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The Folly of Praise: Plato's Critique of Encomiastic Discourse in the Lysis and Symposium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Andrea Wilson Nightingale
Andrea Wilson Nightingale
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Extract

Plato targets the encomiastic genre in three separate dialogues: the Lysis, the Menexenus and the Symposium. Many studies have been devoted to Plato's handling of the funeral oration in the Menexenus. Plato's critique of the encomium in the Lysis and Symposium, however, has not been accorded the same kind of treatment. Yet both of these dialogues go beyond the Menexenus in exploring the opposition between encomiastic and philosophic discourse. In the Lysis, I will argue, Plato sets up encomiastic rhetoric as a foil for Socrates' dialectical method; philosophic discourse is both defined and legitimated by way of its opposition to eulogy. In the Symposium, Plato offers a much more complex critique. First, he illustrates and comments on the vices that inhere in the encomiastic genre. Second, he juxtaposes Socrates' ironic ‘praises’ of his interlocutors with traditional encomiastic discourse, thus inviting the reader to explore the relation between Socratic irony and the rhetoric of eulogy (and censure). And, third, the Symposium exhibits two untraditional ‘encomia’ – Socrates' eulogy for Eros and Alcibiades' for Socrates – that illustrate and interrogate the false ontology underlying the rhetoric of praise.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , May 1993 , pp. 112 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1993

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References

1 One should also note that at Republic 358d and again at 589bc, Plato designates the arguments for injustice and for justice as ‘encomia’ (Socrates makes it clear at 589bc that the encomiast of injustice is a liar and the encomiast of justice a truth-teller). In addition, Socrates suggests retrospectively in the Phaedrus that the two speeches he made fall under the category of the rhetoric of praise and censure: at 265c, he says that his discourse passed ‘from blame to praise’ (⋯π⋯ το⋯ ѱέϒενν πρ⋯ς τ⋯ ⋯παɩνεῑν); he elucidates this at 266ab, where he points out that his first speech ‘abused' (⋯λοɩδόρησεν) bad love and his second ‘praised’ (⋯πῄνεσεν) good love.

2 Kennedy, G. A., The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963), pp. 159–60Google Scholar nn. 50–1, gives a useful survey of the scholarship on the subject. More recently, see Vlastos, G., Platonic Studies 2 (Princeton, 1981), pp. 188–201Google Scholar; Kahn, C. H., ‘Plato's Funeral Oration: The Motive of the Menexenus’, CP 58 (1963), 220–34Google Scholar; Loraux, N., The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, tr. Sheridan, A. (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), pp. 264–74Google Scholar, 311–27 and passim.

3 Praise and censure also play a crucial role in controlling the citizens in the city delineated in the Laws. See, e.g., 663bc, 801d–802d, 822e–823a.

4 Hippothales, the lover in the Lysis, writes in both poetry and prose. Erotic poems of praise in Greek literature were called paidiká. Gentili, B., Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece, tr. Cole, A. Thomas (Baltimore, 1988), p. 113Google Scholar, lists examples of this kind of poem. The pseudoDemosthenean Erôtikos provides a late example of an erotic eulogy in prose. The first two speeches in the Phaedrus appear to be ‘paradoxical’ versions of the erotic prose eulogy.

5 Bury, R. G., The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge, 1932), p. 19Google Scholar (and so also Dover, K., Plato: Symposium (Cambridge, 1980), p. 88)Google Scholar, indicates that the ‘wise man’ in question is generally agreed to be Polycrates, an Athenian teacher of rhetoric.

6 Also mentioned are poetical hymns for the gods and paeans (177a), which occupy a branch of literature quite different from that of the encomiastic pieces of the sophists and teachers of rhetoric. See Harvey, A. E., ‘The Classification of Greek Lyric Poetry', CQ n.s. 5 (1955), 157–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of ancient conceptions of the ‘encomium’ and the ‘hymn’. Plato himself says that the ‘hymn’ is characterized by ‘prayers directed to the gods’ (Laws 700ab); this is quite different from the speeches in the Symposium, which offer praise, not prayers (cf. Socrates' second speech in the Phaedrus, which contains a number of hymnic features). On the generic features of the hymn, see Bundy, E. L., ‘The “Quarrel between Kallimachos and Apollonios”. Part I: The Epilogue of Kallimachos's Hymn to Apollo’, CSCA 5 (1972), 39–94Google Scholar; Race, W. H., ‘Aspects of Rhetoric and Form in Greek Hymns’, GRBS 23 (1982), 5–14Google Scholar; Janko, R., ‘The Structure of the Homeric Hymns: A Study in Genre’, Hermes 109 (1981), 9–24Google Scholar. Why, then, does Plato mention hymns in the Symposium? Probably because the subject matter of his eulogies is a god. Given that he so carefully identifies the prose eulogies that form his target, and that his own eulogists all speak in prose, it is likely that Plato's primary target in this dialogue is the prose eulogies composed and delivered by sophists and teachers of rhetoric.

7 Extant examples are: Prodicus' encomium of Heracles (Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.21–34), Gorgias' Encomium for Helen, Isocrates' Busiris and Helen, and the praise of the non-lover attributed to Lysias in Plato's Phaedrus. Many speeches of this kind are attested by ancient authors. Athenaeus, for example, reports several encomia for courtesans: the sophist Alcidamas, a pupil of Gorgias, wrote in praise of Nais, and the orator Cephalus eulogized Lagis (13.592c). Alcidamas is also said to have written an encomium on death (Cicero, Tusc. 1.48.116), and the Athenian teacher of rhetoric Polycrates composed encomia on infamous mythological figures such as Busiris and Clytemnestra (Isocrates, Busiris 4; Quintilian, Inst. 2.17.4), as well as on trivial mundanities such as pots, pebbles (Alexander, son of Numenius περì ῥητορ. ⋯ϕορμ⋯ν, in Spengel, L., Rhetores Graeci, iii (Leipzig, 1853), p. 3)Google Scholar, and mice (Arist. Rhet. 2.24.2, 1401a; 2.24.6, 1401b). The sophist Lycophron, Aristotle tells us, composed a eulogy for the lyre (Soph. El. 15.174b = DK. 83[0].6), and Zoilus, an orator who studied under Polycrates, wrote an encomium on Polyphemus (Schol. in Platonis, Hipparchum 229d in Radermacher, L., Artium Scriptores (Vienna, 1951), p. 200Google Scholar; Zoilus' encomium for the people of Tenedos, which Strabo quotes from (6.271), may also have been ‘paradoxical’). Finally, Isocrates mentions in his Helen (12) encomia composed for bumble bees and salt (cf. Plato's, Symposium 177b)Google Scholar, and Aristotle alludes in the Rhetoric to a eulogy of Paris (Rhet. 2.23.8, 1398a; 24.7 and 9, 1401b) as well as of mice, dogs, Hermes, and words (Rhet. 2.24.2, 1401a). For a discussion of the (extant) prose encomia of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, see Fraustadt, G., Encomiorum in Litteris Graecis usque ad Romanam Aetatem Historia (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 42–90Google Scholar, and Buchheit, V., Vntersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich, 1960), chaps. 1–2Google Scholar. On the ‘paradoxical’ branch of the prose encomium, see Burgess, T. C., ‘Epideictic literature’, The University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 3 (1902), 157–66Google Scholar, Pease, A. S., “Things Without Honor’, CP 21 (1926), 27–42Google Scholar, and Colie, R. L., Paradoxia Epidemical The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox (Princeton, 1966), esp. pp. 3–40Google Scholar.

8 See Dover (n. 5 above), pp. 4–5.

9 As Dover, K. J., ‘Eros and Nomos (Plato, Symposium 182a–185c)’, BICS 11 (1964), 31–42Google Scholar, shows, Aeschines' speech against Timarchos offers a picture of the homoerotic practices of the wealthy and aristocratic Athenians that is in fundamental accord with that of Pausanias.

10 Kennedy (n. 2 above), pp. 167–73; so also Cole, T., The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore, 1991), pp. 71–94Google Scholar. Cf. Loraux (n. 2 above), p. 225, who suggests (wrongly, in my opinion) that epideictic rhetoric is a kind of ‘art-for-art's sake’ that is fundamentally apolitical.

11 Cicero, , Brutus 12.47Google Scholar. Note also Eudoxus' report that Protagoras ‘taught his pupils to praise and blame the same thing’ (DK 80[74].A21).

l2 On the opening of the Lysis, see Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and his Work, 6th ed. (London, 1949), pp. 65–6Google Scholar; Friedlander, P., Plato, ii, tr. Meyerhoff, H. (New York, 1964), pp. 92–3Google Scholar; Hoerber, R. G., ‘Plato's Lysis’, Phronesis 4 (1959), esp. 15–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a more extended treatment, see Bolotin, D., Plato's Dialogue on Friendship (Ithaca, 1979), pp. 69–82Google Scholar, who shows how Socrates systematically exposes the selfishness in Hippothales' love.

13 Tecusan, Manuela, ‘Logos Sympotikos: Patterns of the Irrational in Philosophical Drinking: Plato Outside the Symposium’, in Murray, O. (ed.), Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion (Oxford, 1990), p. 243Google Scholar, suggests that Socrates' conversation with the youths in the Lysis is ‘an example of good courtesy, set in contrast to Hippothales’ sympotic fashion of wooing'. I would argue that Socrates is not merely being courteous. The contrast is one of discourse and not merely of behaviour.

14 See nn. 8 and 9 above.

15 In the Gorgias we find this same exchange operating on a larger scale: the orators flatter the mob with false rhetoric in order to gain power and influence for themselves. Note that Callicles is said to be a ‘lover’ of the Athenian demos (481d).

16 Cf. Lloyd, G. E. R., Demystifying Mentalities (Cambridge, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who analyses (among other things) the ways in which Greek scientific writers defined themselves in opposition to other writers or modes of writing. Lloyd remarks that this ‘rhetoric of legitimation’ is a regular feature of historical and philosophical as well as scientific writing (p. 23).

17 See n. 7 above.

18 Examples of the agonistic stance adopted by encomiasts: Isocrates' Busiris 4–6, Helen 14–15. Evagoras 8–11, 36; Plato's Menexenus 239bc. Loraux (n. 2 above), p. 241, discusses the agonistic aspect of the funeral oration. Cf. Griffith, M., ‘Contest and Contradiction in Early Greek Poetry’, in Griffith, M. and Mastronarde, D. J. (eds.), Cabinet of the Muses (Atlanta, 1990), pp. 185–207Google Scholar, who argues that Greek poetry from its very beginnings had a prominent agonistic component.

19 Compare how Phaedrus initiates a competition between Lysias and Socrates in the Phaedrus (see, e.g., 235d, 257c).

20 As Russell, D. A. and Wilson, N. G., Menander Rhetor (Oxford, 1981), p. xivGoogle Scholar, observe, the encomium was rapidly systematized by the school of sophistic rhetoric. The rules for composing encomia were explicated as early as Isocrates' Busiris. Aristotle's Rhetoric (1.9.1–41, 1366a–1368a) and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (3, 1425b–1426b) offer even more technical outlines of the ‘system’.

21 Both Aristotle (Rhetoric 1.9.38, 1368a) and the author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (3, 1425b) insist on this aspect of laudatory writing, labelling it (innocuously) ‘amplification’.

22 For example, the speakers contradict one another with little concern for accuracy: if Phaedrus can suggest that Eros is the oldest of the deities because he is the most beneficent (178bc), Agathon can counter that Eros, the most beautiful god, must necessarily be the youngest (195a). And numerous inconsistencies can be found even within individual speeches. After dilating on Eros' ‘delicacy’ (195c,d), ‘softness’ (195e, 196a), and fondness for flowers and scents (196b), for instance, Agathon insists on bis ‘temperance’ and ‘manly courage’ (196cd). Agathon's mania for amplification well illustrates the tendency towards untruth that inheres in this rhetorical device.

23 Socrates says at the very beginning of the party that it would be wonderful if wisdom could be conveyed from one person to another ‘like water, which flows from the fuller into the emptier cup when you connect them with a piece of yarn’ (175d). Clearly, he does not believe that wisdom can be exchanged according to this physicalist model.

24 See, e.g., Burge, E. L., ‘The Irony of Socrates’, Antichthon 3 (1969), 5–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Guthrie, W. K. C., Socrates (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 126–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vlastos, G., ‘Socratic Irony’, CQ 37 (1987), 79–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Booth, W. C., A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago, 1974), esp. pp. 269–76Google Scholar. For more wide-ranging discussions of Socratic irony, see Friedlander, P., Plato, i. An Introduction, tr. Meyerhoff, H. (New York, 1958), ch. 7Google Scholar; Gourinat, M., ‘Socrate etait-il un ironiste?’, Revue de mitaphysique et de morale 91 (1986), 339–53Google Scholar; and Griswold, C. L. Jr, ‘Irony and Aesthetic Language in Plato's Dialogues’, in Boiling, D. (ed.), Philosophy and Literature (New York, 1987), esp. pp. 76–82Google Scholar.

25 Note that Theophrastus says that ‘praising to their faces people he has attacked behind their backs’ is one of the characteristic actions of the ironic individual (Characters 1.2). Though Theophrastus' portrait of the ironist is not especially reminiscent of Socrates, his identification of insincere praise as ironic is instructive.

26 Knox, D., Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony (Leiden, 1989)Google Scholar, shows the pervasiveness of the notion of irony as ‘blame by praise or praise by blame’ in medieval and, especially, Renaissance thinkers. The gentleman who (wrongly) derived the mock encomium from Socratic irony was Caspar Dornau (1577–1632); see Knox, p. 105.

27 See, e.g., Euthyphro 5a, Ion 530bc, Lesser Hippias 364ab.

28 I disagree with Vlastos' reading of ‘εἰρωνευόμενος’ in this passage a s well as of ‘εἰρωνɩκ⋯ς’ at 218d (n. 24 above, pp. 87–93). In calling Socrates an ‘ironist’, Vlastos claims, Alcibiades is not accusing him of wilful deception (the common sense of the Greek word εἰρωνεία) but rather of irony in the modern sense of the word. But Alcibiades says at 222b that Socrates has ‘deceived’ many people by pretending to be their lover (οὗτος ⋯ξαπατ⋯ν ὡς ⋯ραστής). Since the words εἰρωνευόμενος and εἰρωνɩκ⋯ς are put in Alcibiades' mouth, they must be interpreted according to his perception of Socrates. It is precisely the shortcomings of Alcibiades' interpretation of Socrates that invite the reader to seek a different interpretation of Socrates' indirection. Where Alcibiades sees wilful deception, Plato invites the reader to see something different from both sincerity and mendacity.

29 It is crucial to grasp the difference between Diotima's claim (210b) that the lover who ascends the ladder must ‘become a lover of all beautiful bodies and slacken his violent love for one boy, looking down on it and considering it a small thing’ (⋯νός δ⋯ τ⋯ σϕόδρα το⋯το ϰαλάσαɩ καταϕρονήσοντα καί σμɩκρ⋯ν ⋯ϒησάμενον), and Alcibiades’ assertion (216de) that ‘it doesn't matter to Socrates if a person is beautiful, but he looks down on this more than anyone might think…and considers all these possessions [i.e. beauty, wealth, etc.] to be worthless and all of us to be mere nothings’ (ἲστε ὂτɩ οὓτε εἲ τɩς καλός ⋯στɩ μέλεɩ αὐτῷ οὐδέν, ⋯λλ⋯ καταϕρονεῖ τοσο⋯τον ὃσον οὐδ' ἃν εἳς οίηθείη…⋯ϒεῖταɩ δ⋯ πάντα τά κτήματα οὐδενός ἄξɩα καί ήμ⋯ς οὐδ⋯ν εἴναɩ). Alcibiades thinks Socrates' devaluation of physical beauty, riches, etc. is part and parcel of his contemptuous devaluation of his fellow men. Diotima, however, does not enjoin the lover to reject human beings, but rather to rise above physical beauty and the obsession that it creates.

30 Dover, K. J., Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 35Google Scholar. Cf. Gagarin, M., ‘Socrates' Hybris and Alcibiades' Failure’, Phoenix 31 (1977), 22–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Ibid. 35. Fisher, N., ‘The law of hubris in Athens’, in Carter, P., Millett, P. and Todd, S. (eds.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian law, politics and society (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 123–38Google Scholar, argues along the same lines: ‘the essence of hubris is the deliberate attack on the time (honour) of another. That is, it is constituted by intentional, often gratuitous action, frequently but by no means always violent, and specifically designed to inflict shame and public humiliation’ (p. 126).

32 Agathon and Alcibiades are probably not using the word ‘hubris’ in its technical legal sense; as Dover observes (n. 30 above, pp. 34–5), accusations of ‘hubris’ were used for emotional effect in a variety of rhetorical situations. Nonetheless, the repetition of the word ‘hubris’ cannot fail to remind the reader that Socrates was judged and condemned as a threat to the Athenian dêmos and its egalitarian ethos.

33 It is necessary to handle the question of whether Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is insincere (and therefore ‘ironic’ in the original sense of the word) separately from the question of whether his effusive praises are insincere. Socrates' use of praise, which is the focus of this investigation, cannot be completely sincere. But this does not entail that Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge is equally insincere. A full analysis of Socratic irony would have to take both of these aspects into account.

34 Rhetoric 2.2.3–25, 1378b–1379b (irony is mentioned explicitly in sections 24–5; note that Aristotle identifies hubris as one of the three genera of oXiywpia). In the ethical treatises, Aristotle speaks rather differently of irony, identifying it as the opposite of boastfulness (see, e.g. N.E. 2.7.12, 1108a; 4.7.14–17, 1127b; E.E. 3.7.6, 1233b–1234a): although both irony and boasting involve dissembling, the ironic individual is more commendable in that he avoids pompousness.

35 Apollodorus tries to conceal this by acting as though Socrates, rather tha n he, is superior to other people. But Apollodorus clearly thinks that his association with an d imitation of Socrates lifts him above other people. Cf. Socrates' response to Anytus' claim in the Meno that Socrates is ‘too ready to abuse people’ (94e): ‘[Anytus] thinks that I am slandering (κακηϒορεῖν) these men, an d he also believes that he himself is one of them. But if he ever discovers what slander really is, he will cease to be angry; as it stands, he is ignorant of this’ (95a). Though Socrates does criticize me n such as Pericles an d Thucydides in this dialogue, he denies that he is slandering them. First, he is speaking the truth rather than maligning them and, second, his critique is no t designed to elevate him over others.

36 This occurs in the dialogues (i.e. the early and some early/middle) where Socrates is actually using the ‘Socratic’ method. In the Symposium, of course, Socrates claims that he knows ‘nothing except τ⋯⋯ρωτɩκά’ (177d). As I will suggest in section VI, what Socrates is saying here is that he knows only ‘the things to d o with desire’, i.e. the erotic path towards wisdom – not the body of knowledge that a desire of wisdom can lead to.

37 Needless to say, Socrates elenchus does not often succeed. Qualities such as vanity, competitiveness, and complacency often render an interlocutor unable to submit himself to the co-operative enterprise of philosophical conversation: he may take offence (e.g. Callicles, Thrasymachus), or he may simply ignore the force of Socrates' refutation and continue to parade his ‘knowledge’ (e.g. Euthyphro, Ion).

38 Particularly unusual is Alcibiades' blending of praise and censure in his eulogy. Though it was not uncommon for an encomiast to use an invective against some unworthy subject as ballast for his commendation of his principal subject, to praise and blame the same individual in a single speech is quite another matter. Alcibiades' encomium does cleave to some of the standard features in the genre. Though it makes no mention of Socrates' ancestry, it attributes to Socrates the virtues of temperance (219b–d, 219e–220d), courage (220d–221c), and wisdom (at the beginning and end of the speech). In addition, it exploits the device of ‘comparison’ to suggest that Socrates cannot be compared to any human being who ever existed (221c–d). On the problem of the genre of the speech, see Belfiore, E., ‘Dialectic with the Reader in Plato's Symposium’, Mam 36 (1984), 143Google Scholar.

39 Note also the encomium Xenophon pronounces on Socrates at the end of the Memorabilia (4.8.11).

40 See also 11.504e–509e, where Athenaeus takes Plato to task for the numerous ‘invectives’ that he wove into so many of bis dialogues. Athenaeus, of course, is hostile to Socrates and his circle, and his statement here must be taken with a grain of salt.

41 I do not mean to imply that the flctive Alcibiades is necessarily reporting actual facts about the historical Socrates. Rather, within the fiction of Plato's dialogue, some of what Alcibiades says is factual and some subjective interpretation.

42 As Halperin, D. points out in ‘Plato and the Erotics of Narrativity', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (supplementary volume, 1992), p. 115Google Scholar

43 Note that Socrates calls Alcibiades' eulogy into question twice: first, at 214e, where he asks whether Alcibiades is going t o ‘mock’ him by way of praise; and, second, at 222cd, where he says that Alcibiades' eulogy was designed to make trouble between Agathon and Socrates. These remarks warn us not to take everything Alcibiades says at face value.

44 Nussbaum, M ., ‘The Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of the Symposium’, in The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986), ch. 6Google Scholar.

45 Ibid. 190.

46 For the role-reversal of lover and beloved in Socratic dialogues, see Halperin, D ., ‘Plato and Erotic Reciprocity’, CQ 5 (1986), esp. 68–72Google Scholar.

47 Nussbaum (n. 44 above), p. 191.

48 Nussbaum (n. 44 above) seems to anticipate this criticism when she notes on pp. 191–2 that ‘with the failure of physical intimacy a certain part of practical understanding is lost to Alcibiades. There is a part of Socrates that remains dark to him, a dimension of intuitive responsiveness to this particular person, an aptness of speech, movement, and gesture, that he can never develop, a kind of “dialectic” that is missing.’ Nevertheless, she claims, , ‘Alcibiades can tell the truth about Socrates' unique strangeness even though his aims were frustrated’ (p. 191)Google Scholar. But surely the lack of ‘physical intimacy’ is not the only thing that limits Alcibiades' understanding of Socrates.

49 Socrates himself refers to Alcibiades' violent and jealous behaviour at 213cd (though his claims are no doubt exaggerated). For a good analysis of Alcibiades' ‘jealousy’, see Fantham, E., ‘ΖΗΛΟΤΥΙΙΙΑ: A Brief Excursion into Sex, Violence and Literary History’, Phoenix 40 (1986), 47–50Google Scholar. In addition to his (psychological) feelings of jealousy, Fantham notes Alcibiades' tendency towards assault' (p. 50).

50 Why didn't Socrates tell Alcibiades this at the start, in plain and unequivocal terms? Gagarin (n. 30 above) sees this (among other things) as a failure on Socrates' part. Cf. Vlastos (n. 24 above, p. 93), who suggests that Socrates took this approach because ‘he wanted Alcibiades to find out the truth for himself by himself’.

51 Here, Alcibiades appears to be referring back to Socrates' claim that Alcibiades grows violent when Socrates so much as looks at anyone else. But Alcibiades' statement in this passage represents his general view of Socrates' discourse.

52 It is no accident that Plato put this speech into the mouth of a famous (and, indeed, infamous) politician. The ignorant use of the language of praise, he reminds us, poses a very real danger to the city as a whole.

53 For an extended discussion of Diotima's role in the dialogue, see Halperin, D ., ‘Why Is Diotima a Woman?’ in One Hundred Years of Homosexuality (New York, 1990), ch. 6Google Scholar.

54 The Socrates who attends the drinking party is clearly not the person that he claims he used I to be. The disparity between the Socrates whom Diotima accuses of being stupidly infatuated with the young boys (2lid ) and the Socrates wh o resists Alcibiades' enticements suggests that Socrates has made some headway in his erotic pursuits. But this does not mean that Socrates has made it to the top of the ladder: Diotima actually doubts that Socrates can achieve these heights (210a), and Socrates' claim that he knows ‘nothing but ta erotika suggests that he understands the journey but not the journey's end.

55 Burnyeat, M. F., ‘Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration’, BICS 24 (1977), 7–16Google Scholar, suggests that the Socrates of the Symposium has a very different style of pedagogy from that of the ‘midwife’ (which is found in the early dialogues and is articulated in the Theaetetus); ‘the Symposium’, he says on p. 9, ‘presents a middle period Socrates, argumentative still but with positive doctrine of his own or learned from Diotima’. I would argue that Socrates transmits Diotima's ‘doctrines’ (rather than ‘positive doctrines of his own’) in his speech, and that his ironic behaviour at the drinking party is very much in keeping with the Socrates of Plato's early period. Belfiore (n. 38 above) suggests that Plato calls into question the ‘truth’ of Socrates' speech in a number of ways; if this is on target, then Diotima's ‘doctrines’ may be no more Platonic than they are Socratic.

56 Lowenstam, S., ‘Paradoxes in Plato's Symposium’, Ramtis 14 (1985), 88Google Scholar. Roochnik, D. L., ‘The Erotics of Philosophical Discourse’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987), 117–29Google Scholar, comes to a similar conclusion.

57 As R. Colie says in her study of paradoxical discourse (n. 7 above, p. 10), the paradoxical encomium issues a challenge to orthodox opinions (a challenge that characterized the sophistic movement as a whole) by way of an implicit assertion of the relativity of all values. Plato, of course, rejects the notion that values are relative; his deviant use of praise discourse is thus diametrically opposed to that of the paradoxical encomia of the sophists and teachers of rhetoric.

58 I would like to acknowledge the generous help I have received in writing this paper. In particular, warm thanks are owed to Rachel Jacoff, Tony Long, Kathryn Morgan, Richard Patterson, Rush Rehm, Susan Stephens, Gregory Vlastos, and the CQ referee, for their stimulating criticisms and valuable suggestions.