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ΕΦΟΔΟΣ and Insinuatio In Greek and Latin Rhetoric

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

E. W. Bower
E. W. Bower
Affiliation:
The Queen's University of Belfast
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Extract

The rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Anaximenes, in discussing the introduction of a speech, recognize that a speaker may encounter prejudice on the part of his audience for some reason or other; perhaps because of his own character or reputation, or because of the nature of the case he is pleading, or because his opponent has already won their approval. Anaximenes describes a speaker in this situation as and he and Aristotle give advice on countering such if they have arisen (Arist. Rhet. 3. 15; Anax. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 fin., 35 init., 36 init.). Rather more than two centuries later we find the early Latin rhetoricians expounding the doctrine of insinuatio for dealing with such a situation; they distinguish between principium, the ordinary direct introduction, and insinuatio, the ‘subtle approach’ (Caplan, in his Loeb translation of the ad Herennium, p. 13).

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 8 , Issue 3-4 , November 1958 , pp. 224 - 230
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1958

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References

1 I should like to thank Prof. M. J. Boyd, and Prof. M. L. Clarke, for criticisms and suggestions in connexion with this article.

1 It is worth noticing that Cicero translates the Stoic by admirabilia; cf. ‘haec illi, nos admirabilia dicamus’ (de Fin. 4. 27. 74); ‘quae quia sunt admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium, ab ipsis etiam appellantur’ (Par. Stoic. proem. 4).

2 In Halm, , R.L.M., p. 316.Google Scholar

3 This identification was not considered inevitable, as we see from Quintilian: ‘quibusdam recte uidetur adici turpe, quod alii humili, alii admirabili subiciunt’ (4. 1. 40).

1 is the Greek equivalent of genera causarum.

1 Why use in The case is not likely to be turpe, nor the audience tired by the previous speaker, nor convinced by him. Probably the ordinary introduction designed to make the audience docilis, atlentus, beniuolus is regarded as unnecessary in a and an would make it more interesting. See Theon. Progym. 12 and cf. ad Her. 1. 6. 10: ‘si defessi erunt audiendo … ab apologo, fabula ueri simili, imitatione etc …’ (sc. exordiemur).

2 The Latin rhetoricians, on the other hand, were in general quite clear about insinuatio and its relation to principium; cf. Fortunatianus, Ars Rhet. 2. 14: ‘quo differt exordium a principio et insinuatione ? quod exordium genus est, principium et insinuatio species sunt eius’ (inHalm, , R.L.M., p. 109).Google Scholar

1 In Halm, R.L.M.; = Caput X inMigne, , P.L. xxxii. 1447–8.Google Scholar

2 Excluding (obscurum), which must therefore have been added later.

1 I have assumed that is used in sense I (a ‘subtle approach’) in Dionysius and the papyrus fragment; but in factneither author defines it or gives any indication in which sense he is using it. All we can say is that in the papyrus it seems to be brought into relationship with