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The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Stephane Lemaire
Stephane Lemaire*
Affiliation:
Université de Rennes 1
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Confronted with the “wrong kind of reason problem”, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 31 - 53
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful to Christine Tappolet and Cain Todd for their very helpful comments on a previous version of this paper and to Nadja Berrebi and John Angell for their editorial assistance with the manuscript.

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