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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
One significant trend in the Chinese political system in recent years has been the growth of complex bureaucratic patterns of social stratification, even within the ranks of the Party cadres in Communist China. The Party has tried in many ways to resist these trends—for example, by promoting physical labour by cadres, sending personnel to work in rural areas and taking such drastic steps as abolishing ranks within the army but as the égalitarian heritage of active revolutionary struggle has tended to recede into the background, deep-rooted authoritarian and bureaucratic predispositions—especially the tendency to differentiate people on the basis of rank—have reasserted themselves. Consequently, virtually all cadres in Communist China today can be labelled and placed fairly accurately in the hierarchy of power and prestige on the basis of seniority in the Party, salary grade and job rank. Significantly, while formal salary and job ratings are very important, informal ratings based on length of service in the Party appear to be of equal importance, and in fact the former tend to be equated with the latter. The growth of these patterns of social stratification has been a major factor contributing to the steady bureaucratisation of the regime and the erosion of the élite's revolutionary character.
1. Ministry M, which existed in the 1950s, was one of many ministry-level bodies in the economic field. In the following discussion references to it will be in the past tense since it no longer exists, though its functions continue to be performed by another ministry which absorbed most of its agencies and personnel.
2. Sometimes the term “local cadre” is used, however, with other meanings; for example, it may be used to refer to all cadres who work at governmental levels below the central government.
3. According to ex-cadres, Party cadres normally receive their pay from the state, regardless of whether they hold Party or government posts.
4. These figures, based on the memory of an ex-cadre, are estimates and therefore may not be precisely correct, but they provide a useful indication of the general range of salaries.
5. It is difficult to estimate what the real dollar equivalents should be for yuan figures of this sort. However, a rough conversion can be made by using the figure of yuan 2.367 equals one dollar (the official exchange rate).
6. The term “Party cadre” is itself a complex one which can have several meanings or usages. Actually, three different terms are in use, each with a somewhat different meaning, and one could translate these terms differently as follows: (1) tang kan-pu — “Party cadre,” (2) tang yuan kan-pu— “Party member cadre,” and (3) tang-ti kan-pu— “ Party's cadre.” When these distinctions are made, the difference in meanings appear to be as follows: (1) tang kan-pu is applied to Party members who are cadres or functionaries in the Party organisation itself—as contrasted with ordinary Party members; (2) tang yuan kan-pu is applied to all Party members who hold any cadre positions, whether in the Party, government, mass organisations or other institutions—as contrasted with non-Party cadres (fei tang kan-pu); and (3) tang-ti kan pu, the most variable term of the three, is at times used to mean the same as either (1) or (2) above, or even as a synonym for “state cadres,” but at times is used in a more restricted sense to mean all cadres, whether Party members or not, who work for Party administrative organs.
In this discussion, no attempt will be made to use these three different terms, however, and the term “Party cadres” will be used to mean all Party members who hold any cadre positions, whether in the sense of (1) or (2) above.
7. A variation of this term was “1938 line cadres” (san-pa hsien kan-pu).
8. Also used were the terms “uprising generals” (ch'i-yi chiang-ling) and “uprising personages” (ch'i-yi jen-shih)
9. When employed in a more restricted sense, “intellectual” was used to refer to graduates of college or the equivalent, and “higher intellectuals” to such people as university teachers above the level of lecturer, and to doctors, engineers, editors and the like.
10. Final investigation and clearance was done, however, by the public security authorities.
11. Another group in the ministry that created some resentment consisted of wives of high-ranking Party members. Although quantitatively insignificant in terms of the ministry's entire staff, there were enough of them to attract attention and, rightfully or wrongfully, ordinary cadres often felt that they received special treatment, for example, in job assignments.
12. He estimated that in one year there was a turnover of perhaps 200 cadres, or one-fifth of the total staff of the ministry, and that this was not abnormal. Excadres who have worked in other ministries believe, however, that this estimate is probably too high.
* SeeLee, Rensselaer W. III, “The Hsia Fang System,” p. 40Google Scholar.
13. According to other reports, there are at least three publications of this general sort, varying in completeness and objectivity, that circulate in some institutions in Communist China. One, which is the most exhaustive and complete, is said to go only to the offices of vice ministers and above, while another called “Reference Material” (ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao) goes to slightly lower-ranking cadres; “Reference News” goes to the lowest cadre ranks provided with such materials. In some places “Reference News” is said to be available to at least some cadres below section chief rank. See Schwartz, Henry G., “The Ts'an-k'ao Hsiao-hsi,” The China Quarterly, 27, pp. 54–83Google Scholar.
14. Office furniture in Ministry M was differentiated considerably on the basis of rank; for example, only high-ranking cadres, generally bureau chiefs and above, were allotted stuffed furniture for their offices.