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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 June 2009
“We seek a man, not money. Wellnigh every Christian region sendeth us money, but no land sendeth to us a prince. Therefore, we ask a prince that needeth money, not money that needeth a prince.” These words of the Patriarch of Jerusalem to King Henry II of England in April, 1185, reflect one of the chronic predicaments of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem throughout its entire history. By a “prince”, of course, the Patriarch meant an army, namely, manpower. Two years later, the collapse and surrender of most fortresses after the battle of Hittin was clearly a result of a grave manpower deficiency. Fortified cities did not usually fall overnight just because a large army was annihilated in the field, unless there was no one left to defend them. A city like Jerusalem, for example, could certainly have shown effective resistance if more than two knights had been left there for its defense.
1 Quoted by Campbell, G.A., The Knights Templars (London, 1937), p. 100.Google Scholar
2 This is well illustrated by Bloch, Marc in Feudal Society (tr. Manyon, L.A.) (University of Chicago, 1964), p. 444:Google Scholar “We want lands, said in effect the Norman lords who refused the gifts of jewels, arms and horses offered by their Duke. And they added among themselves: ‘It will thus be possible for us to maintain many knights, and the Duke will no longer be able to do so.’”
3 Baldwin I, King of Jerusalem, was pursuing priestly opportunities in his youth before joining the Crusades. Another alternative was joining the household of an established and powerful lord who could employ some knights.
4 Lewis, , “The Closing of the Mediterranean Frontier, 1250–1350”, Speculum, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1958), pp. 475–483.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 This is well symbolized in the frequency of titles ending with “din” (religion) associated with the names of Saljuqid chieftains (Imad-ad-din, Nur-ad-din, Saif-ad-din, etc.).
6 Prawer, J., A History of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (The Bialik Institute, 1963), pp. 365–366Google Scholar (in Hebrew).
7 Hagenmeyer, , Ed., Lettres de Croisades, quoted by Cahen, Claude, La Syrie du Nord à L'Epoque Des Croisades (Paris, P. Gauthier, 1940), p. 333,Google Scholar who remarks: “This ‘we were unable’ does not seem charged with kindness … ”
8 Runciman, S., A History of the Crusades, II (Cambridge, 1951–1954), p. 237.Google Scholar
9 Louis J. Paetow, Ed., The Crusaders and Other Historical Essays, pp. 145–149.
10 Heyd, , Histoire Du Commerce Du Levant (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 158–161.Google Scholar “The commercial communities established in Syria were involved in a continuous struggle with the kings and ecclesiastical and lay dignitaties of the country in order to defend their goods, their rights, and their liberty.”
11 Cahen, Claude, “Notes sur L'Histoire des Croisades et de l'Orient Latin”, Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg, 1951, pp. 328–346.Google Scholar
12 King, E.J., The Knights Hospitallers in the Holy Land (Londen, Methuen, 1931).Google Scholar
13 According to Campbell, in The Knights Templars, pp. 21–22, “ … a fighting force sworn to the church had never previously been known.... They were sworn servants of the Church, but servants sworn not to minister as priests to the people or to live as monks, passing their lives in prayer and meditation, but as soldiers whose duty was to honor God in fighting against the infidel.”
14 ibid., pp. 30–32.
15 Purely secular collective bodies of knights existed in Europe, too, for example, the milites castri in Burgundy, or the Knights of the arms of Nîmes. Such groups were not usually helpful in the work of centralization. But no European state reached a degree of dependence on such bodies as the Kingdom of Jerusalem had. Also, a theocratic centralized monarchy in Jerusalem would have probably attracted more European knights than it did as it was.
16 In his profound analysis of the emergence of vassalage, Marc Bloch treats it as an adaptational innovation in the protective functions of communities at a time when neither the state nor kinship groups provided adequate protection. “In yielding thus to the necessities of the moment these generations of men had no conscious desire to create new social forms, nor were they aware of doing so. Instinctively each strove to turn to account the resources provided by the existing social structure and if, unconsciously, something new was eventually created, it was in the process of trying to adapt the old” (Feudal Society, p. 148). In our terminology “trying to adapt the old” when it is no longer adequate constitutes an institutional lag, while “creating new social forms” is the consequence of neofunctions.