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BonJour’s Defense of Induction: An A Priorist Way Out?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 August 2013

KEVIN KIMBLE
KEVIN KIMBLE*
Affiliation:
National Chung-Cheng University, Taiwan
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Abstract

Laurence BonJour has proposed a novel defense of the inductive principle (IP) in response to a skeptical challenge posed by Hume. In this paper, I elaborate and criticize BonJour’s strategy. Along the way, I draw attention to Anthony Brueckner’s criticisms of BonJour’s approach, detailing why they fall short of providing an effective rebuttal of BonJour’s argument. By distinguishing and applying two different kinds of probability assessment to BonJour’s premises, I argue that BonJour’s a priori strategy fails to provide a cogent defense of IP. I conclude by drawing out some implications for a priori attempts to argue for the principle.

Laurence BonJour a proposé une façon novatrice de défendre son principe inductif (PI) en réponse à une proposition posée par Hume et pouvant être remise en question. Dans cet article, j’élabore et fais la critique de la stratégie de BonJour. Au cours de mon développement, j’attire l’attention sur les critiques formulées par Anthony Brueckner à l’égard de l’approche de BonJour, détaillant les raisons pour lesquelles elles ne parviennent pas à réfuter de manière cohérente l’argument de BonJour. En distinguant et en appliquant deux types distincts d’évaluation des probabilités aux hypothèses de BonJour, j’avance l’argument selon lequel la stratégie déductive de BonJour échoue à fournir une argumentation convaincante en faveur du PI. Je conclus en exposant les implications des tentatives visant à défendre le principe à partir d’arguments a priori.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 449 - 476
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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