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Guerrilla War in Western Missouri, 1862–1865: Historical Extensions of the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Don R. Bowen
Don R. Bowen
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
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Extract

In the winter of 1861–62 there was a guerrilla uprising in WesternMissouri, directed in main against the Union Army and against localpro-Union sympathizers. The number of active participants was smallby more recent standards. At any given time the guerrillas in questionprobably numbered no more than 200 individuals. They had, however, an impact beyond that suggested by their size. In the ensuing three years the guerrillas managed to tie up more than 40,000 Union troops on stationary occupation duty. As in almost all classic cases of guerrilla warfare, the Union forces were rendered relatively immobile by the necessity to protect fixed points such as urban areas, supply depots, and lines of communication. In addition to their military effect, the guerrillas have become over time a fairly well known part of American folklore. Their leader through most of the period was William Quantrill. From their ranks came at least two of the more famous bandit gangs of frontier history—the James brothers and the Younger brothers. Their most famous exploit, the raid on Lawrence, Kansas, has been the subject of film and other commercial treatment.

Type
Society and the Shape of Armies
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , January 1977 , pp. 30 - 51
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1977

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References

1 The estimate is mine and is probably too high. It is based on a total of 296individuals I have so far been able to positively identify as participating at somepoint in the period. Brownlee, R. A. lists a total of 340 participants he identified.See his Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UniversityPress, 1958), pp. 265–74.Google Scholar

2 This account of the events in Missouri is, of course, much too short and simpleto constitute a history. I have tried to follow in brief outline the leading authoritieson the historical origins of the uprising. See, in particular, Britton, Wiley, The CivilWar on the Border (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1898);Google ScholarBrownlee, , op. cit., pp. 3–53;Google ScholarMonagan, Jay, Civil War on the Western Border (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955);Google ScholarWilliam, M. Pruitt, “The More Definitely Pro-Southern Group in Missouri Between August, 1860, and March, 1861, ” unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Missouri, 1932;Google ScholarRyle, Walter, Missouri: Union or Secession (Nashville: Peabody Teachers College, 1931);Google ScholarSmith, William E., “The Blairs and Fremont, ” MissouriHistorical Review, XXIII (01., 1929);Google ScholarSnead, Thomas L., The Fight for Missourifrom the Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1888).Google Scholar

3 Tilly, Charles, The Vendee (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 1.Google Scholar

4 For an example see, Connelley, William E., Quantrill and the Border Wars (Cedar Rapids, la.: 1910).Google Scholar

5 For an example see, Edwards, John N., Noted Guerrillas (St. Louis: 1877).Google Scholar

6 Ethnic difference may have been a more important source of friction than re-gional difference. The German immigrants from the St. Louis area seem to havebeen particularly resented as outsiders.

7 Without any doubt the leading formulator of the model is Ted Gurr, R.. See his, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970),Google Scholar for a generalstatement. See also, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, ” World Politics, XX (01., 1968), pp. 254–78;Google Scholar“A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Anal-ysis Using New Indices, ” American Political Science Review, LXII (12, 1968), pp. 1104–24.Google Scholar For similar formulations see Bowen, Don R., “A Model of PoliticalViolence, ” Paper read at the VIIth World Congress of the International PoliticalScience Association, Munich: 09. 4–10, 1970;Google ScholarGrundy, Kenneth R., GuerrillaStruggle in Africa (New York: Grossman, 1971).Google ScholarFor critical discussions see, Korpi, Walter, “Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation, ” American PoliticalScience Review, LXIII (12, 1974), pp. 1569–78;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMuller, Edward, “A Test of aPartial Theory of Potential for Political Violence, ” American Political Science Review, LXVI (09., 1972) pp. 928–59;CrossRefGoogle ScholarTilly, Charles, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution, ” Comparative Politics, V (04, 1973), pp. 425–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 In general the literature on relative deprivation is vast. I have found the follow-ing helpful in addition to the works cited supra: Aberle, David F., “A Note onRelative Deprivation Theory as Applied to Millenarian and Other Cult Movements, ”in Thrupp, Sylvia L., (ed.), Millenial Dreams in Action (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), pp. 209–14;Google ScholarBowen, Don R., Bowen, Elinor R., Gawiser, Sheldon H., and Masotti, Louis H., “Deprivation, Mobility and Orientation Towards Protest of theUrban Poor, ” in Masotti, L. H. and Bowen, D. R., (eds.), Riots and Rebellion:Civil Violence in the Urban Community, Beverly Hills, Cal.: 1968, pp. 187–200;Google ScholarDouglas, K. Bwy, “Dimensions of Social Conflict in Latin America, ” American Behavioral Scientist, VII (03, 1968), pp. 39–50;Google ScholarCaltado, Everett F., Johnson, Richard and Kellstedt, Lyman, “Social Strain and Urban Violence, “Google Scholar in, Masotti, and Bowen, , op. cit., pp. 285–300;Google ScholarCrawford, Thomas J. and Naditch, Murray, “Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness and Militancy: The Psychology of Social Protest, ” Psychiatry, XXXIII (05, 1970), pp. 208–23;CrossRefGoogle ScholarDavies, James C., “Toward a Theory of Revolution, ” American Sociological Review, XXVII (02., 1962), pp. 5–19;CrossRefGoogle ScholarIvo, K. and Feierabend, Rosalind L., “Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–52, ” Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (09., 1966), pp. 249–71;Google ScholarMorrison, Denton, “Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements andSocial Change, ” American Behavioral Scientist, XIV (05, 1971), pp. 675–90;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSchwartz, David C., “Towards a Theory of Revolutionary Behavior, ” Paper readat the Meetings of the American Psychological Association, Philadelphia, 09. 3–8, 1968;Google ScholarSnyder, David and Tilly, Charles, “Hardship and Collective Violence inFrance, 1830–1960, ” American Sociological Review, XXXVII (10., 1972), pp.520–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Again, the literature and learned controversy surrounding the frustration-aggression theory is vast. For a flavor of the central argument compare, Dollard, John et al. , Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939),CrossRefGoogle Scholar and, Lorenz, Konrad, On Aggression (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966).Google Scholar For a general summary, Berkowits, Leonard, (ed.), Roots of Aggression; A Re-examination of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (New York: Atherton, 1968).Google Scholar

10 For a general review of the controversy see, Converse, Elizabeth, “The War of All Against All: A Review of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957–1968, ” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XII (12, 1968), pp. 471–532;CrossRefGoogle ScholarDahrendorf, Rolf, Class and Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959);Google ScholarGamson, William A., Power and Discontent (Homewood III,.: Dorsey Press, 1968);Google ScholarGrimshaw, Allen, “Interpreting Collective Violence: An Argument for the Impor-tance of Social Structure, ” Annals of the American Academy of Political and SocialScience, CCCLICI (09., 1970), pp. 9–20;CrossRefGoogle ScholarOberschall, Anthony, Social Conflictand Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).Google Scholar

11 See Bowen, et al. , , op. cit.;Google ScholarBwy, , op. cit.;Google ScholarCaltaldo, et al. , , op. cit.;Google ScholarNaditch, Crawfordand, op. cit.;Google ScholarMuller, , op. cit.Google Scholar

12 See, in particular, Gurr, , “A Causal Model of Civil Strife …, ” op. cit.Google Scholar Also, Feierabend, and Feierabend, , op. cit.Google Scholar, Muller, , op. cit., has criticized reliance on suchdata, “But developing an operational system based on macro-indicators is not themost felicitous way to begin testing a theory conceptualized largely in terms ofpsychological characteristics of individuals, ” p. 929.Google Scholar

13 Population of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returnsof the Eighth Census, Under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior, Wash-ington, D.C.: 1864.

14 The census of 1850 unlike that of 1860 reports only the value of real property.Hence comparisons between the two can only be made with respect to value of realproperty. See, Hattie Poppino (ed.), Census of 1850, Jackson County, Missouri and, Hattie Poppino (ed.), Census of 1860, Jackson County, Missouri, Kansas City:1959.

15 The sample was a pure or simple random sample without replacement from aninitial list of 2543 white males enumerated in the Census of 1860 between the agesof 15 and 35 living outside Kansas City but in Jackson County, Missouri. Identifiedparticipants in the guerrilla movement were eliminated from the initial list as weretheir male siblings. The final sample size was 223.

16 As Charles Tilly has persuasively argued about the uprising in the Vendeé in1793.

17 See, The Crowd in History (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).Google Scholar

18 See, Primitive Rebels (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965).Google Scholar

19 Britton, , op. cit.;Google ScholarMonaghan, , op. cit.Google Scholar; Ryle, , op. cit.Google Scholar

20 At least according to his son's memory some forty years later. See, Younger, Coleman, The Story of Cole Younger by Himself (Chicago: 1903).Google Scholar

21 Although on at least one occasion Lincoln had to intervene to make sure such orders were carried out in Missouri. See, U.S. War Department, The War of theRebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Washington, D.C.: 1880-1892, Series I, Vol. III, pp. 469–70, 485–86. Here-inafter cited as Official Record.Google Scholar

22 Brownlee, , op. cit., p. 5, for example, makes such an argument.Google Scholar

23 By order of General Fremont, Commanding, Department of Missouri, Aug.30, 1861, Official Record, Series I, Vol. Ill, pp. 446–67.

24 cf. Table III.

25 Of a total population of 4, 394 in Kansas City, 166 were slaves, a ratio muchlower than for Jackson County.

26 For example, see, Official Record, Series 1, Vol. III, pp. 458–9, 466–7, 469–70, 482, 507 552. For more general accounts, Britton, , op. cit., I. pp. 145–8;Google ScholarBrownlee, , op. cit., pp. 31–51.Google Scholar

27 Specifically, I have constructed an index of official sanctions from the Official Record for the period, Feb., 1862-May, 1865. The index includes the followingactions: search of property, seizure of property (livestock, crops, slaves, etc.), de-struction of property (burning of buildings, shootings of horses, etc.), arrest ordetainment of persons, forced bail or bond giving, forced removal of families, summary execution, execution by court martial. According to my count 93 of the families of the guerillas were the subjects of one or more such official sanctionsduring the time period. In addition there may well be numerous incidents which did not find their way into the Official Record, i.e. incidents which the officers ofthe commands involved chose not to report. These data, however, are ambiguous.The guerrilla families may well have been the subjects of official sanctions preciselybecause it was known that they had sons, or brothers, or in-laws, etc. who were inthe brush. Or, alternately, many may have joined the uprising because their familieswere the subjects of official abuse. What I do think completely clear is that thosewho became guerrillas did so because they had something to fear, either actual oranticipated.

28 Connelley, , op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar