‘Friendship’ and ‘Self-Sufficiency’ in Homer and Aristotle

A. W. H. Adkins

doi:10.1017/S0009838800001579

‘Friendship’ and ‘Self-Sufficiency’ in Homer and Aristotle

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009

A. W. H. Adkins

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A. W. H. Adkins: Affiliation:
Exeter College, Oxford

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This article falls into two parts: the first is an analysis, in the light of my earlier discussions of and of the Homeric usage of and the second, an attempt to show that, as in the case of the effects of Homeric usage persist to a considerable degree in the moral philosophy of Aristotle. In the earlier discussions I have argued that the higher value placed upon the competitive in Greek entails that co-operative relationships, even when valued and necessary, take the form dictated by the more valued qualities, the The most general words to denote co-operative relationships in Greek are and its derivatives: my purpose here is to show how the Homeric usage of these words is related to the Homeric standard and to Homeric society, and to sketch in the outline of a wider discussion, which I hope to be able to fill in later.

Type: Research Article
Information: The Classical Quarterly , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , May 1963 , pp. 30 - 45

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838800001579 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © The Classical Association 1963

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^{page 30 note 1} Merit and Responsibility, chapter iii.

^{page 30 note 2} ‘“Honour” and “Punishment” in the Homeric Poems,’ Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vii (1960), 23 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 30 note 3} Lexicon Homericum, s.v.

^{page 30 note 4} It is difficult to discover exactly how Ebeling understood the usage of Having stated that the usage sometimes appears very close to that of a reflexive pronoun, he nevertheless classifies the instances in which is used of things as parallel to those used of persons, under the general heading ‘carus’, ‘dilectus’.

^{page 30 note 5} The ‘beggar’ Odysseus (hopefully) addresses Antinous as Od. 17. 415, when asking for alms.

^{page 30 note 6} See pp. 34 ff.

^{page 30 note 7} For requires possessions, Od. 19. 194 f., and the would have more of these anyway. Non- could use of the benefits they conferred on their dependants, e.g. Eumaeus the ‘beggar’, Od. 14. 388, and is addressed as 115, etc.; but menial services performed by the dependants in return would not be characterized by and Eumaeus does not address the ‘beggar’ as Aristotle finds similar difficulties in ‘unequal E.N. 1159^b1 ff.

^{page 31 note 1} ‘Beloved’, not ‘friendly’. The active usages of applied to persons in Homer alleged by the lexicographers, Od. 1. 313 and Il. 24. 775, can be translated as passive, and should be so translated.

^{page 31 note 2} e.g. is used appropriately of a bull, Il. 2. 402, inappropriately of a pig, Od. 14. 419.

^{page 31 note 3} e.g. Od. 1. 29, is not a misapplied formula: belongs to the -group, and Aegisthus is as as the suitors are.

^{page 32 note 1} Cf. Il. 6. 350.

^{page 32 note 2} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 34 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 1} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 34 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 2} Cf. ‘“Honour” and “Punishment” in the Homeric Poems’, passim.

^{page 33 note 3} The (post-Homeric) idiom is illuminating.

^{page 34 note 1} Cf. p. 30, n. 6.

^{page 34 note 2} is passive heretoo: the clause does not repeat the sense of the earlier clause, but explains why Axylus was to men.

^{page 34 note 3} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 46 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 4} Ibid., p. 6.

^{page 34 note 5} Cf. ‘“Honour” and “Punishment”’, p. 25.Google Scholar

^{page 35 note 1} The comer can be termed only prospectively if he is an equal (cf. p. 36 below and Od. 1. 158, where Telemachus does not know who his guest is), not at all if he is unlikely ever to be able to in return (cf. p. 30 n. 7 above).

^{page 35 note 2} Cf. ‘“Honour” and “Punishment”’, passim.

^{page 35 note 3} Cf. Il. 23. 571, and Merit and Responsibility, p. 56. The felt most acutely when a man considered ‘worse’ defeats a man considered ‘better’; but a stranger is likely to be considered ‘worse’; and if he wishes, as Odysseus does, to disprove this, strife will result.Google Scholar

^{page 35 note 4} For such a use of in later Greek, cf. S.I.G. ³ 1122, Thuc. 6. 78. 1. (I am indebted to Professor Dover for these examples.)

^{page 36 note 1} For this aspect of cf. Merit ana Responsibility, p. 35.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 2} would be a principle of great value to a wanderer in a moneyless society.

^{page 36 note 3} Cf. Od. 10.336; Il. 3. 354.

^{page 37 note 1} Above, p. 33.

^{page 37 note 2} here each refer to the They may also refer to the -aspect, cf. 1168^a19.

^{page 37 note 3} Discussed below, pp. 41 ff.

^{page 38 note 1} Unequal 1163^a24 ff., could be similarly analysed.

^{page 38 note 2} Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, ii. 274.Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 3} This phrase, and will be discussed below.

^{page 38 note 4} This clause might well appear neatly parallel to above.

^{page 38 note 5} It should not be assumed that these are synonyms for See below, p. 42.

^{page 39 note 1} For does not mean ‘ for both A and B at the same time’, but ‘really for A, who finds things which are really for him because he is ’.

^{page 40 note 1} This remains true even though the can be reduced to two, 1155^b19, ff.: though is only because it is a means to three types of can easily be distinguished by the appropriate

^{page 40 note 2} 1155^b18 ^b23 ^b28 ^b31 ^b32

^{page 41 note 1} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, chapter xi, especially pp. 230 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} Crito 45 c 5 ff.

^{page 41 note 3} Cf. also Plato, Meno 71 e 2 ff., and Merit and Responsibility, pp. 228 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 1} This despite his use of on account of the or the earlier in the passage quoted, 1167^a12. Aristode's language is confused here. The reason for the usual range of in Aristotle is of course the iame as that for the range of in Homer, p. 36 above.

^{page 43 note 1} The implications of this phrase are discussed below.

^{page 43 note 2} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, chapters x and xi.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 1} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, passim.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 2} Quoted by Aristotle, E.N. 1169^b7.

^{page 44 note 3} Cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 344 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 45 note 1} Who has (but does not acknowledge) the same problem. Cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 290 f.Google Scholar

^{page 45 note 2} Notably (but not exclusively) the alterego arguments of 1169^b3ff. E.N. 9. 7 ff. need an article to themselves for adequate discussion.

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