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Anti-Theism and the Objective Meaningful Life Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2017

KIRK LOUGHEED
KIRK LOUGHEED*
Affiliation:
McMaster University
*
*<lougheek@mcmaster.ca>
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Abstract

Philosophers of religion have begun to explore the value question of whether God’s existence would add to, detract from, or have no impact on the value of our world. The Meaningful Life Argument is one of the most promising arguments in support of the view that God’s existence would make the world worse, at least for certain individuals. I offer an objectivized version of the Meaningful Life Argument and show why recent objections leveled against it by Myron A. Penner do not apply to this version.

Les philosophes de la religion ont récemment commencé à se demander si l’existence de Dieu ajouterait ou enlèverait de la valeur à notre monde, ou encore si elle n’aurait aucun impact sur sa valeur. De plus en plus populaire, l’argument du sens de la vie (Meaningful Life Argument) soutient que l’existence de Dieu rendrait le monde pire, du moins pour certains individus. Dans cet article, j’offre une adaptation objectivée de l’argument du sens de la vie et je démontre que les objections formulées par Myron A. Penner ne s’appliquent plus.

Keywords

axiology of theismpersonal anti-theismmeaning of lifepro-theismMyron A. Penner
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 337 - 355
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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