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Pleasure, Tragedy and Aristotelian Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Elizabeth Belfiore
Elizabeth Belfiore
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Extract

Aristotle's Rhetoric defines fear as a kind of pain (lypē) or disturbance (tarachē) and pity as a kind of pain (2.5.1382 a 21 and 2.8.1385 b 13). In his Poetics, however, pity and fear are associated with pleasure: ‘ The poet must provide the pleasure that comes from pity and fear by means of imitation’ (τ⋯ν ⋯π⋯ ⋯λέου κα⋯ ɸόβου δι⋯ μιμήσεως δεῖ ⋯δον⋯ν παρασκευάζειν 14.1453 b 12–13). The question of the relationship between pleasure and pain in Aristotle's aesthetics has been studied primarily in connection with catharsis. Catharsis, however, raises more problems than it solves. Aristotle says nothing at all about the tragic catharsis in the Poetics except to state that tragedy accomplishes it. Though he gives a more complete account of catharsis in the Politics, the context of this passage is so different from that of the Poetics that its relevance is questionable. A more promising, but largely neglected, approach to Aristotle's theory of tragic pleasure and pain is through a study of his psychological works. Here, Aristotle describes a number of emotional and cognitive responses to kinds of objects that include works of art. These descriptions support an interpretation of the Poetics according to which (1) a tragedy is pleasurable in one respect and painful in another, and (2) pity and fear, though painful and not in themselves productive of pleasure, are nevertheless essential to the production of the oikeia hēdonē, ‘proper pleasure’, of tragedy. This interpretation has the advantage of not depending on a particular view of catharsis. It also makes much better sense than alternative views, once its seemingly paradoxical aspects are explained with the help of the psychological works.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , December 1985 , pp. 349 - 361
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1985

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References

1 All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I have used the following editions of Aristotle's works: Kassel, R., ed., Aristotelis De Arte Poetica Liber (Oxford, 1965)Google Scholar; Kassel, , ed., Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica (Berlin and New York, 1976)Google Scholar; Ross, W. D., ed., Aristotelis Politica (Oxford, 1957)Google Scholar; Ross, , ed., Aristotle, Parva Naturalia (Oxford, 1955)Google Scholar; Hicks, R., Aristotle, De Anima (Amsterdam, 1965)Google Scholar; Nussbaum, M., Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton, 1978)Google Scholar.

2 Po. 6.1449 b 27–8. The word occurs in the Po. only here and at 17.1455 b 15, where it is used of the ritual purification of Orestes in Euripides' Iphigeneia in Tauris.

3 Pol. 8.1341 b 32ff. says that music can be used for catharsis. Good arguments against applying this account to the Po. are given by Else, G., Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 440–3Google Scholar and Kitto, H. D. F., ‘Catharsis’, in The Classical Tradition, ed. Wallach, L. (Ithaca, NY, 1966), 134–6Google Scholar. I cannot begin to discuss the complicated catharsis question here. Some bibliographical surveys of the vast literature on the subject can be found in Else, 225–6; Somville, P., Essai sur la Poétique d'Aristote (Paris, 1975), 78–95Google Scholar; Golden, L., ‘The Clarification Theory of Katharsis’, Hermes 104 (1976), 437–52Google Scholar. Bennet, K., ‘The Purging of Catharsis’, British Journal of Aesthetics 21 (1981), 204–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provides a refreshingly sceptical survey of the problem, concluding that ‘it seems wisest to purge catharsis of its accreted meanings and declare a decent thorough-going scepticism concerning Aristotle's intent’ (p. 211).

4 Though isolated passages of the psychological works are sometimes mentioned in connection with the Po., there has never been any sort of systematic study of the relevance of these works to the Po.

5 This is argued, for example, by Butcher, S. H., Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, 4th ed. (New York, 1951), 254–73Google Scholar; Schaper, E., ‘ Aristotle's Catharsis and Aesthetic Pleasure’, PQ 18 (1968), 131–43, esp. 139CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Golden, L., ‘Epic, Tragedy, and Catharsis’, CP 71 (1976), 77–85Google Scholar, correctly argues that the pleasure of tragedy arises from mimēsis and not from pity and fear, which are painful emotions.

The problem of ‘aesthetic’ emotions has not yet been solved by modern philosophers. For a good recent discussion see Eaton, M., ‘A Strange Kind of Sadness’, JAAC 41 (1982), 51–63Google Scholar.

6 See Schadewaldt, W., ‘Furcht und Mitleid?’, Hermes 83 (1955), 129–171Google Scholar; Pohlenz, M., ‘Furcht und Mitleid? Ein Nachwort’, Hermes 84 (1956), 49–74Google Scholar; Flashar, H., ‘Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik’, Hermes 84 (1956), 12–48Google Scholar.

7 Readers who share Goodman's objections to ‘similarity’ may substitute a phrase such as ‘sharing of properties’. I use the term ‘similarity’ in this paper because Aristotle is clearly committed to the concept. See Butcher 127, who cites Teichmüller, G., Aristotelische Forschungen (Halle, 1869), ii. 145–54Google Scholar, and Sorabji, R., Aristotle on Memory (London, 1972), 2–7Google Scholar.

8 Cf. Il. 23.108 and Od. 4.102–3.

9 Contrast Rhet. 1.11.1370 b 22–9, where Aristotle analyses the ‘pleasure in lamentation’ described by Homer in Il. 23.108 as pain due to the absence of someone and pleasure in remembering him.

10 On the notion of a non-abstract image that does not represent see Gombrich, E. H., ‘Meditations on a Hobby Horse’, rpt. in Meditations on a Hobby Horse (London and New York, 1971), 1–11Google Scholar, and Goodman, N., Languages of Art (Indianapolis, 1976), 21–6Google Scholar.

11 Aristotle on Memory, 84.

12 On phantasia see further below and note 23.

13 Sorabji's translation, Aristotle on Memory.

14 See Sorabji ad loc. and 5–7.

15 See, for example, Golden, L., ‘The Purgation Theory of Catharsis’, JAAC 31 (1973), 475–6Google Scholar.

16 On the distinction between praxis and mythos (= systasis pragmatōn) see Jones, J., On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London, 1962), 24–5Google Scholar. The pragmata in this passage and at 1453 b 13–14 should not be confused with praxis, the action imitated, but are equivalent to the systasis pragmatōn, the mythos. For this point, and a good discussion of some of the other problems presented by this passage, see Else, 408–12.

17 Translation of Furley, D. J., ‘Aristotle on the Voluntary’, rpt. in Articles on Aristotle, Barnes, J., Schofield, M., Sorabji, R., eds. (New York, 1977), ii. 57Google Scholar.

18 Furley, 222–3. See also the excellent commentary of Nussbaum, 382–3.

19 Nussbaum, 350 and 355, cites Resp. 479 b 19ff. and 480a 13ff., Prob. 888 a 12ff. and 902b 37–9, PA 650 b 27ff., 679 a 25–6, 692 a 23–4. See also the numerous examples given by Flashar, and his discussions.

20 This point is discussed by Furley, 222 and Nussbaum, 155–6. The problem cannot be solved without a full investigation of Aristotle's views on the body–soul relationship, a topic well beyond the scope of this paper. For bibliography and discussions see Nussbaum, 143–64; Hardie, W. F. R., ‘Aristotle on the Soul and Body’, PQ 14 (1964), 53–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sorabji, R., ‘Body and Soul in Aristotle’, Philosophy 49 (1974), 63–89CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Robinson, H. M., ‘Mind and Body in Aristotle’, CQ 28 (1978), 105–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Again, I cannot deal fully here with many of the details of Aristotle's psychology of emotion. For some recent discussions see Allan, D. J., ‘Aristotle's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles’, rpt. in Articles on Aristotle, ii. 72–8Google Scholar; Fortenbaugh, W., ‘Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 52 (1970), 40–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his Aristotle on Emotion (London, 1975); Kosman, L., ‘Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics’, in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Rorty, A. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), 103–16Google Scholar; Garver, E., ‘The Meaning of ΘΡΑΣΟΣ in Aristotle's Ethics’, CP 77 (1982), 228–33Google Scholar; Leighton, S., ‘Aristotle and the Emotions’, Phronesis 27 (1982), 144–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Aristotle does not explicitly state that flight is the aim of fear. Although, as Leighton points out, 149, this raises some interesting questions, it does not, I believe, create difficulties for my interpretation.

23 Phantasia is another controversial topic I cannot fully investigate here. See the discussions of Freudenthal, J., Über den Begriff des Wortes ɸαντασία bei Aristoteles (Göttingen, 1863)Google Scholar; Nussbaum, 221–69, with her bibliography; Watson, G., ‘ɸαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3,3’, CQ 32 (1982), 100–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In what follows I do not mean to assume that phantasia is a sort of picture-viewing, but merely to point out some parallels between the two activities.

24 ‘We do not experience the corresponding emotions at all, but like those contemplating things drawn in pictures, we do not experience any reactions at all [paschomen ouden]’: Themistii In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. Heinze, R. (Berlin, 1899), p. 89, 18–19Google Scholar. The passage is cited with approval by Hicks, ad DA 427 b 23, who states that those viewing pictures are ‘wholly unaffected’. These statements are especially difficult to account for since both Hicks and Themistius connect DA 427 b 21ff. with DA 432 b 28.

25 Norman Dahl has called my attention to some interesting complications. First, I might think of something as frightening without experiencing any reaction associated with fear if I judge that something threatens my safety without becoming emotionally aroused. (I know that smoking is hazardous to my health, but I continue to smoke without fear.) However, this is a special case that does not fit Aristotle's examples discussed above. A second complication arises when our fear is aroused by the object of which a picture is a likeness. This response depends on viewing the imitation qua likeness and differs from the automatic physiological reactions to the picture qua thing in its own right with which Aristotle is concerned in our examples, and in the aesthetic case.

26 Lang, P. et al. , ‘Emotional Imagery: Conceptual Structure and Pattern of Somato-Visceral Response’, Psychophysiology 17 (1980), 180CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. Lang's ‘bio-informational theory of emotional imagery’ is extremely interesting in connection with Aristotle's views about images. See also his ‘Imagery in Therapy: An Information Processing Analysis of Fear’, Behavior Therapy 8 (1977), 862–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Anxiety: Toward a Psychophysiological Definition’, in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Exploration of Biological Predictors, Akiskal, H. and Webb, W., eds. (New York, 1978), 365–89Google Scholar; ‘A Bio-Informational Theory of Emotional Imagery’, Psychophysiology 16 (1979), 495–512CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Cognition in Emotion: Concept and Action’, forthcoming in Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, Izard, C., Kagan, J., Zajonc, R., eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press)Google Scholar.

27 Rhet. 2.8.1386 a 21 mentions weeping as a symptom of pity. Cf. the examples given by Schadewaldt, 142 n. 2: Rhet. 2.13.1390 a 19, HA 608 b 8, Physics 808 a 23. According to Flashar, weeping, the symptom of pity, is caused, in Greek medical theory, by excess moisture (see esp. p. 36), and Aristotle, for example at HA 608a 13, also connects pity with moisture (p. 38).

28 Pohlenz, esp. p. 57. An exception is HA 631 a 19, which states that animals feel pity, or at least something ‘like’ [hoion] pity. This exception is noted by Fortenbaugh, W., ‘Aristotle: Animals, Emotion, and Moral Virtue’, Arethusa 4 (1971), 153Google Scholar.

29 Rhet. 2.8.1386 a 7–9. This distinction between pity and fear is argued for by Fortenbaugh, , Aristotle on Emotion, 79–83Google Scholar. See further, on the distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘non-practical’ emotions, his ‘Aristotle on the Questionable Mean-Dispositions’, TAPA 99 (1968), 203–31Google Scholar. For a different view, see Leighton, 145 and 169 n. 4, who writes that though Aristotle does not explicitly state the aim of emotions like pity and indignation, ‘it is part of the larger concept of these emotions’.

30 I am grateful to the anonymous referee of C.Q. for bringing this problem to my attention.

31 ‘Serious’ is the most common translation, given, for example, by Else, Butcher and Bywater. For a defence of the translation ‘noble’ and bibliography on this subject see Golden, L., ‘Is Tragedy the “Imitation of a Serious Action”?’, GRBS 6 (1965), 283–9Google Scholar. Golden explicitly notes (p. 288) that both his translation and the link between tragedy and pity and fear imply the seriousness of tragedy.

32 This point remains the same if we follow Else (pp. 343 and 349–51) in translating ‘blood relationship’ and ‘enmity’.

33 A version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Philological Association, Dec. 1984, Toronto, Canada. I am grateful to Norman Dahl, Marcia Eaton, William Fortenbaugh, Leon Golden and the anonymous referee of C.Q. for helpful discussions and criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper, and to Peter Lang for allowing me to read an unpublished paper. I also wish to thank the editors of C.Q. for their assistance and the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota for a Faculty Summer Research Fellowship that allowed me to complete this paper.