Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-ndw9j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-15T05:29:36.072Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Violence in the Dutch Patriot Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Wayne P. Te Brake
Wayne P. Te Brake
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Purchase
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In the small provincial cities of the eastern Netherlands, the annual election of magistrates and town councilors was perhaps the most important public ritualof the year under the old regime. The elaborate and often solemn ceremony symbolized ancient chartered liberties—even when results of the co-optative elections were a foregone conclusion—and thus served to reinforce the community's sense of corporate identity. In 1786, however, in the midst of astruggle for control of the city, the annual Petrikeur in Deventer got out of hand. The day started out normally enough with the traditional worship service in the Grote Kerk, but after the black-robed members of the town council had passed in procession across the square to the stadhuis, a group of dissident councilors, who called themselves Patriots and were implacably opposed to the influence of the stadhouder in municipal politics, attacked aportrait of Prince William III of Orange, the stadhouder who in 1675 first insinuated himself into the electoral process.

Type
Early Modern Revolution
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , January 1988 , pp. 143 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 This incident is reported briefly in the Book of Resolutions of the Magistracy of the City of Deventer, 14 February 1788: Gemeente Archief (cited hereafter as GA) Deventer, Rep. I, no. 4, vol. 45 (1786–1788). Cf. “Deventer in de Patriottentijd III,” Salland, 29:30 (16 April 1935); the (unnamed) author of that article mistakenly reports that this incident occurred in 1785. On the elaborate ceremonial attached to the Petrikeur (22 February: St. Petri ad Cathedrum), see “Oude, regeerings-gebruiken te Deventer,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Overijssel, 2 (1875), 226–40, and 3 (1876), 250–58. 0010–4175/88/1660–3394 $5.00 © 1988 Society for Comparative Study of Society and HistoryGoogle Scholar

2 See, for example, Charles Tilly, “The Web of Contention in Eighteenth-Century Cities,” in Class Conflict and Collective Action, Tilly, Louise A. and Tilly, Charles, eds. (Beverly Hills, 1981), 27–51.Google Scholar

3 See Book of Resolutions cited in note 1.

4 Tumin, Jonathan, “The Theory of Democratic Development: A Critical Revision,” Theory and Society, 11:2 (1982), 143–64;CrossRefGoogle Scholar see also the diverse literature on consociational political systems collected in McRae, Kenneth, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto, 1974).Google Scholar

5 Cf. Blok, Anton, “De vraag is waarom er niet méér geweld gebruikt wordt,” NRC Handelsblad, 15 11 1980, 7.Google Scholar

6 See, for example, Dekker, R. M. and Johannes, G., “Sire, het volk mort,” Vrij Nederland, 4 12 1982.Google Scholar

7 There have been two major exchanges. See Goudsblom, Johan, “De Nederlandse samenleving in een ontwikkelingsperspectief,” Symposion, 1:1–2 (1979), 8–27;Google ScholarStuurman, Siep, “Staatsvormingsprocessen in Europa en Azië na 1750. Bespreking van Symposion 1/1,2/1979,” Amsterdams sociologisch tijdschrift, 6 (1980), 690–717;Google Scholar and the reply by Goudsblom, Johan, “Kanttekeningen bij ‘De Nederlandse samenleving in een ontwikkelingsperspectief,’” Amsterdams sociologisch tijdschrifi, 7 (1980), 170–83.Google Scholar Also, Zwaan, Ton, “Politiek geweld, maatschappelijk structuur en burgerlijke civilizatie,” Sociologisch tijdschrift, 9 (1982), 433–75;Google ScholarDekker, Rudolf, “‘Politiek geweld’ en het proces van staatsvorming in de geschiedenis van de Nederlanden,” Sociologisch tijdschrift, 10 (1983), 335–53;Google Scholar reply by Ton Zwaan, “Politiek geweld in ontwikkelings-perspectief,” ibid., 353–68; and another exchange in the next issue, ibid., 593–605. At bottom, the disagreements seem to hinge as much on the appropriateness and usefulness of Norbert Elias's theory of the civilizing process as they do on the specifics of the Dutch case. Though the theoretical issues involved here are by no means insignificant, I am not in position to summarize them, much less resolve them, in this article on the Patriot Revolution. See Elias, Norbert, Über den Prozess der Zivilisation, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Bem/Miinchen, 1969).Google Scholar

8 Though the Patriots were defeated in 1787 by foreign intervention, Dutch revolutionary sympathies did not die. At the beginning of 1795, in advance of the French revolutionary armies, the Dutch undid the Orangist restoration of 1787 and established the Batavian Republic. Frenchsponsorship of the Batavian Revolution under the Directory eventually gave way to creation of aclient kingdom (ruled by Napoleon's brother) and finally direct annexation under the Napoleonic Empire. For this reason, the entire period of Dutch history from 1795 to 1813 is often known asthe French time. For an excellent review of the most recent historiography of the entire revolutionary period, see Mulier, E. O. G. Haitsma, “De geschiedschrijving over de Patriottentijd en de Bataaffse Tijd,” in Kantelend geschiedbeeld, Mijnhardt, W. W., ed. (Utrecht/Antwerpen, 1983),206–27.Google Scholar See also Schama, Simon, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813 (New York, 1977).Google Scholar

9 Geyl, P., De Patriottenbeweging (Amsterdam, 1947)Google Scholar, emphasized the Patriots' moderatenationalism in reaction to Colenbrander, H. T., De Patriottentijd, 3 vols. ('s Gravenhage, 1897–1899)Google Scholar, whose diplomatic sources and Orangist sentiments dismissed the Patriots as pawns especiallyof the French ambassador. Cf. Cobban, Alfred, Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacyof the First Earl of Malmsbury at The Hague (London, 1954).Google Scholar

10 As is usually the case, the best research relates to the province Holland during the period of the republic; see especially Dekker, Rudolf, Holland in beroering, Oproeren in de 17de en 18de eeuw (Baarn, 1982)Google Scholar; idem, “Oproeren in de provincie holland 1600–1750, Frequence en karakter, relatie met de conjunctuur en repressie,” Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, no. 9 (1977), 229–329;Google Scholaridem, “De rol van vrouwen in oproeren in de Republiek in de 17de en 18de eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, no. 12 (1978), 305–16. See also Rudolf Dekker, “Women in Revolt,” Theory and Society, forthcoming.Google Scholar

11 I am especially endebted to the theoretical work of Charles Tilly, who, by precept and example, has helped immeasurably to mold my own historical interests; see especially his “Revolutions and Collective Violence,” in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, Greenstein, F. and Polsby, N., eds. (Reading, Mass., 1975);Google Scholar and idem, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass., 1978).Google ScholarPubMed For an especially clear and concise exposition of the political model and its implications for historical research, see Aya, R., “Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations: A Research Agenda,” Symposion, 1:1–2(1979)Google Scholar, 124–51. For an astute critical evaluation of Tilly's and various other theories, see Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979), 3–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 See the articles by Zwaan and Dekker cited in note 7.

13 The standard scholarly works on the institutions of the Dutch Republic are Fruin, R. and Colenbrander, H. T., Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek ('s Gravenhage, 1922)Google Scholar and Andreae, S. J. Fockema, De Nederlandse stoat onder de Republiek (Amsterdam, 1960).Google Scholar

14 The Dutch Republic could be considered simply a continuation of pre-Burgundian political trends except for two things: the (unintended) elimination of the monarch, or landsheer, and the creation of a permanent voluntary union, both of which were decidedly new and important developments.

15 For an especially relevant example of the problems of institutional and political adaptation during the early years of the Dutch Revolt, see Reitsma, R., Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in the Early Dutch Republic: The States of Overyssel, 1566–1600 (Amsterdam, 1982).Google Scholar

16 de Wit, C. H. E., De Nederlandse Revolutie van de achttiende eeuw, 1708–1787 (Oirsbeek, 1974), places special emphasis on the role of the patronage system after 1747 in his analysis of he political background of the Patriot Revolution.Google Scholar

17 Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 64–135, aptly describes the Patriot Revolution as the piecemeal revolution.

18 Cf. Kossmann, E. H., “The Crisis of the Dutch State, 1780–1813: Nationalism, Federalism, Unitarism,” in Britain and the Netherlands, Bromley, J. S. and Kossmann, E. H., eds. (The Hague, 1971), IV, 156–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 J. D. van der Capellen, Aan het Volk van Nederland, modern Dutch edition, introduction by Wertheim, W. F. and Wertheim-Gijse, A. H.Weenink (Weesp, 1981); see pp. 158–60 for works by and about van der Capellen. Aan het volk, much like Tom Paine's Common Sense and Abbé Sieyès's Qu'est-ce que le tiers état? helped to focus the political debate at a particularly important point in the development of the conflict.Google Scholar

20 The following account of the Patriot Revolution in Overijssel is based on W. P. Te Brake, “Revolutionary Conflict in the Dutch Republic: The Patriot Crisis in Overijssel, 1780–1787” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977); only the most critical archival and printed sources will be cited here.

21 On the nature and importance of van der Capellen's leadership in Overijssel, see Brake, W. P. Te, “Van der Capellen en de Patriottisch Revolutie in Overijssel,” in De wekker van de Nederlandse natie, Dijk, E. A. van, et ai, eds. (Zwolle, 1984).Google Scholar

22 The records of the provincial vrijcorps meetings are in GA Zwolle, Oud Archief, no. A-75. In July 1787, a total of 2,874 men under arms was reported by 19 of 25 militias. If these figures are typical, then 3,500 may be a conservative estimate. Although some local vrijcorps did not send representatives to the provincial meetings, the provincial leaders were apparently awaiting reports from militias in as many as seven more districts or villages in the countryside.

23 At a number of critical points, and especially in 1618, 1650, 1672, 1702, and 1747, popular protests and demonstrations (sometimes violent) were instrumental in bringing about political realignments—generally shifts in the political coloration of the patrician oligarchy. In none of these cases, however, was popular mobilization sustained as it was in the 1780s. On the general character and significance of popular mobilization, see Brake, W. P. Te, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution,” Theory and Society, 14:2 (1985), 199–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 The problem with most discussions of the Patriots' ideology and goals is the tendency to focus on a few famous documents with supposed national significance. It was, however, within the voluminous provincial and local literature that this important transition was evident. For the transition to more radical demands in Overijssel, see Te Brake, "Revolutionary Conflict," 52–62. Cf. Leeb, I. Leonard, The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution (The Hague, 1973);CrossRefGoogle Scholar C. H. E. de Wit, Nederlandse Revolutie; and idem, “Oud en modern. De Republiek 1780–1795,” Algemene Geschiedenis derNederlanden (Bussum, 1980), IX, 113–25.Google Scholar De Wit has been perhaps the most rigid in the formulation of these essentially static “national” ideological categories. For an excellent explication of one of the most famous and controversial documents, see Himbergen, E. J. van, “Grondwettig Herstelling,” Kleio, 19:3 (1978), 265–75.Google Scholar

25 In most cities, magistrates had at their disposal only a few subordinates in the judicial system plus the local civic guards (schutterijen), which were not generally well trained or reliable, and whatever troops were garrisoned locally. The decision to invoke the army, however, demanded more unanimity and determination than appears to have existed almost anywhere in the 1780s. Indeed, in most places, deep divisions within the patrician oligarchy greatly facilitated the Patriots' rise to power.

26 In order to get a general overview of the conflict, as well as reports of specific incidents, I consulted the following monthly or weekly publications: Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken (Leiden, 1770–1787)Google Scholar, De Politieke Kruijer (Amsterdam, 1782–1787)Google Scholar, De Post van den Neder-Rijn (Utrecht, 1781–1787)Google Scholar, Blaadje zonder titel voor burger en boer in Overijssel (Deventer, 1785–1786).Google Scholar Archival sources are cited separately below. See also the polemical works cited in “Staatkundige vlugschriften, 1782–1799,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Overijssel, 7 (1883), 34–78, 121–35.Google Scholar

27 For a closer analysis of the development in Bathmen in particular, see Brake, W. P. Te, “Revolution and the Rural Community in the Eastern Netherlands,” Class Conflict and Collective Action, Tilly, and Tilly, , eds. (Beverly Hills, 1981), 53–71. On Woolde, see Rijksarchief in Overijssel (cited hereafter as RAO), Staten Archief (cited hereafter as SA), 911, and Rechterlijk Archief (cited hereafter as RA), Twente, 529.Google Scholar

28 RAO, SA, 4818, pt. I.

29 RAO, SA, 4818, pts. II, III. Cf. Steen, G. and Veldsink, W., Geschiedenis van Ommen (Ommen, 1948), 36–37.Google Scholar

30 For Steenwijk, see GA Steenwijk, 212, 213, 214, and RAO, SA, 800; for Staphorst, , Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken (1787), 362, 585, 602; for Vriesenveen, see GA Zwolle, Oud Archief, A-75.Google Scholar

31 Te Brake, “Revolutionary Conflict,” 95–190; see notes and bibliography for full archival citations.

32 Cf. Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken (1787), 2166–71.Google Scholar

33 Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken (1787); GA Hasselt, 189; GA Zwolle, Oud Archief, A-75.Google Scholar

3 4 Cf. Schama, , Patriots and Liberators, 110–32.Google Scholar

35 Te Brake, “Revolutionary Conflict,” 78–81.

36 In both cases, the violence followed a period in which the challengers (land invaders or counterrevolutionaries) tried to defend their interests using traditional legal means.

37 On the whole, it could be said that violence was quite effective in the short run at least. The land invaders forestalled more enclosures of commons land by their enemies; plans for a universal conscription were scrapped after the protests in Den Ham; the guildsmen of Deventer were able to prevent the adoption and implementation of the Patriots' proposed constitution for municipal government.

38 Vries, Jan de, The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500–1700 (New Haven, 1974).Google Scholar

39 Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken (1785).

40 Hildebrand, K., “De Patriottentijd in Stad en Lande 1780–1787,” Groningse volksalmanak (1950), 1–71Google Scholar; Blecourt, A. S. de, “Burgerwapening in de Patriottentijd,” Groningsche volksalmanak voor hetjaar 1897 (1896), 145–90;Google ScholarVijlbrief, I., Van anti-aristocratie tot democratic een bijdrage tot de politieke geschiedenis der stad Utrecht (Amsterdam, 1950)Google Scholar; Hulsen, A. van, Utrecht in de Patriottentijd (Zaltbommel, 1966)Google Scholar; “Eenige aantekeningen wegens het gebeurde te Utrecht in 1786 en 1787,” Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap (1870), 341–87, 391–444, 447–85.Google Scholar

41 Boyd, J., ed., Works of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, 1954), X, 348.Google Scholar

42 Geyl, P., Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse stam (Amsterdam/Antwerpen, 1962), V, 1306–52.Google Scholar

43 Manen, I. van and Vermeulen, K., “Het lagere volk van Amsterdam in de strijd tussen Patriotten en Oranjegezinden 1780–1800,” Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, pt. I, 6 (1980)Google Scholar, 331–56, and pt. II, 7 (1981), 3–42; Manen, I. van, “De ‘crowd’ in de geschiedenis van Amsterdam, dejaren 1696, 1748, 1787,” Mededelingblad, orgaan van deNVSG, 46 (1974), 42–73.Google Scholar

44 Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 108ff.

45 This is the thrust of de Wit's Nederlandse Revolutie, which has surprisingly little to say about the Patriots' revolution and is really an extended essay on the Orangists' counterrevolution as seen especially through the efforts of aristocratic “conspirators” like G. K. van Hogendorp.

46 Cf. Weenink, A. H. Wertheim-Gijse, Democratische bewegingen in Gelderland 1672–1795 (Amsterdam, 1973)Google Scholar; Rooden, P. T. van, “De plunderingen op Schouwen en te Zierikzee, 1786–1788,” Archiefvan net Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen (1983), 173–99.Google Scholar

47 Tilly, C., “Some Problems in the History of the Vendee,” American Historical Review, 67:1 (1961), 19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48 Dekker, , Holland in beroering, 95–120.Google Scholar

49 A number of authors point to the remarkable infrequency of food riots in the Dutch Republic; see, for example, Faber, J. A., “Dure tijden en hongersnoden in preindustrieel Nederland” (inaugural lecture, Amsterdam, 1976), 16–17.Google Scholar During most crises, local authorities appear to have acted quickly to assure adequate supplies of food at reasonable prices, but when they failed to act, crowds typically invoked the apparently universal technique of the taxation populaire. Cf. Dekker, , Holland in beroering, 23–28.Google Scholar

50 This was, for example, the case in the land provinces generally in both 1703 and 1747–1748. Cf. Weenink, Wertheim-Gijse, Democratische bewegingenGoogle Scholar; idem, Twee woelige jaren in Zutphen, de plooierijen van 1703–1705 (Zutphen, 1977); and Wertheim, W. F. and Weenink, A. H. Wertheim-Gijse, Burgers in verzet tegen regenten-heerschappij, Onrust in Sticht en Oversticht, 1703–1706 (Amsterdam, 1976).Google Scholar

51 The process of creating a unitary state was by no means fast and easy; on the various fits and starts, see Schama, , Patriots and Liberators, 354–409.Google Scholar

52 Kossmann, E. H., The Low Countries, 1780–1940 (Oxford, 1978), 103ff.Google Scholar

53 Palmer, R. R., The Challenge, Vol. I of The Age of the Democratic Revolution (Princeton, 1959), 323.Google Scholar