Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T07:10:11.997Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Politics of Judicial Development in Indonesia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Daniel S. Lev
Daniel S. Lev
Affiliation:
Cornell University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Legal approaches to judicial development in the new states of Asia and Africa seem to be inadequate for at least two reasons. One is that we cannot assume a prior knowledge of the political and social factors bearing on the process of change in these countries. The second is that by emphasizing legislative aspects of development, the spotlight is shifted away from the institutions themselves. One way of meeting these two objections is to bypass momentarily the normal function of judicial institutions and to look at them first of all as organizations like any other with group interests to defend and ambitions to pursue. From that starting point, it is possible to get a glimpse of the politics and sociology of legal and institutional change.

Type
Revolution and the Rule of Law
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , January 1965 , pp. 173 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1965

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For a general introduction to the colonial legal system, see Alting, Carpentier, Grondslagen der Rechtsbedeeling in Nederlandsch-Indie (1926)Google Scholar; de la Porte, Recht en Rechtsbedeeling in Nederlandsch-Indie (1933); Supomo, , Sistim Hukum di Indonesia sebelum Perang Dunia II [The Legal System in Indonesia before World War II] (1957)Google Scholar; in English see Angelino, de Kat, Colonial Policy (1931), vol. IICrossRefGoogle Scholar, chapter II; Schiller, and Hoebel, , introduction to translation of ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia (1948)Google Scholar; Schiller, “Indonesian Law”, in Studies in the Law of the Far East and Southeast Asia (1956)Google Scholar. For codes and other legislation see the compilation issued from time to time by Engelbrecht, Leiden.

2 In addition to these two sets of courts, there also existed a common court of European and Indonesian misdemeanors, the landgerecht; and there were customary courts and a system of Islamic courts, which still exist but will not be discussed in this article.

3 See infra, pp. 180–181.

4 On the functions and position of the djaksa, see Jonkers, , Het vooronderzoek en de telastelegging in het Landraad-strafproces (1940), 28–31Google Scholar and 48; and Carpentier Alting, Grondslagen, 242.

5 Inlandsch Reglement, which also laid down the responsibilities of the regional civil service (pamong pradja) and the police. Hirsch, , Het Inlandsch Reglement (1915)Google Scholar. Another law, the Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten, provided procedural rules for the outer islands, but was similar to the Inlandsch Reglement; the two will not be distinguished hereafter.

6 This revision is known as the Herziene Indonesisch Reglement (H.I.R.) [Revised Indonesian Regulation], in Engelbrecht, 1954, 1291. For commentaries on the H.I.R. see Tresna, , Komentar atas Reglement Hukum Atjara didalam Pemeriksaan dimuka Pengadilan Negeri atau H.I.R. (1959)Google Scholar; Amin, , Hukum Atjara Pengadilan Negeri [Procedural law of the Pengadilan Negeri — trial court] (1957)Google Scholar. The revision was accompanied by amendments of the Reglement op de Rechterlijke Organisatie en het Beleid der Justitie [Law on Judicial Organization and Policy], Art. 93a Law on Judicial Organization, Engelbrecht, 120. In regencies where officieren van justitie were not yet appointed, the unrevised Inlandsch Reglement was to remain in force.

7 On the revision of criminal procedure for Indonesians, see Herziening van het Strafprocesrecht (1940), vols. I and II, especially the remarks on unification of the law, vol. II, 108–115.

8 On the judicial system under the Japanese, see Kartodirdjo, Oerip, “De Rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japanse Bezetting, 1942–1945”, Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht (1947), 8Google Scholar; Siong, Han Bing, An Outline of the Recent History of Indonesian Criminal Law (1961), 2–16Google Scholar. The latter study presents an interesting and valuable account of some problems of Indonesian criminal law during and after the revolution. Also Tresna, , Peradilan di Indonesia dari abad ke abad [The Judiciary in Indonesia from Century to Century] (1957), 78–81.Google Scholar

9 See Republic of Indonesia Law no. 1/1946, which revised the criminal code, and the clarification of the law, in Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan Undang2, Peraturan2, Penetapan2 Pemerintah Republik Indonesia [Laws, Regulations, and Decrees of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia] (1951), vol. 1946, 1.

10 The Constitution of 1945 (art. II, transitional provisions), the federal Constitution of 1949 (art. 192), and the provisional Constitution of 1950 (art. 142) all provided that during the “period of transition” laws in force at the time of promulgation of the constitution would remain in force until revoked or amended.

11 The Dutch also established new unified courts in those areas of the archipelago which they controlled during the revolution. Schiller, , The Formation of Federal Indonesia (1955)Google Scholar, passim. The basic reason for this seems to have been that the Dutch administration also ran short of judges. There were several Republican laws on judicial organization during the revolution, all of them incorporating a single three instance court hierarchy: the Pengadilan Negeri (trial court), Pengadilan Tinggi (appeals), and Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court). Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan, vol. 1947, 14, and 1948, 62. After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, two laws were promulgated which laid down the basic structure, competence, and procedure of the unified courts, Emergency Law no. 1/1951, Lembaran Negara (Statutes) 9/51; and established the form, jurisdiction, and procedural rules of the Supreme Court, Law no. 1/1950, LN 30/50. See also Scheers, Hartog and Sidabutar, Susunan Pengadilan dalam Negara Republik Indonesia [Court Structure in the RI]; Tresna, Peradilan, 91–97.

12 Although the European Burgelijk Rechtsvordering [civil procedure] and Strafvordering [criminal procedure] were not adopted by the independent state, Indonesian judges have nevertheless referred to them for useful rules and procedures not available in the H.I.R. Their ability to do so was facilitated by the adoption of the H.I.R. only as a “guide” (pedoman) to procedure, rather than as a binding and permanent code. Art. 6, Emergency Law no. 1/1951. It could not serve all procedural requirements because it did not, for example, provide rules for appeals. These had to be laid down in Emergency Law no. 1/1951. Cf. Tresna, Peradilan, 89.

13 The name adopted for prosecutors was djaksa, rather than an Indonesianized form of offider van justitie, e.g., opsir djustisi. Presumably the reason for this was national pride. The word djaksa, meaning a judicial official of the king's administration, pre-dates the arrival of the Dutch.

14 As the first Chief Prosecutor after the transfer of sovereignty, the government appointed Soeprapto, a highly respected official who had been a landraad judge before the war. He did not join the Prosecutors' Association, but the organization was led by members of his staff.

15 For comparison, see Staatsblad (Indies statutes), no. 43/1925 and no. 106/1938. The Republican regulation was no. 21/1948, Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan, vol. 1948, 271, clarification at 357.

16 The jurisdictions of trial courts are classified according to size of population, there being four classes at first, now three.

17 In its early years the Judges' Association (JA) was concerned almost wholly with improving the position of judges and dealing with the prosecutor dispute. Later some of its branches began to hold occasional meetings to discuss common problems of law and court administration.

18 In 1959, three years after the judges had stopped work in an attempt to prevent a. new salary schedule from going into effect, the late Supreme Court judge Malikoel Adil wrote that although there was no prohibition of strikes by judges, yet “for judges to strike is to violate their own ethical code, or in other words to violate the dignity of their office”, “Hukum dan Hakim in Civilibus” [Law and the Judge in Civil Sessions] in Hukum [Journal of Law], 1959/1–2, 6.

19 As in the colony, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for the administration of court and prosecution personnel.

20 Various statistics have appeared on the number of judges available in Indonesia's courts. In 1956 Wirjono Prodjodikoro reported that there were 280 judges in the country. Antara news bureau, Jan. 27, 1956. This was for a population of approximately 90 million at that time. The number increased thereafter — to 500 in 1959 — partly with the addition of “acting judges” who were not fully trained.

21 Minutes of Committee Hearings, Feb. 18. 1954, and Dec. 11, 1954.

22 Ibid., Feb. 2, 1956, meeting of Committee H with leaders of the Prosecutors' Association (PA). However, the committee chairman also tried to convince the prosecutors to agree to a higher salary for judges for the time being. A factor working against the judges was that some of them had not remained with the Republic during the revolution, but had worked in Dutch territory. How much of an influence this had in Parliament and elsewhere is hard to evaluate.

23 Ibid. The PA also argued that judges had such advantages as extra salary for working in more than one court. Moreover the judges had appeals courts, while the prosecutors had no intermediate prosecution office. Indeed, there was no function for the prosecution at this level, since appeals courts did not hear trials anew. Notwithstanding this, the prosecutors later insisted on an intermediate level prosecution office and finally got it in 1961. Law no. 16/1961, LN 255/61.

24 Arts. 83i and 250(4), H.I.R., in Tresna, Komentar, 227–231; Tirtaamidjaja, Kedudukan Hakim dan Djaksa [The Positions of Judge and Prosecutor] (1954), 43–44. This procedure was held over in the H.I.R. from the earlier Inlandsch Reglement because the colonial revision committee felt that most Indonesian prosecutors would not be well acquainted with “juridical formulations”. Herziening van het Strafprocesrecht, vol. I, 103Google Scholar; see also 105–106. Jonkers discussed the rule and noted that in practice it worked well, however much it might arouse the doubts of “a Western jurist”, Het Vooronderzoek, 48. It was only the chairman of the landraad who drew up the indictment, so that the collegial court probably reduced whatever ill-effects might follow from the rule. But after 1950 single judge courts could not offer this safeguard. The judge had to play the roles of magistrate, prosecutor, and judge all in one.

25 There is some disagreement over whether Indonesian procedure is accusatorial or inquisitorial, but primarily because various scholars have looked at different stages of criminal examination. Lemaire, , Het Recht in Indonesia (1952), 147–148Google Scholar; Tirtaamidjaja, Kedudukan, 39; and Utrecht, , Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia [Introduction to Indonesian Law], 5th ed. (1959), 558Google Scholar; all describe trial procedure as accusatorial. But if active participation of the judge in the trial examination distinguishes an inquisitorial process — see International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a Free Society (1959), 254–256 — then Indonesian trial procedure is decidedly inquisitorial. For a strong argument favoring adoption of the accusatorial process in Indonesian courts, see Wirjanto, “Apakah Hukum Atjara H.I.R. dapat bertahan kalau diudji dengan batu udjian kebutuhan2 Hukum daripada Negara Hukum” [Can the criminal procedure of the H.I.R. be defended against the test of the legal requirements of the rule of law] in Madjalah Hukum dan Masjarakat [Law and Society], Aug.-Nov. 1957, 57.

26 Arts. 34 and 41 of Law no. 1/1950 provided that the Chief Prosecutor would write his own indictment. This procedural requirement at the Supreme Court led Mr. Tirtaamidjaja, himself a Supreme Court judge before his untimely death, to remark that possibly the same procedure would soon be adopted in first instance courts, “because it is more in keeping with the general position of the public prosecution”, Kedudukan.

27 An illustration of this point involves the seating arrangement of the courts. The prosecutor should be on the far right of the bench, separated from the chairman of the court by member judges. In the single judge court, the prosecutor has moved closer and closer to the judge until, in some cases, he sits on the immediate right of the judge, with the clerk on the other side. The prosecutor is thus in a position to confer with the judge during session — and he often does — placing the defense counsel, if there is one, and his client at a disadvantage. Moreover since both judge and prosecutor wear black robes, the accused is sometimes at a loss to tell who is judging him. Some judges feel that the prosecutor should move away from the center of the bench, but often feel that to tell the prosecutor so would be impolite. When I once asked a judge about this, he replied that he didn't want to hurt the prosecutor's feelings by asking him to sit at the end of the bench. The judge regarded the prosecutor as a colleague and therefore deserving of more than common courtesy.

28 Letter of JA to PA, Sept. 12, 1954. This was the first of two exchanges of letters in which the judges and prosecutors set forth their arguments. Copies were given to the Minister of Justice for evaluation in order that he might eventually arbitrate the conflict.

29 Letter of PA to JA, Sept. 22, 1954.

30 Ibid. The judges contended that the subordination of prosecutors to them was indicated by the fact that judges were responsible for permitting house-searches (H.I.R., art. 77–78), extending the time of detention of suspects (83 c/4), and determining when the preliminary examination must be completed (83 d/1). Both judges and prosecutors gave somewhat idealized pictures of criminal procedures in the heat of their debate, for in practice the H.I.R. articles referred to did not always offer the guarantees they should have. For example, judges were in the habit of extending detention almost automatically on request by prosecution, partly because they did not have the time to examine the prosecutor's progress in every case.

31 Antara, Feb. 2, 1955, statement by Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice, in which he reported that Minister of Justice Djody Gondokusumo had submitted new draft laws on procedure to the Cabinet. Antara, Aug. 20, 1955, statement by Minister Djody concerning the draft laws on procedure which the Cabinet had sent to Parliament. They were the result, he said, of a compromise between the JA and PA.

32 Antara, Aug. 20, 1955.

33 Art. 12, Law no. 15/1961, LN 254/61.

34 Though the following figures represent a change from circumstances immediately after the revolution, they do give some idea of the extent of legal training of judges and prosecutors. In 1959, of 500 judges, 158 were graduates of a law faculty or of the prewar legal college (Rechtsschool, which trained Indonesians for judicial positions before the law faculty opened in 1924); 111 had some law faculty education, most of them through the third out of four years; 86 were from the post-war legal high schools, and 145 had only junior high school or grade school educations. Most of the latter had been customary court judges. Of 870 prosecutors, 69 had law faculty or legal college degrees, 162 were at some stage in the law faculty, mostly second year, and 181 came from legal high schools. 249 had the equivalent of high school educations, mostly from the pre-war regional civil service school (Mosvia), and 209 had junior high school or grade school educations. Statistics from the Ministry of Justice, Djakarta.

35 Both prosecutors and judges wanted to attract better trained personnel. Equality of rank and salary with judges, the prosecutors said, would make it possible for them to get capable officials. On the other hand, Judge Soerjadi argued that lowering the prestige of judges would make it impossible for the courts to attract well trained men. His prophecy turned out to be correct. Even during the early years after 1950, law graduates were beginning to turn towards the prosecution, which frequently had more to offer in the way of material return — for example, a portion of confiscated goods. See Star Weekly (Djakarta), Dec. 10, 1955. But the more prestigeful courts were able to hold their own. Within a few years, however, as the prosecution's power, prestige, and profits rose, law students flocked to the prosecution, leaving the courts to face a serious shortage of good personnel.

36 In the clarification of their proposals for the Constituent Assembly some time later, a JA committee stated that “As a guide in determining the position of our judiciary in the Constitution, we must use the principles 1) that our state is a democratic state, and 2) that our state is based on the rule of law … In a [democratic] state, the judiciary, as the guardian of the law and of … democracy, must necessarily be given considerable power; and [the judiciary] cannot be subordinated to any authority other than the Constitution and the law. This has long been taught in the famous doctrine of Trias Politika, which gives to the judiciary a position equal to that of the legislature and executive.”

37 Report of JA meeting, Apr. 19, 1953.

38 As early as December, 1953, the JA asked Wirjono Prodjodikoro, who was going abroad to an international meeting of judges, t o make informal inquiries about the position of judiciaries in other countries. These questions were of especial concern to the judges: “1) Does what is meant by the judicial power include the public prosecution; 2) What are the functions and powers of prosecutors in criminal cases; 3) Are there separate courts for criminal and civil cases; 4) Is the compensation of judges provided for in a separate regulation; 5) How does the above compensation compare with that of other officials, especially prosecutors; 6) At formal gatherings, do judges get a special place as a mark of distinction.” Letter of Dec. 1, 1953 t o Wirjono.

39 See statement of Mr. Soedardjat, an official in t he Ministry of Justice, who spoke in favor of equalization before the Parliamentary committee, Dec. 11, 1954. Also Committee H hearings of Feb. 2, 1956, statement of Seno-Adji. The prosecutors mentioned that in Holland judges and prosecutors can be shifted back and forth between their respective offices, because both are equally well trained and equally paid. Later the Indonesian government decided t o adopt this practice, and Soerjadi was transferred to the Chief Prosecutor's Office, partly in the hope of smoothing down ruffled feathers. Another judge who was transferred at the same time, Gunawan, later became Chief Prosecutor. Soerjadi became a judge again in 1961, when he was appointed to the Djakarta appeals court.

40 Chief Prosecutor Soeprapto and Seno-Adji opposed Djody's attempts to “politicize” the prosecution, and they did not themselves become members of any party. Djody also tried to recruit judges, but he was much less successful among them. One of his recruits, however, was Gunawan (see supra, note 39) who became Minister of Agrarian Affairs for a time. It was not unusual for judges to join political parties; there were a few in nearly all the larger parties.

41 JA Congress resolution, Nov. 29, 1954. Soerjadi told the judges that “The several institutions of government [in Indonesia] are now in the process of growing. The respect and position accorded to the judicial corps as an instrument of the state, in the eyes of our society, the state itself, and the world, depend primarily on the force of our struggle.… We must hold ourselves responsible to future generations.”

42 Seno-Adji told the press that the PA had a plan “which might be carried out if its position was clearly damaged”, Antara, Feb. 24, 1956.

43 See editorials in Pedoman Rakjat (Makassar), Jan. 1, 1956; Nasional (Jogjakarta), Feb. 25, 1956; Duta Masjarakat (Djakarta), Feb. 21, 1956; Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), Feb. 21, 1956; Feb. 26,1956; Keng Po (Djakarta), Jan. 1, 1956. Beginning in January 1956 the daily press began to take interest in the conflict. Before that it received very little attention, aside from an occasional item on Parliamentary hearings or a particularly tough statement by one of the antagonists.

44 See editorial, Suluh Indonesia, Feb. 21, 1956. For a foreign comment, Leyser, , “Some Thoughts on Courts and Law Reform in Indonesia”, Madjalah Hukum dan Masjarakat, 1957/1951, 16.Google Scholar

45 See editorials in Duta Masjarakat, Feb. 21, 1956; Java Post (Surabaja), Mar. 2, 1956; Sin Po (Djakarta), Mar. 2, 1956.

46 Proklamasi (Djakarta daily), Mar. 8, 1956; National, Feb. 25, 1956.

47 PIA news service, Mar. 8, 1956; Bintang Timur, Mar. 6, 1956. A few judges in the outer islands refused to return to work until the middle of the month. The JA declared that it was not giving up its struggle, but would determine a new policy soon.

48 On a trip to the United States with the President, the Supreme Court chairman received a much lower protocol position than the U. S. Chief Justice. This was reported with some bitterness to the JA.

49 These included fourteen draft articles entitled “Powers of the Judiciary” (Kekuasaan Angkatan Pengadilan) submitted to Soerjadi in July 1956. The drafting committee consisted of six trial court and appeals judges headed by a Supreme Court judge. Wirjono Prodjodikoro sent his own recommendations to the Constituent Assembly on the latter's request. His proposals were similar in most respects to those of the JA. See “Saran-Saran untuk Konstituante tentang Tempat Pengadilan dalam Ketatanegaraan” [Proposals to the Constituent Assembly concerning the Place of Courts in the Constitutional System], dated March 2, 1956, in Hukum, 1956/5–6, 1.

50 This would have meant taking the courts out of the Ministry of Justice and reducing executive control over them. Wirjono pictured the Cabinet and the Supreme Court standing on the same level with one another, both subject to the will of Parliament; the Cabinet would appoint its own officials, and the Supreme Court would appoint and administer the nation's judges, “Saran-Saran”, 2–3.

51 Specific references to American practice were made by the JA committee and by Wirjono, both being particularly attracted by the judicial review powers of the U.S. federal judiciary. See arts. 9–12 of the JA proposals and their clarification, which states in part that “If our constitution later provides that laws which are not in conflict with the constitution cannot be interfered with, then there will be an opportunity for our Supreme Court to follow the same path as the American Supreme Court; that is, to become the body in accordance with unwritten law which will decide whether or not a law is in conflict with the constitution.” See also Wirjono, “Saran-Saran”, 3. For an article strongly in favor of giving the Supreme Court judicial review powers as a means of weeding out old colonial laws and, as well, limiting the powers of Parliament, see Star Weekly, Dec. 3, 1955. The article refers to American practice and the views of Chief Justice Marshall.

52 Constituent Assembly, Constitutional Preparatory Committee, Sub-committee III, passim. In the sub-committee discussions, the judges insisted on using the term “kekuasaan mengadili” — literally, the power which judges — to describe the judiciary, rather than “kekuasaan Judikatip”, judicial power, to avoid the possibility of including prosecutors within the judiciary. The prosecutors also made efforts to have the Constituent Assembly provide for the public prosecution in the new Constitution, in order to guarantee it an independent position. PIA news service, Oct. 29, 1956.

53 Cf. Tresna, Peradilan, 141.

54 In 1960, President Soekarno announced that the concept of the separation of powers was abolished in Indonesia, and he proceeded to appoint Wirjono to the Cabinet. Some judges agreed that the appointment need not violate the separation of powers principle, but many did believe that Soekarno's statement was symbolic of profound changes in government structure and policies that would not work to strengthen the courts and law.

55 The lawyers' association also included judges and prosecutors, so that for this reason as well it was difficult for it to favor one side or the other.

56 On the history of the Indonesian police, see Oudang, , Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia [The Development of the Police in Indonesia] (1952)Google Scholar; Dekker, and Tacoma, , De Politie in Nederlandsch-Indie (1933)Google Scholar.

57 Arts. 180 and 181, Reglement op de Rechterlijke Organizatie. Dekker and Tacoma, De Politie, 176. “Police” here is used in the sense of general police; no attempt is made to distinguish between the pamong-pradja police, city police, field police, etc., and their lines of responsibility. See Oudang, Perkembangan, 12–19.

58 Dekker and Tacoma, De Politie, 176–177.

59 See Antara, April 23, 1953, speech by Memet Tanumidjaja.

60 Presidential Decision 22/1950. Cited in Oudang, Perkembangan, 136.

61 The procedural confusion which arose as a result was considerable, contributing to the tense relations between police, prosecution, and pamong pradja. Prof. Muljatno has explained the situation clearly from one point of view. The disappearance of the European assistant resident during the revolution, wrote Muljatno, had the effect of bringing local prosecuting and police officials into control of their own offices, separating them from the pamong pradja. The result was “that there is no single leadership of the investigative function”. To whom, he asked, should control over investigation be given, the regent (pamong pradja), the local chief of police, or the head of the local prosecuting office? “Pimpinan pemeriksaan permulaan dalam perkara pidana jang mendjadi kekuasaan pengadilan Negeri dan penahanan sementara” [Leadership of the preliminary examination in criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Pengadilan Negeri and temporary detention], Hukum, 1952/2, 3, at 5.

62 Mimbar Indonesia, July 12, 1952. See also Keng Po, Oct. 24, 1956, Nov. 4, 1956, Nov. 11, 1956, for two articles and a letter dealing with relations between the pamong pradja, police, prosecutors, and judges.

63 Merdeka (Djakarta daily), Jan. 9, 1954, open letter to Minister of Justice attacking malfunctioning of the police and implying that the police ought to be under the prosecution and, it followed, ultimately under the Ministry of Justice. In reply to this letter, a member of the P3RI wrote another open letter to the Minister, Mimbar Indonesia, Jan. 15, 1954, in which he pointed out, among other things, that the writer of the first letter was a member of the National People's Party, headed by Minister Djody.

64 During the Japanese occupation, the police and prosecution were combined in one Ministry of Security. The Japanese also abolished control of the police by the pamong pradja at the same time. After 1950 some observers thought it a good idea to have a similar Ministry of Security. Mimbar Indonesia, July 12, 1952, editorial, which also suggested that because prosecutors have more to do with police than judges, police and prosecution ought to be in the same ministry. The P3RI disliked this proposal, but felt that the Japanese innovation of removing pamong pradja control over the police was a good one.

65 Mimbar Indonesia, Jan. 15, 1954, open letter cited supra, note 63.

66 The four-powers (tjatur-pradja) concept was borrowed from the Dutch legal scholar, van Vollenhoven, Staatsrecht Overzee (1934); and see comment by Utrecht, Pengantar, 141, note 26. The theory received support in Indonesia especially from Prof. Djokosoetono, dean of the faculty of law, University of Indonesia.

67 Statement by PA, Nov. 6, 1953, in Berita Indonesia (Djakarta daily), Nov. 9, 1953.

68 To which the police replied that there was no need to parrot foreign practice. Mimbar Indonesia, Jan. 15, 1954. Despite this denial, the police did resort to foreign example, as did the prosecutors. One source frequently used by the police was Wilson, Police Administration (1950), a book that is still popular in police circles in Indonesia. American influence on Indonesian police organization and methods had an early beginning in the revolution, when Chief of Police Soekanto made a trip to this country to observe police techniques. Much later the International Cooperation Administration undertook a project to train selected Indonesian police officers.

69 See Oudang, Perkembangan, 136 and 208, for rather roundabout statements to this effect, and open letter in Mimbar Indonesia, Jan. 15, 1954.

70 Alam, Radja, Aparatur-Aparatur Keamanan Dalam Negeri [Domestic Security Organization] (1957?), 20.Google Scholar

71 Statement by Memet Tanumidjaja, Antara, Oct. 2, 1953, and Radja Alam, Aparatur, 18.

72 Antara, Oct. 2, 1953.

73 PA statement, Berita Indonesia, Nov. 9, 1953. The prosecutors also supported the pamong pradja's claim to control of preventive police functions. The police, on the other hand, did all they could to allay pamong pradja anxieties. Keng Po, Nov. 11, 1956.

74 Muljatno was a professor of criminal law at Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta. In 1950 or 1951 he had worked in the Chief Prosecutor's office. Between him and Chief Prosecutor Soeprapto there was some personal enmity that had an important influence on the developments discussed here.

75 Muljatno also pointed out that Parliament held him responsible for the public prosecution — he had to answer interpellations on the activities of the prosecution — and therefore he ought to have control of it. For Muljatno's comments on the anti-corruption campaign and institutional changes which he believed necessary, see Nasional, Apr. 14, 1956; Pedoman, Aug. 30, 1956; Keng Po, Sept. 11, 1956.

76 The draft law dealt with the position of the Chief Prosecutor and the leadership of the judicial police (police judiciaire). Indonesia Raja (Djakarta daily), Aug. 21, 1956; Keng Po, Sept. 11, 1956.

77 For statements by the PA on t he bill, see PIA, Oct. 29, 1956; Indonesia Raja. Oct. 28, 1956, and Nov. 16, 1956. Judges, incidentally, favored making the Chief Prosecutor responsible to the Minister of Justice or the Prime Minister. See statement by Wirjono, PIA, Oct. 12, 1956. Judges supported their opinions with sound constitutional arguments, but a few clearly took some delight in the taste of revenge.

78 Suara Masjarakat (Surabaja daily), Nov. 29, 1956; Merdeka, Dec. 4, 1956; Antara, Feb. 15, 1957.

79 Interview with Memet Tanumidjaja, Oct. 30, 1961. The size of the police force — approximately 113,000 in 1958, Antara, Mar. 3, 1958 — and its efficient organization gave it some political leverage after 1957.

80 At the time the Cabinet was organized into core ministers and junior ministers, each of the former being responsible for co-ordinating a few of the latter. The Minister of Police was made a junior minister, along with the Minister of Justice, and both were to be under the jurisdiction of core Minister for Security and Defense, General Nasution. This arrangement was later changed to eliminate junior ministerial status. Also in mid-1959, the Chief Prosecutor was made a Minister ex-officio, but the prosecution remained in the Ministry of Justice.

81 Presidental Decree 5/1959, July 27, 1959. LN 80/59.

82 The Chief Prosecutor was arrested in June and released from his position in August. Antara, Aug. 11, 1959. Thereafter he returned to his former job in the Ministry of Justice.

83 See Antara, Aug. 23, 1960. In court sessions, the prosecutors continued to wear their black robes. At other times, they wore either a khaki or white uniform.

84 Others, including police and customs officials, also received premiums in certain cases, depending on internal regulations of their ministries. Their objection was that the prosecutors had become altogether too greedy. The corrupting influence of the premium system was also felt in the courts, where in time a few judges — poorly paid and otherwise demoralized — were willing to accept a prosecutor's offer of a share from judgments in economic cases.

85 The police had much to gain from being considered part of the armed forces. Their salaries, for example, eventually were raised to conform to military scales, an advantage of some importance. From the army's point of view, classifying the police as one of the four armed forces made it possible to exercise a measure of control over the state police and to keep them out of politics. Some tension occasionally developed, however, for the police were jealous of their independence and would not permit the Ministry of Defense to interfere with their organization.

86 PIA, June 19, 20, 21, 1961.

87 Law no. 13/1961, Basic Provisions on the State Police. LN 245/61. Art. 13 gave the police authority to a) receive accusations, b) examine identities, c) take fingerprints and photographs, d) make arrests, e) search persons, f) detain temporarily, g) issue summons, h) call experts, i) search buildings and vehicles, j) seize evidence, k) take other steps according to the procedural code.

88 Law no. 15/1961, Basic Provisions on the Public Prosecution. LN 254/61. Art. 2(2).

89 Ibid., art. 11.

90 Ibid., art. 2 (1).

91 Antara, Mar. 19, 1962.