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The Reemergence of “Peripheral Nationalisms”: Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Peter Alexis Gourevitch
Peter Alexis Gourevitch
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Extract

Recent challenges to the unity of the nation-state in advanced industrial societies have surprised most of us. Scotland, Quebec, Flanders, Occitania, bCatalonia and other regions have made life more interesting politically and more confusing intellectually. While the emergence of ethnic consciousness, or concern with ethnic identity, appears nearly universal across Europe and North America (or indeed around the globe)nationalist movements—demands for autonomy or outright separation—are not equally strong: the nationalism of the Scots, the Basques, Catalans, Croats, Flemish, and Quebecois is far more powerful than that of the Alsatians, Bretons, South Italians, and the Occitents.

Type
Regionalism
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , July 1979 , pp. 303 - 322
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1979

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References

For their comments on earlier drafts, the author wishes to thank Suzanne Berger, David Bloom, Milton Esman, Michael Hechter, Patrice Higonnet, Albert Hirschman, Lisa Hirschman, James Kurth, Juan Linz, Charles Lipson, Charles Maier, Tom Naylor, Victor Perez-Diaz, Harvey Rishikof, Judith Shklar, Martin Shefter, Theda Skocpol, Sidney Tarrow, John Zysman and the participants of seminars at Airlie House, the Center for European Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, Cornell University and York University.

1 Linz, Juan, “Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State,” Eisenstadt, S. N. and Rokkan, S., eds., Building States and Nations (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), pp. 32–112;Google ScholarHechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975);Google ScholarRokkan, Stein, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building”, in Tilly, Charles, ed., The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 562–600;Google ScholarBerger, Suzanne, Peasants Against Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972);CrossRefGoogle ScholarHanham, Harry, Scottish Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969);Google ScholarWallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974);Google ScholarAnderson, Perry, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974);Google ScholarWeber, Eugen, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976);Google Scholar The European Consortium for European Research Newsletter of December 1976 (European Political Data, 21) announces the publication of two potentially informative books: Stephens, Meic, Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe (Gomer Press: Landysul, Dyfed, Wales, 1976);Google ScholarPetrella, Riccardo, Les “regions” de l'Europe: Etude exploratoire sur les cultures regionales dans la Communauté Européenne. Commission of the European Communities, provisional text X/46/1/76F.Google Scholar

2 While this paper was being revised for publication during July 1978, a group of Bretons demanding autonomy for their people set off a bomb at the place of Versailles. There have also been a number of incidents recently in Corsica, somewhat more than in Brittany. Nonetheless, in comparative terms, Breton and Corsican nationalism remains relatively weak when contrasted with the ability of the Catalan, Quebecois, Spanish Basque or Scots movements to attract votes or sustain long-term violence.

3 Roneen, Dov, “From Class Conflict to Ethnic Separatism” and “Toward a Theory of Self-Rule,” The Hebrew University and Harvard University, Center for International Affairs (mimeo, 1977).Google Scholar

4 Specification of core and periphery for Germany is immensely complicated by changing boundaries and borders. Down to 1945 the role of Prussia is clear enough; it was the Catholic South, the free cities, and old kingdoms such as Hanover which resisted the Bismarckian version of unity, but acquiesced. Today the rump of Prussia in the West still dominates. Bavaria is the most independent-minded but accepts the situation. Southern Italy and other regions had considerable distinctiveness of institutions and traditions until 1870 and considerable variance of language. The discussion does not include areas where the claims are irredentist, seeking to join up with ethnic neighbors in another country, such as Alto Adige and Frulia-Venetia.

5 Unlike Ireland, which remained largely agricultural. Michael Hechter makes a very good case for treating this as the principal reason that Ireland was the one to break away: the absence of industrial development maintained the homogeneity of the economic function of most of the Irish, around which a mass movement could be mobilized. See Hechter, Internal Colonialism.

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7 Some of the deviance from a class model of voting does derive from the hold of Anglican and English identities on the English working class. See Alford, Robert, “Class and Party,” in Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, Stein, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), 67–94;Google ScholarButler, Richard and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969; 2nd ed., 1976).Google Scholar

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11 See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism. Ireland fits less well, since Eire broke away during the apogee of British economic and imperial power. An explanation of that fact consistent with the argument here would require deeper analysis of the types of economic dominance—dependence between center and periphery and the types of people in the periphery drawn into a relationship with the core. Hechter's interpretation is very plausible: Ireland alone of the Celtic fringe broke away because Ireland alone had no industrial development; hence there was no industrial enclave within the country having strong ties to the core. More purely agricultural, Ireland was more homogeneous, hence more easily mobilizable against metropole. Hechter does examine the other interpretations of Ireland's difference, especially religion. See pp. 266–92.

12 See Merriman, R. B., Six Contemporaneous Revolutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1935).Google Scholar

13 Linz, Juan, “Politics in a multilingual society with a dominant world language” Savard, Jean-Guy and Vigneault, Richard, eds., Les Etats Multilingues (Quebec: Presses Universitaires de Laval, 1975), pp. 367–444.Google Scholar

14 Kurth, James, ‘Patrimonial Authority, Delayed Development, and Mediterranean Politics,’ paper delivered at American Political Science Association, Sept. 1973;Google ScholarKurth, , “Industrial Structure and Comparative Politics,” in International Organization, Winter, 1979.Google Scholar

15 Most bureaucratic-military capitals, even those with no special advantages in location or resources eventually attract industrial development.. Berlin is the best example, along with Madrid today; Moscow?

16 Alsace, Franche-Comté, Picardy and the lands up to the Pyrenees were brought under the crown during the reign of Louis XIV. Lorraine was added in the mid-eighteenth century, Savoy in 1860.

17 Lafont, Robert, La révolution régionaliste (Paris: Laffont, 1967).Google Scholar

18 The creation of regional government in France has had little to do with peripheral nationalism and much more to do with party politics, bureaucratic rivalries, and economic imbalances. See Gourevitch, Peter, “Reforming the Napoleonic State: the Creation of Regional Government in France and Italy,” in Graziano, Luigi, Katzenstein, Peter and Tarrow, Sidney, eds., Territorial Politics in Industrial States (New York: Praeger, 1978).Google Scholar See also Tarrow, Sidney, Between Center and Periphery (New Haven: Yale, University Press, 1977).Google Scholar

19 Gershenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

20 Smith, Denis Mack, Italy; A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960).Google Scholar

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22 Zolberg, Aristide R., “Splitting the Difference: Federalization without Federalism in Belgium,” in Esman, Milton, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) pp. 103–42.Google Scholar

23 For more detailed development of my remarks on Canada, see Gourevitch, Peter, “Canada-Quebec in Comparative Perspective,” in Feldman, Elliot and Nevitt, Neil, eds., The Future of North America: Canada, the United States, and Quebec Nationalism (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, 1979).Google ScholarNaylor, Tom, “The Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence,” Teeple, Gary, ed., Economics and the National Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972)Google Scholar and Naylor, Tom, The History of Canadian Business 1867–1914 (Toronto: Lorimer, 1976);Google ScholarEsman, Milton, “The Escalation of Communal Conflict in Canada” (Cornell University, Center for International Studies, mimeo, 01 1977).Google Scholar

24 These tensions among different sectors of the economy during periods of severe international competition were not unique to Canada. Similar things happened in the United States, Britain, France, Germany and other countries. See Peter Gourevitch, “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty.”

25 Stevenson, Garth, “Federalism and the Political Economy of the Canadian State,” in Panitch, Leo, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) and other essays in that volume.Google Scholar

26 Simeon, Richard, “The Regional Distribution of the Benefits of Confederation: A Preliminary Analysis” (Queen's University, Institute for International Affairs, draft mimeo, Dec. 1976);Google ScholarTremblay, Rodrique, Minister of Industry and Commerce, “Présentation des Comptes économiques du Québec, 1961–1975” (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 1977);Google ScholarMacdonald, Donald, “Provincial Economic Accounts,” Department of Finance, Press Release 77–63 (Ottawa: 6 06 1977);Google ScholarBélanger, Gérard, “Why do the Balances Differ on Federal Receipts and Expenditures in Quebec?” C. D. Howe Research Institute, Montreal, Oct. 1977;Google ScholarDeutsch, Antal, “The Political Economy of Quebec Libre,” Canadian Economic Problems, 407–18.Google ScholarCaves, Richard, “Economic models of Political Choice: Canadian Tariff Structure,” Canadian Journal of Economics (05, 1976) 278–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 Oglesby, Carl, The Yankee and Cowboy War (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1976);Google ScholarSale, Kirkpatrick, Power Shift (New York: Random House, 1975).Google Scholar

28 Zolberg, Aristide, “Culture, Territory, Class: Ethnicity Demystified,” International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, 16–21 Aug. 1976;Google ScholarDeutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953);Google ScholarMcRae, Kenneth, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stuart, 1974) contains an excellent summary of the literature on nation–building in countries of this type including excerpts of the important work by such people as Lorwin, Lijphardt, Daalder, Steiner, along with useful analytic essays by the editor.CrossRefGoogle Scholar