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Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2016

PETER BAUMANN
PETER BAUMANN*
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College
*
*<pbauman1@swarthmore.edu>
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Abstract

The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject-sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.), but also by non-epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject-sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected but is so serious that one should look for alternative accounts of knowledge.

La possibilité de faire des attributions de connaissance en croisant les contextes épistémiques — c’est-à-dire lorsque le sujet et l’attributeur se trouvent dans des contextes différents — peut donner lieu à de sérieux problèmes pour certaines théories de la connaissance. Parmi ces théories se trouve l’invariantisme sensible au sujet, qui défend l’idée selon laquelle la connaissance est déterminée non seulement par des facteurs épistémiques (croyance, vérité, preuves, etc.), mais aussi par des facteurs non-épistémiques (intérêts pratiques, etc.). Je soutiens que l’invariantisme sensible n’a d’autre choix que d’accepter une contradiction ou de poser des hypothèses très peu plausibles. Ce problème a été négligé, mais il est si grave que l’on doit chercher de nouvelles façons de rendre compte des connaissances.

Keywords

knowledgeknowledge attributionscontextsubject-sensitive invariantismstakes
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 363 - 380
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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