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THE BELLVM CIVILE POMPEIANVM: THE WAR OF WORDS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2020

Pedro López Barja de Quiroga
Pedro López Barja de Quiroga*
Affiliation:
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
*
pedro.barjadequiroga@usc.es
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Extract

The irrelevance of ideology is perhaps one of the most strongly held views shared by the historians of the Late Republic. As indicated by Matthias Gelzer in 1912, in those final years of the Roman Republic, ‘political struggles were fought out by the nobiles at the head of their dependents’. In his opinion, this was nothing more than a power struggle, in which slogans or ideas were merely propaganda, without any real value. In 1931, analysing the political proposals of Cicero, Gelzer's disciple Hermann Strasburger rejected the existence of political parties, as, in his opinion, terms such as optimates or populares were merely propagandistic mottos and pure wordplay. As a result, it became widely believed that the civil war between Caesar and Pompey was nothing more than a struggle between dignitates, that is, a confrontation for leadership between ambitious politicians who were not prepared to compromise. More recently, in 1994, Luigi Loreto considered the conflict between Caesar and Pompey to be aimed at seizing power, unlike ‘ideological’ wars, where the aim was to maintain or instate a specific type of social or political order.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 69 , Issue 2 , December 2019 , pp. 700 - 714
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Copyright © The Classical Association 2020

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References

1 Gelzer, M., Die Nobilität der römischen Republik (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912)Google Scholar = id. (transl. Seager, R.), The Roman Nobility (Oxford, 1975), 139Google Scholar.

2 Strasburger, H., Concordia ordinum. Eine Untersuchung zur Politik Ciceros (Leipzig, 1931), IVGoogle Scholar.

3 Some important contributions include Syme, R., ‘Review of M. Gelzer, Caesar der Politiker und Staatsmann’, JRS 24 (1944), 92–103Google Scholar, at 98 = Syme, R., Roman Papers (Oxford, 1979), 1.148–81Google Scholar, at 1.161; Wirszubski, C., Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and the Early Empire (Cambridge, 1950), 78Google Scholar: ‘the Civil War was a struggle for dignitas’. Strasburger, H., Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen (Munich, 1968 2), 243Google Scholar; Jal, P., La guerre civile à Rome. Étude littéraire et moral (Paris, 1963), 38Google Scholar; Hellegouarc'h, J., Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République (Paris, 1972), 388–9Google Scholar. See further Raaflaub, K., Dignitatis contentio. Studien zur Motivation und politischen Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius (Munich, 1974), 183–6Google Scholar for the conclusion that the defence of his own dignitas was of paramount importance for Caesar.

4 Loreto, L., Il piano di guerra dei Pompeiani e di Cesare dopo Farsalo (Amsterdam, 1994), 7Google Scholar. Even so, he recognizes that even in ‘political’ civil wars there is an ideological component.

5 Syme, R., The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), 59 and 374Google Scholar.

6 Meier, C., Res publica amissa. Eine Studie zur Verfassung und Geschichte der römischen Republik (Wiesbaden, 1966), 174, 182, 189Google Scholar. Cf. the review by P.A. Brunt in JRS 58 (1968), 229–32.

7 Gelzer, M., Cicero. Ein biographischer Versuch (Wiesbaden, 1969; Stuttgart, 2014)Google Scholar, 47 and 60, here in n. 32, refers directly to Meier (n. 6).

8 Robb, M.A., Beyond Populares and Optimates. Political Language in the Late Republic (Stuttgart, 2010), 167Google Scholar.

9 Millar, F., The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor, 1998), 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morstein-Marx, R., Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004), 265CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 277–8. There have been numerous recent studies on oratory and contiones. See, for example, Polo, F. Pina, Contra arma verbis. Der Redner vor dem Volk in der späten römischen Republik (Stuttgart, 1996)Google Scholar; Hiebel, D., Rôles institutionnel et politique de la contio sous la République romaine (287–49 av. J.-C.) (Paris, 2009)Google Scholar; Steel, C. and Blom, H. van der (edd.), Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome (Oxford, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Russell, A., ‘Why did Clodius shut the shops? The rhetoric of mobilizing a crowd in the Late Republic’, Historia 65 (2016), 186–210Google Scholar. Most recently, against Morstein-Marx's ‘ideological monotony’ in contional oratory, see Rosenblitt, J.A., ‘Hostile politics: Sallust and the rhetoric of popular champions in the Late Republic’, AJPh 137 (2016), 655–88Google Scholar. On the relation between contiones and public feasts (feriae), see de Quiroga, P. López Barja, ‘The Quinquatrus of June, Marsyas and libertas in the Late Roman Republic’, CQ 68 (2018), 143–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See Morstein-Marx, R., ‘Political graffiti in the Late Roman Republic: hidden transcripts and common knowledge’, in Kuhn, C. (ed.), Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt (Heidelberg, 2012), 191–21Google Scholar7, at 214.

11 Morstein-Marx, R., ‘Cultural hegemony and the communicative power of the Roman elite’, in Steel, C. and Blom, H. van der (edd.), Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome (Oxford, 2013), 29–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 44.

12 These include Ferrary, J.-L., ‘Le idee politiche a Roma nell'epoca republicana’, in Firpo, L. (ed.), Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e sociali, vol. I, L'Antichità classica (Turin, 1982), 724–804Google Scholar; Perelli, L., Il movimento popolare nell'ultimo secolo della repubblica (Turin, 1982)Google Scholar; Mackie, N., ‘Popularis ideology and popular politics at Rome’, RhM 135 (1992), 49–73Google Scholar; Wiseman, T.P., ‘Roman history and the ideological vacuum’, in Wiseman, T.P. (ed.), Classics in Progress. Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome (Oxford, 2002), 285–310Google Scholar; and Rosenblitt (n. 9). Peter Wiseman claims that there were two opposed interpretations of civil war: one held by Varro, Sallust and Lucan, which put the blame on Roman aristocracy, and one which was Cicero's favourite, that is, the seditiosi were responsible for disturbing the concordia, so their killing was justified: Wiseman, T.P., ‘The two-headed state: how Romans explained civil war’, in Breed, B.W., Damon, C. and Rossi, A. (edd.), Citizens of Discord. Rome and its Civil Wars (Oxford, 2010), 25–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Skinner, Q., Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), 105Google Scholar; cfr. Skinner, Q., ‘Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas’, History and Theory 8 (1969), 3–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 42 n. 171.

14 Suet. Iul. 56.1. As it is known, to designate this Civil War as Pompeianum implies adopting a Caesarean point of view (Rosenberger, V., Bella et expeditiones. Die antike Terminologie der Kriege Roms [Stuttgart, 1992], 11 and 40Google Scholar). Armitage, D., Civil Wars. A History in Ideas (New York, 2017)Google Scholar has placed much emphasis on the invention of the notion of ‘civil war’ by the Romans, but see the comments on this view by Lange, C.H., ‘Stasis and bellum ciuile: a difference in scale?’, Critical Analysis of Law 4 (2017), 129–40Google Scholar.

15 Collins, J.H., ‘On the date and interpretation of the Bellum Civile’, AJPh 80 (1959), 113–32Google Scholar, partly coinciding with the ideas of Klotz, A., ‘Zu Caesars Bellum Ciuile’, RhM 66 (1911), 81–93Google Scholar, in that Hirtius was responsible for its publication after the death of Caesar. On the contrary, Barwick, K., Caesars Bellum Ciuile. Tendenz, Abfassungszeit und Stil (Leipzig, 1951)Google Scholar states that the work had already been published, albeit in two parts, the first of which corresponded to Books 1–2 (as a single volume) at the end of 49 b.c. and Book 3 at the end of 48 b.c. or in early 47 b.c.; Peer, A., Julius Caesar's Bellum Civile and the Composition of a New Reality (Farnham, 2015), 167–81Google Scholar thinks that Books 1–2 were written and published separately in 49 b.c., while Book 3 was written in 48 b.c. but finalized and published in 46 b.c.; Penna, A. La, ‘Tendenze e arte del Bellum Ciuile di Cesare’, Maia 5 (1952), 191–233Google Scholar, at 209–10 and 224–33 thinks that almost the whole work (up to 3.99) was published in 46 b.c. The scholarly consensus is that, when Caesar was assassinated, the Bellum Ciuile was in an unfinished state (so briefly Damon, C., Studies on the Text of Caesar's Bellum Ciuile [Oxford, 2015], 10–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar). In this article, the recent Oxford Classical Text of the Bellum Ciuile by C. Damon (Oxford, 2015) will be used.

16 Boatwright, M.T., ‘Caesar's second consulship and the completion and date of the Bellum Civile’, CJ 84 (1988–9), 31–40Google Scholar. Other alternatives have been proposed: Macfarlane, R.T., ‘Ab inimicis incitatus: on dating the composition of Caesar's Bellum Civile’, SyllClass 7 (1996), 107–32Google Scholar states that Caesar uses inimici only to refer to his opponents in the first thirty-three chapters, as he then goes on to refer openly to the aduersarii/hostes; based on this, Macfarlane infers that Caesar wrote these thirty-three chapters prior to April 49 b.c., when there were still hopes of reconciliation. His argument has been convincingly criticized by Gaertner, J.F. and Hausburg, B.C., Caesar and the Bellum Alexandrinum: An Analysis of Style, Narrative Technique, and the Reception of Greek Historiography (Göttingen, 2013), 185–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. According to Jehne, M., ‘Caesar und die Krise von 47 v.Chr.’, in Urso, G. (ed.), L'ultimo Cesare. Scritti riforme progetti coniure (Cividale del Friuli, 1999), 151–73Google Scholar, the context fits the publication of the Bellum Ciuile in 47 b.c.

17 I have borrowed this concept from V. Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2012), 7, where she defines ideological ‘families’ as follows: ‘systems of thought, more or less coherent in themselves, that displayed distinct orientations on questions related to fundamental evaluative terms such as liberty, justice, and sovereignty’.

18 Cf. Pompey's letter to the consuls in Cic. Att. 8.6 (154 SB), 2 and especially the message Pompey sent to Caesar in Ariminium, in which he refers to the res publica no fewer than four times in just a few lines (Caes. BCiu. 1.8.3). See Hodgson, L., Publica, Resand the Roman Republic (Oxford, 2017), 166Google Scholar. Certainly, Caesar may have not reproduced Pompey's letter faithfully, but, if he edited it, it is telling that he chose to highlight precisely the importance of res publica as a catchword of the optimates.

19 Cic. Fam. 14.7 (155 SB), 2. Cf. Brunt, P.A., ‘Cicero's officium in the Civil War’, JRS 76 (1986), 12–32Google Scholar. On what Cicero meant by ‘Republic’, see p. 10 below with n. 44.

20 Vell. Pat. 2.48.4.

21 Cic. Lig. 21. Similarly, in 46 b.c. Cicero remembered that those who had taken up arms in 49 b.c. believed they were doing so pro re publica (Fam. 6.6.12). Welch, K., ‘Both sides of the coin: Sextus Pompeius and the so-called Pompeiani’, in Powell, A. and Welch, K. (edd.), Sextus Pompeius (London, 2012), 1–30Google Scholar, at 10 and Welch, K., Magnus Pius. Sextus Pompeius and the Transformation of the Roman Republic (Swansea, 2012), 143CrossRefGoogle Scholar have suggested that it was Mark Anthony who coined the expression partes Pompeianae (Cic. Phil. 5.32), which distorted reality, as those who fought against Caesar did not do so for Pompey but instead for the Republic.

22 Regarding tuba, cf. Caes. BCiu. 3.90.3 (battle of Pharsalus) and Sall. Cat. 60.1 (battle of Pistoria). In turn, Morgan, L., ‘Leui quidem de re … Julius Caesar as tyrant and pedant’, JRS 87 (1997), 23–40Google Scholar, at 38 dates both phrases to the final months of Caesar's life.

23 Syme (n. 3), 92 = 150.

24 The title of biography, M. Gelzer's, Caesar, der Politiker und Staatsman (Wiesbaden, 1960 6)Google Scholar, prompted the ironic comment of Schmitt, C., Un giurista davanti a se stesso. Saggi e intervista (Vicenza, 2012 2), 153Google Scholar: ‘Questo lo trovo ridicolo: come se dicessi Carlo Magno come automobilista’. According to Schmitt, the state was as much a fantasy in Caesar's times as cars were in Charlemagne's.

25 Caesar's sentence becomes almost a leitmotiv in Gelzer, M.'s biography Caesar. Politician and Statesman (Oxford, 1968, transl. Needham, P.)Google Scholar. It is often quoted or alluded to: for example at 217 n. 4, 232 n. 1, 273.

26 Syme (n. 5), 48; Meier (n. 6), 297–9.

27 Raaflaub (n. 3), 182–3. Raaflaub builds his case upon Caesar's proposal in BCiu. 1.9.5: omnis res publica senatui populo Romano permittatur, which he sees as encapsulating a very important political goal of the optimates: the abolition of extraordinary commands (at 166–7).

28 See n. 3 above and very recently Peer (n. 15), 45. Peer claims (at 54) that Caesar only in Book 1 mentioned libertas, even if recognizing (at n. 56) that libertas also appears in Book 3, when Crastinus makes his short speech. She appears not to have noticed that the same can be said of dignitas, only mentioned in Books 1 and 3 (among Crastinus’ words again), because at BCiu. 3.83.1 it is Domitius Ahenobarbus’ dignitas, not Caesar's, that is at stake.

29 The most influential paper in this sense probably has been the paper written by Collins (n. 15). La Penna (n. 15), 195–200 claims that Caesar's political platform was moderate and law-abiding.

30 Grillo, L., The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile. Literature, Ideology and Community (Cambridge, 2012)Google Scholar, 58 n. 1. He quotes five passages from Caesar's Bellum Ciuile as proof of his thesis (BCiu. 1.7.1, 1.9.1–3, 1.22.5, 2.21, 3.1.1), but only in one of them (1.9.3) did Caesar mention the res publica. Lange, C.H., ‘Triumph and civil war in the Late Republic’, PBSR 81 (2013), 67–90Google Scholar, at 75 n. 32 thinks that Caesar's justification in the Civil War was rei publicae causa. As supporting evidence, he quotes Caes. BCiu. 1.9.5; cf. 1.8.3, 1.9.3; BGall. 6.1.2; however, none of these passages is decisive: in BCiu. 1.9.5 (and 1.9.3) Caesar is speaking about the tug-of-war after crossing the Rubicon, enumerates his grievances and declares to be willing to suffer everything ‘for the Republic's sake’. He does not say that what he did (crossing the Rubicon) was ‘for the Republic's sake’. In 1.8.3 it is not Caesar who is speaking but an emissary from Pompey. In BGall. 6.1.2 it is said only that Pompey (not Caesar) remains near the urbs and does not travel to his province cum imperio rei publicae causa. On this topic, Hodgson's ([n. 18], 180) view is preferable: ‘Caesar would have had to strain so hard to make res publica relevant to his action that he was better off saying as little as possible about it.’

31 Morstein-Marx, R., ‘Dignitas and res publica: Caesar and Republican legitimacy’, in Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (ed.), Eine politische Kultur (in) der Krise? Die ‘letzte Generation’ der römischen Republik (Munich, 2009), 115–40Google Scholar.

32 Westall, R.W., Caesar's Civil War. Historical Reality and Fabrication (Leiden, 2017), 275–6Google Scholar.

33 Dio Cass. 41.3.2 says that the names of the tribunes were erased from the senatorial register, although Caesar is much more direct: their citizenship was revoked.

34 Regarding the contrast between ciuitas and urbs, see Cic. Fam. 9.14.8 = 326 SB; Phil. 11.25; Rep. 1.58; Off. 2.78.

35 Cic. Phil. 5.39: [Lepidus] … Sex. Pompeium restituit ciuitati.

36 The sources are contradictory and the subject has been much debated. According to Duplá, A., Videant consules. Las medidas de excepción en la crisis de la República romana (Saragossa, 1990), 141Google Scholar, it was only a threat that did not become effective. Yet, Jal, P., ‘«Hostis publicus» dans la littérature latine de la fin de la République’, REA 65 (1963), 53–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar thinks that there was a senatorial declaration that they were hostes. Recently, Allély, B., La déclaration d'hostis sous la République romaine (Bordeaux, 2012), 82–4Google Scholar, after revising all the evidence (especially, App. B Ciu. 2.33 and 2.50; Flor. 2.13), concludes that in 49 b.c. the SCV and the senatorial declaration took place, affecting both Caesar and his soldiers. Most recently, Fezzi, L., Il dado è tratto. Cesare e la resa di Roma (Bari and Rome, 2017), 205Google Scholar remains non-committal.

37 Guarino, A., ‘«Nemico della patria» a Roma’, Labeo 18 (1972), 95–100Google Scholar considered that the ‘hostis declaration’ lacked any type of legal value, and that it was only of political relevance.

38 Scipio Aemilianus, fr. 32 ORF 3 Malcovati = Isid. Etym. 2.21.4: ut est illud Africani: ex innocentia nascitur dignitas, ex dignitate honor, ex honore imperium, ex imperio libertas. For the close connection between dignitas and salus, see Hellegouarc'h (n. 3), 411–12. Interestingly, Arena (n. 17), 142–3 notes that Scipio's notion of libertas is close to the notion of libertas expressed by the supporters of democracy in Cicero's De re publica. Perhaps the same can also be said of his notion of dignitas, which seems to coincide with Caesar's. Nevertheless, some caution is necessary, as we do not know whether the fragment is referring to the commonwealth or the individual.

39 Regarding the question of why Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the obvious answer is: because of the SCV of 7 January. However, the SCV does not appear amongst the various reasons indicated by Stanton, G.R., ‘Why did Caesar cross the Rubicon?’, Historia 52 (2003), 67–94Google Scholar, who points towards Caesar's fear of a likely accusation and conviction by the tribunals. Morstein-Marx, R., ‘Caesar's alleged fear of prosecution and his ratio absentis in the approach of the Civil War’, Historia 56 (2007), 159–78Google Scholar rejects the idea that an accusation was being prepared against Caesar.

40 On this sense of res publica as public institutions (magistrates, assemblies, etc.), see, for instance, Cic. Leg. 3.41 and Leg. agr. 1.19 with de Quiroga, P. López Barja, Imperio legítimo. El pensamiento político romano en tiempos de Cicerón (Madrid, 2007), 181Google Scholar and Moatti, C., Res publica. Histoire romaine de la chose publique (Paris, 2018), 43 n. 2Google Scholar. For the more specific meaning of res publica as ‘public treasure’, see Drexler, H., ‘Res publica’, Maia 9 (1957), 247–81Google Scholar, at 257–8.

41 After 49 b.c. Caesar's closest collaborators ‘nicht einmal … vermochten sich positiv über die alten Normen der res publica hinauszuheben’: Meier (n. 6), 299.

42 BCiu. 1.2.6; cf. 1.1.2 and 1.1.3, 1.4.3, 1.5.3.

43 On this very important letter, see n. 18 above and Carter, J.M., Julius Caesar. The Civil War, 2 vols. (Warminster, 1991–3)Google Scholar, ad loc.

44 Cic. Rep. 3.43–5. See further Schofield, M., ‘Cicero's definition of res publica’, in Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher (Oxford, 1995), 63–83Google Scholar.

45 Cic. Parad. Stoic. 4.27–8; Red. pop. 14.

46 In Spain in 1930, Ortega y Gasset used the word estado with similar ambiguity in his cry against the monarchy of Alfonso XIII: ‘Spaniards! Your state is no more! Reconstitute it! Delenda est monarchia!’: http://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/issue.vm?id=0000435614&page=1&search=berenguer&lang=es On the biographical context for this newspaper article, see Gracia, J., José Ortega y Gasset (Madrid, 2014), 449–51Google Scholar.

47 While Raaflaub (n. 3), 172 n. 91 had refrained from analysing Crastinus’ words, Raaflaub, K., ‘Caesar the liberator? Factional politics, civil war and ideology’, in Cairns, F. and Fantham, E. (edd.), Caesar against Liberty? Perspectives on his Autocracy (Cambridge, 2003), 35–67Google Scholar, at 57 n. 72 (see also id., ‘Between tradition and innovation: shifts in Caesar's political propaganda’, in G. Urso [ed.], Cesare: precursore o visionario [Cividale del Friuli, 2009], 141–57, at 148 n. 29) interprets libertas here as ciuitas, but this is not likely, for libertas should be understood in the sense it has in the Bellum Ciuile, in particular as referring back to BCiu. 1.22.5. Against Raaflaub's proposal, see Hölkeskamp, K.J., ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen: addressing the Roman People and the rhetoric of inclusion’, in Steel, C. and Blom, H. van der (edd.), Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome (Oxford, 2013), 11–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 15 n. 17.

48 As we can also see in Caes. BGall. 4.17.1.

49 This is a case of ‘ring-composition’, as it has been pointed out by Carter (n. 43), 2.213. See also Brown, R.D., ‘Two Caesarean battle descriptions: a study in contrast’, CJ 94 (1999), 329–57Google Scholar, at 351.

50 Weber, W., Princeps. Studien zur Geschichte des Augustus (Berlin, 1936), n. 557Google Scholar contains a detailed list of passages in which either of these expressions is included, i.e. rem publicam / populum in libertatem uindicare. Both expressions are usually dealt with as being equivalent, without any further discussion; see e.g. Hellegouarc'h (n. 3), 555; Wirszubski (n. 3), 103; Seager, R., ‘Cicero and the word popularis’, CQ 22 (1972), 328–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 337 n. 11 and 338 n. 2; Grillo (n. 30), 136; Moatti (n. 40), 235 n. 1. An exception is La Penna, A., Sallustio e la “rivoluzione” romana (Milan, 1968), 238Google Scholar n. 271: ‘È tuttavia notevole che la tradizione aristocratica ed Augusto parlino della patria o della repubblica, Cesare e Sallustio, di populus e plebs.’

51 Caes. BGall. 8.1.3; BCiu. 2.21.1.

52 Zetzel, J.E.G. (ed.). Cicero: De Re Publica: Selections (New York, 1995)Google Scholar.

53 Crawford, M., Roman Republican Coinage (Cambridge, 1975), 449/4Google Scholar. Crawford states that ‘(it) is an almost visual equivalent of Caesar's claim to be freeing the Roman people from the oppression of a clique of oligarchs’ (at 736) and, very significantly, associates this coin of Pansa with Caes. BCiu. 1.22.5 (at 465).

54 Krebs, C.B., ‘More than words: the Commentaries in their propagandist context’, in Grillo, L. and Krebs, C.B. (edd.), The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar (Cambridge, 2018), 29–42Google Scholar, at 38–9.

55 Regarding the technical phrase uindico in libertatem, see Dig. 1.4.12 pr., 40.12.3 pr. In general, see Nicolau, M., Causa liberalis. Étude historique et comparative du procès de liberté dans les législations anciennes (Paris, 1933)Google Scholar and Franciosi, G., Il processo di libertà in diritto romano (Naples, 1961)Google Scholar.

56 Arena (n. 17), 116–68.

57 Cic. Brut. 212: … Scipione … qui ex dominatu Ti. Gracchi priuatus in libertatem rem publicam uindicauit … Cf. Cic. Fam. 2.5 (49 SB).2 (Cicero to Curio, 53 b.c.) : … rem publicam adflictam et oppressam … ueteram dignitatem et libertatem uindicaturus. Cicero to Octavius after 20 December 44 b.c. (fr. epistularum 7 Beaujeu = 14 Watt = Non. p. 419.11M): qui si nihil ad id beneficium adderes, quo per te me una cum re publica in libertatem uindicassem. Beaujeu has some doubts concerning its authenticity. The letter could be a fabrication responding to the letter in which Brutus complains that Cicero is being too generous to Octavius.

58 Cic. Ep. Brut. 1.16.1 (25 SB); Cic. Fam. 10.31.5 (368 SB, Asinius Pollio to Cicero, 16 March 43 b.c.); Cic. Fam. 10.21.6 (391 SB, Plancus to Cicero, 13 May 43 b.c.).

59 Both Koestermann, E., ‘L. Munatius Plancus und das Bellum Africum’, Historia 22 (1973), 48–63Google Scholar and Pallavisini, A., ‘Il capitolo 22 del Bellum Africum e la propaganda augustea’, Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia Antica, vol. 2 (Milan, 1974), 107–14Google Scholar find these words from BAfr. 22 to be out of touch with the popularis colour of the work. They therefore claim that it is the result of an interpolation. Yet, this sentence is attributed to Cato, a fact that makes interpolation unnecessary and shows the capacity of its unknown author to record the enemy's propaganda in its own terms. Caesar does exactly the same thing when he records every time Pompey used res publica in his letters.

60 Hodgson, L., ‘Appropriation and adaptation: Republican idiom in Res Gestae 1.1’, CQ 64 (2014), 254–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 268.

61 Cic. Rep. 1.41 with Arena (n. 17), 97.

62 See Raaflaub, K., ‘Creating a great coalition of true Roman citizens’, in Breed, B.W., Damon, C. and Rossi, A. (edd.), Citizens of Discord. Rome and its Civil Wars (Oxford, 2010), 159–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Cic. Dom. 130; cf. Fam. 10.6.2 (370 SB) and 11.7.2 (372 SB).

64 Cic. Phil. 3.8, 3.32, 3.33 (de libertate populi Romani et dignitate uestra), 3.37, 3.39, 4.8, 5.35, 5.53, 7.27 (libertas agitur populi Romani, quae est commendata uobis), 10.23, 13.33. On other occasions, libertas populi Romani is associated with the consuls (3.36) or with the res publica (5.46, 7.11, 12.29). It should also be noted that there is a close link between the army and the libertas populi (10.15, 14.36), which helps to explain the importance the latter has in Caesar's account.

65 Cf. Scott, J.C., Hidden Transcripts. Domination and the Art of Resistance (New Haven, 1990), 77Google Scholar.

66 Arena (n. 17), 9: ‘a commonly shared notion of liberty, understood as a status of non-subjection to the arbitrary will of either a foreign power or a domestic group or individual’. As she herself has indicated, however, in Cicero's De legibus liberty does not mean ‘non-domination’, because the participation by the people in the commonwealth ‘ought to take the form of a submission to the senatorial nobility’: see Arena, V., ‘Popular sovereignty in the Late Roman Republic: Cicero and the will of the People’, in Bourke, R. and Skinner, Q. (edd.), Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2016), 73–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 90.