Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 April 2011
This article examines the evolution of Greece's foreign policy from a position of relative detachment to an increasing involvement in international affairs that eventually led to the country's realignment with Britain during the Abyssinian crisis. It is argued that Greece's foreign policy shift was a result of an interplay between a perceived threat of Italian revisionism, Britain's reappearance in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Abyssinian crisis and domestic political dynamics that led to the defeat of Eleftherios Venizelos who favoured a foreign policy detached from combinations of great powers.
Cette étude se porte sur l'évolution de la politique étrangère de la Grèce qui, partant d'une position relativement détachée et procédant à travers un engagement progressif, a abouti à un réalignement avec la Grande Bretagne à l'occasion de la crise abyssinienne. Nous chercherons à établir que cette réorientation de la politique étrangère hellénique fut le résultat de l'interaction entre la perception menaçante du révisionisme italien, le retour de la Grande Bretagne sur la scène de l'orient méditerranéen lors de la crise abyssinienne, et une dynamique politique interne qui a provoqué la défaite de Venizelos, partisan d'une politique étrangère qui refusait tout engagement avec les Grandes Puissances.
Dieser Artikel untersucht die Entwicklung der griechischen Aussenpolitik weg von einer Position relativer Distanz gegenüber dem internationalen System hin zu einer zunehmenden aktive Rolle in den internationalen Beziehungen – ein Wandel, der letztlich während der Abessynien-Krise zu einer Annäherung an Großbritannien führte. Der Autor argumentiert, dass dieser Wandel in der griechischen Aussenpolitik auf das Wechselspiel zwischen der Wahrnehmung eines italienischen Revisionismus, Großbritanniens erneutes Engagement im östlichen Mittelmeerraum sowie auf Dynamiken der griechischen Innenpolitik zurückzuführen ist, welche zur Niederlage von Venizelos führten, welche die Politik der Distanz maßgeblich bestimmt hatte.
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