechanization in Jilin Province's Yushu County”) in Nongye jingji luncong (Collection of Essays on Agricultural Economy), No. 2(1982), p. 256Google Scholar; For Western analyses on this point, see Hsu, Robert C., “Agricultural mechanization in China: policies, problems, and prospects”, Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 5 (1979), p. 445CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Orleans, Leo A., “A note on agricultural mechanization”, in Orleans, Leo A. (ed.), Science in Contemporary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), pp. 377–78Google Scholar;

15. Technical training for agricultural machinery service personnel was mostly not adequate. In Henan Province, for instance, where a test was conducted in 1978 for farm machinery operators, 28% of those who took the test failed. Xinhua Domestic Service, 16 February 1979 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-China (hereafter FBIS-CHI). 23 February 1979, p. E 15. Furthermore, peasants had to entertain the tractor drivers with cigarettes and wine in order to get the work done right and on time. See Hinton, William, Shenfan (New York: Random House, 1983), p. 676Google Scholar; The Chinese government officially warned of this tendency by asking “not to eat special meals” (bu chi teshufan). See Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 27 January 1978.

16. For the effects of the intensification of both cropping cycles and practices, see Rawski, Thomas G., “Agricultural employment and technology”, in Barker, R., Sinha, R. and Rose, B. (eds.), The Chinese Agricultural Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 125–27Google Scholar; For China's increased reliance on the biological package in the 1960s and 1970s, see Stavis, Benedict, Making Green Revolution: The Politics of Agricultural Development in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974)Google Scholar and Barnett, A. Doak, China and the World Food System (Washington D.C.: Overseas Development Council. 1979), pp. 44–55Google Scholar; For the increase of rural labour force, see Rawski, Thomas G., Economic Growth and Employment in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 119, 125Google Scholar;

17. Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1980 (China Agricultural Yearbook; hereafter ZGNYNJ) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1980), pp. 335–36Google Scholar;

18. See Mao's letter of March 1966 in Quandang dongyuan juezhan sannian wei jibenshang shixian nongye jixiehua er fendou (Struggle to Accomplish the Basic Mechanization in Three Years by Fully Mobilizing the Party; hereafter Quandang) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), pp. 3–4Google Scholar;

19. See Chen Yonggui's speech on this point. “Yong geminghua daidong jixiehua” (“Bring about mechanization by revolutionalizing ourselves”) in Yanzhe Maozhuxi de nongye jixiehua daolu qianjin (Proceed According to the Path of Agricultural Mechanization Set by Chairman Mao) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1972), p. 19Google Scholar;

20. Food and Agriculture Organization, Learning from China: A Report on Agriculture and the Chinese People's Commune (Rome: FAO, 1978), p. 21Google Scholar; A more comprehensive picture can be drawn from the aforementioned case of Yushu County of Jilin. Of the total of 67 million yuan of investment for mechanization made during the period of 1966–78, only 10% was contributed by the state while the remaining went to the shoulders of the collectives. Guoyao, Yu et al. , “A survey on agricultural mechanization”, p. 256Google Scholar;

21. According to a modest Chinese estimate based upon a survey in a county in Hubei, basic mechanization across the county would require an investment of 170 yuan per mu, while the size of available rural capital accumulation was less than 10 yuan per mu. Pre-reform rural China, therefore, simply was not rich enough for full-scale mechanization as projected in the national policy. See Ruizhen, Yan and Tianfu, Liu, “Dui nongye jixiehua jingji tiaojian de tantao” (“A discussion of the economic conditions for agricultural mechanization”) in Jingji yanjiu (Economic Studies), No. 2 (1980), p. 21Google Scholar;

22. The total horse power of the year-end agricultural machinery marked a 32.2% increase between 1980 and 1984. See Yearbook of Rural Social and Economic Statistics of China (Beijing: State Statistical Bureau, 1987), p. 210Google Scholar;

23. The reduction in the basic construction investment in agricultural mechanization was supplemented partly and indirectly by the increased farm purchase prices implemented in 1979, which kept constant or even lowered the real price of farm machinery. See Kueh, Yak-Yeow, “China's new agricultural-policy program: major economic consequences, 1979–1983”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1984), pp. 359Google Scholar; 365. Given that both agricultural machinery and chemical fertilizer and herbicides are farm inputs that were similarly affected by the increased farm procurement prices, the relatively small reduction in basic construction investment in the latter sector– 1,500 million yuan in 1978, 1,350 million in 1985 and 1,168 million 1987–clearly represents a drastically downgraded status of the agricultural machinery sector. See Zhongguo guding zichan touzi tongji ziliao, 1987, pp. 82–83; and 1989, p. 82.

24. Information concerning the meetings on mechanization is drawn from ZGNYNJ, 1980 issue, pp. 261–62; 1981 issue, p. 202; and 1983 issue, p. 330.

25. See ZGNYNJ 1988, pp. 475–76.

26. Nongye de genben chulu zaiyu jixiehua (Mechanization is the Only Way Out for Agriculture) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1976), pp. 7Google Scholar; 10–11.

27. Renmin ribao, 15 September 1975. For a discussion of the Dazhai Conference's emphasis on mechanization, see Tarn, , China's Agricultural Modernization, pp. 56–58Google Scholar;

28. Zhongguo nongye dashiji (Chronicles of Chinese Agriculture) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1982), p. 158Google Scholar;

29. Quandang, pp. 11–14.

30. In 1980 the percentage of machine-tilled land in Shandong was 63. Research Office of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee, Shandong Shengqing 1949–1984 (Facts and Figures of Shandong Province) (Jinan: Shandong Renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 153Google Scholar;

31. Quandang, pp. 16–17. It should be noted that Yu did provide some rational measures to correct the mistakes and malpractices in the past, although his tone was undeniably in favour of the “across-the-board” mechanization. See ibid. pp. 27–28, 30–31, 33–35. For a critique of the feasibility of such ambitious targets, see Hsu, , “Agricultural mechanization in China”, pp. 441–44Google Scholar;

32. Qiaomu, Hu, “Act in accordance with economic laws”, in Hinton, Harold C. (ed.), The People's Republic of China 1949–1979: A Documentary Survey (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc.. 1980), Vol. 5, pp. 2786–798Google Scholar;

33. Beijing Review, 20 October 1978, pp. 8–12.

34. Beijing Review, 11 March 1979, pp. 9–10.

35. Renmin ribao, 6 February 1979.

36. Official Chinese sources, too, indicate that it was not the Third but the Fourth Plenum that formally downgraded the agricultural mechanization option. See NYJXGY, p. 37.

37. Zhonggong shiyijie sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyang shouyao jianghua ji wenjian xuanbian (Selected Speeches and Documents from the Centre Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP; hereafter Xuanbian) (Taipei: Zhonggong yanjiu zazhishe, 1983), pp. 186–89Google Scholar; 195–96. Also see Renmin ribao, 15 October 1979.

38. ZGNYNJ 1980, pp. 172–73.

39. Ibid. pp. 199,201.

40. Renmin ribao, 20 July 1980.

41. Hua Guofeng's ambitious projections at the 1975 Dazhai Conference for the extent of China's agricultural mechanization and his initiation of the 1978 National Conference on Agricultural Mechanization undoubtedly linked him to this cause. Furthermore, the re-establishment of the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery in February 1979 was also facilitated by Hua. Author's interview in Beijing on 9 April 1992.

42. ZGNYNJ 1981, pp. 85–86.

43. See Shambaugh, David L. (ed.), “Zhao Ziyang's ‘Sichuan experience’: blueprint for a nation”, Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 1982)Google Scholar;

44. A survey in Henan Province's Chenqui County, though a bit extreme, well illustrates peasants' heavy reliance on animal power after the implementation of the household responsibility system. While in 1979 the machine-tilled area constituted 82% of the county's total sown area, in 1981 no land was machine-tilled and the number of farm animals tripled from 135 to 354. “Tan xuli nongye de youshi” (“Advantages of agricultural production based on animal power”) in Nongye jingji wenti (Problems of Agricultural Economics), No. 30 (1982), pp. 24–25. The drastic increase in the number of China's draught animals in 1981–84, 17% as compared to a 1.3% increase in 1978–80 and 2.9% decline in 1975–77, was attributed largely to the downgrading of mechanization based on the collective farming system. For the figures, see ZGTJNJ, 1981 issue, p. 162; 1984 issue, p. 159; and 1986 issue, p. 188. On the relationship between mechanization and draught animals, see Walker, Kenneth, “Chinese agriculture during the period of the readjustment, 1978–83”, The China Quarterly, No. 100 (1984), p. 796Google Scholar; and China: Agriculture to the Year 2000, Annex 2 to China: Long-Term Development Issues and Options (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1985), p. xviiiGoogle Scholar;

45. The interest rate of the special loan from the Agricultural Bank of China (Zhongguo nongye yinhang) for farm machinery purchase (nongji zhuanxiang daikuan) was 2.16%, which went up to the average rate of 4.32 in 1982 and 7.2% in 1983–84. Zhongguo nongcun jinrong tongji 1979–89 (Financial Statistics of the Chinese Countryside) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1991), p. 1264Google Scholar; For the cancellation of state subsidies for diesel oil in October 1982, seeDangdai zhongguo de caizheng (Contemporary China's Finance)(Beijing: Shehuikexue chubanshe, 1988), Vol. 1, p. 311Google Scholar;

46. In Gansu, for instance, agricultural machinery enterprises were running on a serious deficit that amounted to 5.3 and 7 million yuan in 1980 and 1981 respectively. See Zhaoxing, Li Heihu and Dong, “Nongye jixie yinggai xiang xiaoxinghua duoyonghua tongyonghua fangxiang fazhan” (“Agricultural machinery should move toward the directions of small in size, extensive in use and standardized in design”) in Jingji yanjiu, No. 4 (1982), p. 59Google Scholar;

47. See, for instance, the report by Shaowen, Wu, Vice-Minister of the MAM, in ZGNYNJ 1982, pp. 287–89Google Scholar;

48. Ibid. p. 222.

49. Ibid. p. 223.

50. On such peasant fears, see FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1981, p. W6.

51. ZGNYNJ 1982, p. 369.

52. The amount spent purchasing agricultural machinery by communes and 21 brigades was 1.2 billion yuan in 1978, 0.9 billion yuan in 1980, and 0.5 billion yuan in 1982. ZGNYNJ 1980, p. 366; ZGTJNJ 1981, p. 192; and ZGTJNJ 1983, p.207.

53. Rapidly increasing peasant incomes could still not match the price of agricultural machinery. Despite the ten price reductions since 1961, each averaging 10%, agricultural machinery was still considered very expensive. See Zhengzhi, Ye, “Woguo nongye jixie chanpin jiage wenti de tantao” (“On the price of China's agricultural machinery”) in Nongchanpin chengben yu jiage lunwenji (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue chubanshe, 1983), pp. 227–29Google Scholar; I thank Alastair I. Johnston for drawing this material to my attention.

54. ZGTJNJ 1985, p. 281.

55. Beijing Review, 3 September 1984, p. 10. Forthe Sixth Five-Year Plan's stress on the chemical sector, fertilizer, see Guowuyuan gongbao (State Council Gazette), No. 9 (1983), p. 328–29Google Scholar; With regard to agricultural machinery plants, cancellation was the major trend of the time. Among all agricultural machinery plant projects approved before 1980, only 5% of large and medium-scale projects and 12% of small-scale projects were allowed to continue in 1981. See Agricultural Machinery Industry in Contemporary China, p. 95.

56. ZGNYNJ 1981, p. 125.

57. Ibid. pp. 120–22. The restructuring drastically reduced the number of agricultural machinery plants and repair stations. The number of state-owned tractor plants went down from 208 in 1978 to 100 in 1984. And the number of repair stations at the county level and above decreased from 2,418 in 1978 to 1,849 in 1984. See Agricultural Machinery Industry in Contemporary China, pp. 263, 511, 518.

58. See Renmin ribao, 30 January and 22 May 1982; and Guangyuan, He, “Wei nongcun jingji fuwu shi jixiegongye de yixiang zhanlue renwu” (“To serve the rural economy is the strategic duty of the machine-building industry”) in Zhongguo gongye he diqu jingji fazhan zhanlue yanjiu lunwenji (Collection of Research Papers on Developmental Strategies for Chinese Industry and Regional Economies) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1985), p. 210Google Scholar;

59. ZGNYNJ 1983, pp. 227–28. Also recall the aforementioned production statistics of small and hand tractors compared to medium and large tractors.

60. The MAM's export drive was quite successful in the subsequent years as well. See, for instance, China Daily, 25 August 1986 in FBIS-CHI, 26 August 1986, p. K20; and Zhongguo jixie dianzi gongye nianjian 1989 (Yearbook of China's Machinery and Electronics Industries) (Beijing: Jixie dianzi gongye chubanshe, 1989), p. IV–3Google Scholar;

61. Heilongjiang Provincial Statistical Bureau, Heilongjiang sishinian jubian 1949–1989 (Great Changes in Heilongjiang: Last Forty Years, 1949–1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1989), pp. 1Google Scholar; 2, 7.

62. See Stavis, , The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization, pp. 37–38Google Scholar;

63. ZGNYNJ 1980, p. 143.

64. Heilongjiang ribao (Heilongjiang Daily, hereafter HLJRB), 8 February 1978; Heilongjiang sishinian jubian, p. 231; and Dangdai zhongguo de nongkenshiye (Contemporary China's Land Reclamation) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), pp. 68Google Scholar; 93, 94.

65. The earliest treatment as such can be found in Renmin ribao, 6 February 1979.

66. See HURB, 1 and 11 April 1979.

67. HURB, 26 November 1979.

68. Heilongjiang Provincial Service, 5 April 1980 in FBIS-CHI, 14 April 1980, p. SI.

69. For the designation, see Renmin ribao, 20 July 1980 and ZGNYNJ 1981, pp. 85–86. And for the interprovincial transfer of tractors, see Xinhua Domestic Service, 11 March 1981 in FBIS-CHI, 31 March 1981, p. SI and Yuansheng, Song, Heilongjiang nongye jixiehua fazhan yu erqiannian zhanlue (The Development of Mechanization in Heilongjiang and its Strategy for the Year 2000) (Harbin: Heilongjiang kexue jishu chubanshe, 1991), p. 229Google Scholar;

70. According to 1980 data when 806 large and medium-sized tractors were produced, Heilongjiang had 16 tractor plants. This meant that each plant produced approximately 50 tractors a year, a production capacity which was almost negligible for a province which had an annual average demand for 2,600 large and medium-sized tractors (based on the 1965–78 period). For the figures, see Heilongjiang tongji nianjian 1987 (Statistical Yearbook of Heilongjiang 1987), pp. 233 and 323, and Heilongjiang sishinian jubian, p. 221.

71. See Zhongguo nongcun jinrong tongji, pp. 406–407.

72. Guoyao, Yu et al. , “A survey on agricultural mechanization”, p. 256Google Scholar;

73. Bu, Xu, “Guanyu Heilongjiangsheng tuixing nongye jixiehua jige wenti de tantao” (“Some problems concerning the implementation of agricultural mechanization in Heilongjiang”) in Nongye jishu jingji (Economics for Agricultural Production Technology), No. 6 (1983), p. 22Google Scholar;

74. It should be noted that almost all of Heilongjiang's provincial policy positions on the household responsibility system were explicitly related to those on mechanization. As of 1980, for instance, the share of large and medium-sized tractors in Heilongjiang's total number of tractors was 65.1%, while the comparable national ratio was only 28.1%. See ZGTJNJ 1981, p. 176.

75. HLJRB, 16 August 1981. For a similar line of argument, see HLJRB, 15 September 1981, and 29 January and 25 December 1982.

76. Some evidence suggests that various administrative measures were indeed used to delay the implementation of the household responsibility system. For instance, a report on the Laozhou Commune of Zhadong County revealed that the size of the Commune's land under baogan daohu had decreased from 8,000 mu in late 1981 to 2,000 mu in early 1982 (HLJRB, 4 February 1982). Given the peasants' general preference of the baogan daohu system, this drastic decrease must have been a result of certain administrative interference on the part of the local authority. Another report testified to the actual existence of such administrative interference by revealing that it was not unusual for households under baochan daohu or baogan daohu to be unable to obtain bank loans. See Yang, Li, “Nongye shengchan zerenzhi bujiushi baochan daohu” (“The agricultural production responsibility system is not just baochan daohu”) in Fendou (Struggle), 02 1982, p. 26Google Scholar;

77. Yang Yichen's personal conviction contributed in significant part to Heilongjiang's extremely slow pace of implementing the household-based responsibility system. Author's interviews in Harbin on 22, 24 and 29 April 1992.

78. See the speech delivered by Wan Li to the National Agricultural Secretaries Conference and the Work Conference on Rural Ideology and Politics in November 1982, published in Renmin ribao on 23 December 1982. Wan Li pointed out the existence of passivity in the implementation of baogan daohu and strongly called for its redress.

79. For Heilongjiang's self-criticism regarding the delayed implementation of household contract systems, see HLJRB, 2 March 1984.

80. Heilongjiang Provincial Service, 19 January 1984 in FBIS-CHI, 20 January 1984, pp. SI–3. Interestingly, Sun Weiben, first provincial party secretary of Liaoning, had no mention of mechanization in his speech to the respective province's rural work conference. See Liaoning Provincial Service, 23 January 1984 in FBIS-CHI, 24 January 1984, pp. Sl–2.

81. For instance, Renmin ribao of 26 January 1984 reported: “State farms have a high degree of mechanization and large-scale production. Will they be able to draw on the experiences of rural communes and production brigades in fixing quotas for each household with payment linked to outputs? Some of the rural areas with a higher degree of mechanization in such provinces as Heilongjiang have implemented a responsibility system with excellent results.” Translated in FBIS-CHI, 31 January 1984, pp. K8–10.

82. On the evolution of new forms of agricultural production, see Kojima, Reeitsu, “Agricultural organizations: new forms, new contradictions”, The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1988), pp. 706–735Google Scholar; and for a brief description of the changes in the agricultural machinery ownership and management systems, pp. 719–720.

83. ZGNYNJ 1982, p. 289.

84. ZGNYNJ 1983, p. 225; ZGNYNJ 1985, p. 300; and Qi, Jin, “Responsibility system leads to farm mechanization”, Beijing Review, 13 08 1984, p. 4Google Scholar;

85. While the share of rural employment in total employment decreased by 2% in 1978–84, the growth rate of non-agricultural rural employment increased by an annual rate of 20% as opposed to less than 1% increase of agricultural employment. Despite these changes in the rates, the absolute number of people engaged in farming increased over the same period by 32 million, thus further reducing the size of per capita land for cultivation. Household-based farming has often generated labour shortages, but largely only during the busy season. See Taylor, Jeffrey R., “Rural employment trends and the legacy of surplus labour, 1978–86”, The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1988), pp. 745–46Google Scholar; 754–55. There are local variations, however. Where the household responsibility system was successfully implemented and peasant production activities were fully diversified, the decrease in the number of people engaged in farming and increase in the per capita size of farm plot generated demand for machinery. For such case in Jiangsu, see Sheng, Chen, “Nongye laodongli zhuanyi ying yu jixiehua tongbu fazhan” (“The transfer of agricultural labour must develop along with agricultural mechanization”) in Nongye jishu jingji, No. 39 (1986), pp. 6–8Google Scholar;

86. Xinhua Domestic Service, 23 November 1982 in FBIS-CHI, 24 November 1982, p. K16; and ZGNYNJ 1984, p. 18.

87. FBIS-CHI, 26 October 1983, p. K9; and Guowuyuan gongbao, No. 4 (1984), pp. 134–36.

88. Walker, , “Chinese agriculture during the period of readjustment”, p. 801Google Scholar;

89. ZGNYNJ 1983, p. 225. In the Taiping Commune of Jiashan County in Anhui, for instance, co-operative households made 94.6% of the new tractor purchases, while individual households made the rest. The price of hand tractors-about 2,000 yuan in 1981 –was considered very high so that in many areas only co-operative households were able to make the purchase. See Songpei, Wang, “Yikao nongye neizai jingji dongli ban jixiehua” (“Carry out agricultural mechanization by harnessing economic potentials within the farm sector”) in Jingji yanjiu, No. 2 (1983), p. 63Google Scholar; By the end of 1983, of those tractors owned by peasants, 69% belonged to individual households and the rest were owned by co-operative households. The increased household savings and the nation-wide popularization of baogan daohu in 1982–83 seem to have contributed to the increase in machinery purchase by individual households. See Beijing Review, 21 July 1984, p. 8.

90. See ZGNYNJ 1986, p. 255. One should be careful, however, in making linkages between increased demand for and purchases of tractors by households, and mechanization (of zhongzhiye). Many small tractors purchased by households were used for transport rather than farming. In Jianyang County of Sichuan, for instance, at the end of 1984, 85% of the county's 2,822 tractors were being used for transport. That 41% of China's rural transport in 1984 was provided by tractors also indicates this extensive use. See Agricultural Machinery Industry in Contemporary China, pp. 54,275.

91. Runsheng, Du, “Guanyu nongcun de jixiehua wenti” (“On the problems of rural mechanization”) in Zhongguo nongcun jingji gaige (China's Rural Economic Reform) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1985), pp. 241–45Google Scholar;

92. See, for instance, Ruizhen, Yan, “Guanyu nongye shengchan danwei guimo de jige lilun wenti” (“On some theoretical problems of the size of the agricultural production unit”) in Jingji yanjiu, 04 1984, pp. 3–9Google Scholar;

93. Rapid increases in peasant incomes, an average of 16% per year in nominal terms for the period of 1978–86, explain the relative stability of peasants' purchasing power as well as the continued popular demands for agricultural machinery, the price of which was upwardly adjusted by 8.9% in 1984. See Kueh, Y. Y, “Food consumption and peasant incomes in the post-Mao era”, The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1988), p. 640Google Scholar;

94. 6 November 1985 in FB1S-CHI, 15 November 1985, p. K14.

95. Xinhua Domestic Service, 22 February 1986 in FBIS-CHJ, 24 February 1986, pp. Kl-9.

96. One important indicator of the lagging state support can be found in the continued reduction of the amount of diesel fuel supplied by the state for agricultural use. While state guaranteed supply of diesel oil had been 90 kilograms per horsepower in 1978, it was reduced with an annual average of 8.5% so that the figure was only 48.5 kilograms per horsepower in 1985. See Hanying, Dong, “Dui nongye jixiehua wenti de yixie sisuo” (“Some thoughts on the problems of agricultural mechanization”) in Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), Vol. 30 (1987), p. 23Google Scholar;

97. ”Mechanized farming on the rise again”, Beijing Review, 13 April 1987, p. 8.

98. See ZGNYNJ 1987 pp. 184–85.

99. It is worth noting that in the initial conception of the Seventh Five-Year Plan mechanization received little policy attention. The only thing prescribed for it was the goal of increasing the area of mechanized farming to 46.7 million hectares. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehuifazhan diqige wunian jihua 1986–1990 (The People's Republic of China's Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 43Google Scholar;

100. See ZGNYNJ 1988, pp. 83, 524.

101. See “Guanyu dangqian nongye jixiehua wenti de baogao” (“Report on the current problems concerning agricultural mechanization”), “Guowuyuan pizhuan guanyu dangqian nongye jixhiehua wenti de baogao de tongzhi” (“State Council's approval of the report on the current problems concerning agricultural mechanization”), and “Guowuyuan guanyu jianjue luoshi liangshi hetong dingguo sanguagcu zhengce de jinji tongzhi” (“State Council's urgent circular on resolutely implementing the policy of 'three linkages' in procuring contract grain”) in ZGNYNJ 1988, pp. 475–77. This policy of sanguagou was not only aimed at increasing grain production but also at encouraging peasants to utilize agricultural machinery for fanning rather than for transport by using the distribution of diesel oil at subsidized prices as a leverage. This policy seems to have been highly effective in “having agricultural machinery return to the fields” (nongji huitian). Author's interviews in Jinan on 17 April 1992, in Harbin on 24 April and Nanjing on 4 May 1992.

102. China Daily, 20 March 1988 in FBIS-CHI, 24 March 1988, p. 59. It is also worth noting that provinces began to invest in projects for producing agricultural machinery, a sector which had long been considered unprofitable and therefore grossly ignored. See Renmin ribao, 20 November 1988.

103. In the process of research for this study, I came across with more than 25 different central and provincial-level surveys concerning agricultural mechanization, among which 11 are cited in this article.

104. China Daily, 28 December 1989 in FBIS-Supplement, 5 January 1990, p. 58.

105. See Zhengde, Pu, Shuming, Zhang, Xinnong, Wang and Guiling, Yu, Nongye zhongchangqi fazhan zhanlue duice yanjiu (Study of Mid- and Long- Term Strategies for Agricultural Development) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1990), ch. 13, especially pp. 229–235Google Scholar; Nongmin ribao, 13 December 1989 in FBIS-Supplement, 5 January 1990, pp. 59–60; Xinhua, Beijing, 16 January 1990 in FBIS-CHI, 23 02 1990, p. 36Google Scholar; China Daily, 12 March 1990 in FBIS-CHI, 13 March 1990, pp. 28–29; and Yao Jianfu and Zheng Li, “Woguo dazhongxing tuolaji gengxin wenti yu duice” (“Problems of renovating China's large and medium-sized tractors”) in Nongcun jingji yanjiu cankao (Research Reference to Agricultural Economy), August 1991, pp. 47–51.