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Plato, Parmenides 129 and Republic 475–480

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

N. R. Murphy
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Extract

The reply which Socrates makes to Zeno in the Parmenides and that which he makes to the φιλοθɛ⋯μονɛς in the Republic are perhaps connected chiefly by the fact that a false interpretation of either might prejudice the other, but it seems convenient to take them together for that reason even if they have not much actual connection in themselves. Both are controversial, and in the case of Socrates' reply to Zeno, no re-statement of it could be secure which did not take account of Parmenides' reply to Socrates. For if Parmenides, as is maintained by some, is not attacking the doctrine of forms as such, but only Socratic theories of their relation with particulars, it would be natural to think that these theories about ‘participation’ had been the substance of Socrates' answer to Zeno. So it is impossible to avoid some discussion of the later passage, however cursory, as a preliminary.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , April 1937 , pp. 71 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1937

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References

page 71 note 1 Cp. Burnet, , Greek Philosophy, p. 254Google Scholar . His view is apparently based largely on historical probabilities; ‘if these arguments’ (about participation) ‘are Eleatic in origin, it follows that they are not directed against the reality of the intelligible, but against that of the sensible.’ ProfessorTaylor, A. E., Plato, pp. 350 ff.Google Scholar, has done much to support this view by analysis of the detail of the dialogue.

page 71 note 2 This is the view of the passage which I am to defend later.

page 72 note 1 Phys. 185B 25.

page 72 note 2 There hardly seems to me sufficient evidence in the dialogue to be quite sure exactly what Zeno's arguments against pluralism were, nor yet what precisely Socrates meant by such remarks as οὐδ⋯ν ἃτοπον and τ⋯ θαυματ⋯ν. So far as the dialogue goes, different interpretations could be imagined. It looks as if this question of synthetic predication were just what Plato did not wish to raise except by way of hints and anticipations. This is natural enough if the main answer attributed to Socrates consists in urging that there are many distinct forms. There is, however, no doubt, I think, that by such phrases τ⋯ πολλ⋯ ὂμοια the Parmenides means things which are like—e.g., sticks and stones, etc. I am dealing with this point in section C.

page 73 note 1 I take it that a similar use of the plurality of forms underlies the position of the εἰδ⋯ν φ⋯λοι in the Sophist. Cp. 249c, where these and the Eleatics are distinguished as οі ἓν ἣ κα⋯ τ⋯ πολλ⋯ ɛἲδη λ⋯γοντɛς.

page 74 note 1 The same reproach would have to apply equally to Theaetetus 154–155.

page 74 note 2 I quote Aristotle's remark (Met. 1043B 24) with reference to mental types rather than to individuals or schools.

page 74 note 3 Τ⋯ παντɛλ⋯ς ⋯ν of 477A should not be identified with ideal being at this stage of the argument. It is supposed to be common ground that knowledge is of the real, just as it is that non existence goes with ignorance. Socrates has to prove (after the repetition of the preliminary agreements in 478D) that it is the favourite interests of the πιλο⋯μων, and not his own, which are rightly to be classified as intermediate, Originally, both sides claim to know the real.

page 75 note 1 See note at end of article.

page 75 note 2 Cp. Parmenides, 29D, ⋯ληθ⋯ ⋯ποφα⋯νɛι ⋯μφ⋯ τɛρα.

page 75 note 3 It is not that Simmias' greatness is surpassed by Phaedo's, but that when compared with him Simmias loses greatness altogether and acquires smallness. Plato's treatment of relations differs in many respects from the modern view; see Cornford, F. M., Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 282 ffGoogle Scholar. Light and heavy we would conceive as on a continuous scale of weight; all bodies exemplify weight and we cannot say that they have it and have not. But we must take such concepts with reference to Greek ways of thinking. Cp. Ross, W. D., Aristotle's Physics, Intro. pp. 26–28Google Scholar. Dr. Ross suggests that the Timaeus implies a relative distinction between heavy and light, or at least something more like a relative one than Aristotle's. But Plato could not have been so thinking of them here; he calls them ⋯ναντ⋯α (479B 7) and treats them as opposite qualities—i.e., as if so far as a body is light it does not partake of heaviness at all, so that if it also partakes of heaviness it must be in some different respect — rather than as different quantifications of the weight which all bodies have. (Contrast the treatment of ἃπɛιρα in Philebus 24·25.)

page 76 note note 1 If what is half, in being also other than half, ceased to exist, how could it be also double ? It can only be ‘as half’ that it ceases to exist; i.e., it is not half in that respect. It is therefore not that which is half and double that has ambiguous existence, but its halfness and doubleness. Similarly, τ⋯ αἰσχρ⋯ν and τ⋯ ἃδικον are not to be taken here as pure negatives. That which is not beautiful retains the quasi-positive character of being ugly.

page 76 note 2 Cp. Adam's note on 476D.

page 77 note 1 See note at end of article.

page 77 note 2 When in Republic VI 507 Plato recalls the πολλ⋯ καλ⋯ and classifies them loosely as ⋯ρώμɛνα, he also expands the term to cover γιγν⋯μɛνα generally. Just as in the Phaedo, he uses it in either sense indifferently. The reference in 507A to the previous discussions by which the status of γιγν⋯μɛνα has been established cannot there fore be confined to Book V. These subjects have been discussed ἃλλοτε ἤδη πολλ⋯κις, and as so often in dealing with aspects of the ideal theory, Plato treats it as too familiar to need detailed explanation. A fresh start was made in 502D-E (ὣσπɛρ ⋯ξ ⋯ρχ⋯ς) and the metaphysics of the Divided Line do not really depend solely on Book V, but on ‘what has often been said else where’.