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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
We must return to the transmitted reading, which is beyond objection. The persons referred to in 
want to establish that passivity, the experiencing of desire, grief, and the like, is a thing of the body and not of the soul, which, they maintain, is
The climactic 
structure makes it plain enough that what is in dispute and has to be proved is that the soul is 
, and that what is assumed for the proof is that it is 
. It is, therefore, wrong to change the text so as to make those engaging in the proof try to argue from 
instead of the other way round.
1 I give the text of Sandbach, F.H., Plutarch's Moralia, Fragments (London 1969) (vol. XV of the Loeb Moralia), 56Google Scholar. M. Pohlenz (Teubner 1953) and K. Zeigler, who revised Pohlenz's text (1959), also accept Hartman's conjecture as a correction.
2 Hartman, J.J., De Plutarcho scriptore et philosopho (Leiden 1916), 633–4. Hartman 
Sandbach accepted the result of this prejudice. Both Pohlenz, in his apparatus, (so too Ziegler) and Sandbach refer to Plot. 3. 6(1), mysteriously as far as the textual point is concerned: Plot. 3.6. 1, properly understood, supports the manuscript reading here; not that any external support is needed.Google Scholar
3 In the manuscripts the soul's 
, in Hartman—Sandbach its 
is granted for a premiss.
4 For this syllogism to be valid the major premiss should assure us, either that ‘All A is all B’ or, more naturally, that ‘All B is A’.